UPDATE ON UAE DETENTION OF MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000607

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, SCA, AND EEB/TRA/OTP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS: EAIR PTER PGOV PREL MOPS AF IZ KUAE
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON UAE DETENTION OF MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON
RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT

REF: ABU DHABI 00583

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Following overnight indications that four U.S.
military escorts (reftel) might be prosecuted along with the Russian
crew and carrier, Ambassador met June 15 with UAE Armed Forces Chief
of Staff General Rumaithi and Minister of Interior Saif to seek their
intervention in the release the U.S. escorts and cargo. Saif was
direct in pointing to violations of the law by the Russian carrier,
Volga-Dnepr Air, and the U.S. military personnel, but later June 15
the U.S. legal team representing the Russian carrier informed us that
the captain of one of the aircraft had been fined, and that this
appeared to end the case. Pending confirmation that there is no
further legal action planned, and that the U.S. aircrew and cargo
will be allowed to depart, we need to begin addressing how to design
a better clearance request process in order to avoid similar
incidents in the future. See action request in para 14. End
Summary.


2. (C) On 15 June 2009, the senior of four U.S. soldiers
accompanying the military cargo on the two IL-76 aircraft informed
DATT that he was being questioned by the Ras al-Khaimah prosecutor
and was now being considered a suspect in the commission of a crime.
In response, Ambassador and DATT immediately met with UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff (COS),Lt Gen Hamid Thani al Rumaithy. The
Ambassador laid out the background of the case, appealed for fair
treatment of the four U.S. soldiers, and described the contractual
relationship between Volga-Dnepr Air (VDA) and TRANSCOM. The COS
re-affirmed the unique and close relationship between the UAE and the
US but stated the problem's resolution rested with the Minister of
the Interior, Sheikh Saif bin Zayed al Nahyan. He recommended the
Ambassador meet with Sheikh Saif.


3. (C) The Ambassador met with Sheikh Saif in the early afternoon,
and again reviewed the background, acknowledged that the cargo and
passengers on the flight were not consistent with our diplomatic
overflight clearance, but asked Sheikh Saif to release the couriers
who had simply been performing their duties in good faith, and
release the US cargo which was needed for the fight in Afghanistan.
The meeting was cordial and Saif was conversant with the issue. Saif
indicated that the UAE is attempting to tighten its own internal
controls to stop illicit cargo from entering the UAE, and was doing
so after repeated requests from the USG (Note: this is correct in
that we have repeatedly attempted to shut down use of UAE based
carriers carrying weapons in contravention of UNSCRS). Saif
emphasized the outstanding relations between the US and the UAE but
noted that laws had been broken and local prosecutors needed to be
allowed to do their duties. Most troublingly, Saif observed that
while the US personnel may not have been aware of what the overflight
clearance said, they should have known that entering with a weapon
was a "violation of international law." He concluded his remarks by
telling the Ambassador he would look into the matter but suggested
both countries prevent further problems of this type in the future
through enhanced cooperation. Ambassador closed the meeting with a
personal appeal to release the US Service personnel.


4. (C) Shortly after the Ambassador's meeting with Sheikh Saif,
Volga-Dnepr legal rep Glen Wicks told the DCM and DATT that the VDA
aircrew was called into the court in Fujairah. The Judge told the
crew he had made his decision and fined the Captain of the aircraft
10,000 Dirhams (approximately 2740 USD). The judge then closed the
case and released the aircrew. This is preliminary information; we
do not know if there will be further steps from the courts. We do
not have final information on the status of the U.S. military
personnel and cargo.


5. (C) Today's developments followed Mission discussions on June 14
with the Wicks legal team. Wicks told us that the main reason for
the current problems was the inaccuracy of the diplomatic clearance
obtained on VDA behalf by the Defense Attach Office (DAO). VDA,
through Mr. Wicks has secured local legal representation who agrees
the problem is with the diplomatic clearance. At the end of the day
the bottom line is the UAE believes VDA was illegally carrying
undeclared weapons into the UAE.


6. (C) The process for obtaining a diplomatic clearance requires
participants to pass and receive accurate information. The shipper
must provide the carrier an accurate list of the cargo, the carrier
must provide the DAO an accurate list plus accurate details about the
aircraft and crew as passengers. The DAO in turn provides the

ABU DHABI 00000607 002 OF 003


Ministry of Foreign Affairs the complete information package. MFA
then provides a copy to General Headquarters who makes sure the
aircraft is not intercepted and/or shot down. MFA also provides a
copy to the Ministry of the Interior, which in turn passes a copy to
the local customs and immigration offices at the landing airfields.
To complete the process MFA sends the clearance back to the DAO,
which sends the clearance to the carrier.


7. (C) There are certain items that will always need to be
highlighted in the clearance request process when carried on the
aircraft: passengers, weapons, ammunition or reconnaissance
equipment. In this case the carrier, VDA, claims they did not get an
accurate list of the cargo from the shipper (USG) and therefore
forwarded a generic cargo description to meet the needs of the DAO,
indicating they were carrying armored personnel carriers (APCs).
(Note: once the cargo was actually loaded on the VDA aircraft, VDA
would have been well aware the cargo they were carrying -- sealed
cargo containers and pallets -- was not the APCs they told the DAO
they were carrying.) The Wicks Group told us the aircrew and VDA had
no idea what they were carrying, they were only completing their
contractual obligations. The containers did in fact hold a number of
weapons of varying sizes and uses.


8. (C) VDA also failed to update the DAO with the number of crew and
passengers actually on the aircraft. In conveying the clearance
request, VDA told the DAO there would be five crew members and no
passengers on all of their aircraft. The aircraft now stuck in
Fujairah had five crew and two passengers (U.S. military personnel
serving as cargo couriers). The aircraft currently in Ras al Khaimah
landed with thirteen crew and two passengers (U.S. military personnel
serving as cargo carriers).


9. (C) Finally, the VDA crews did not follow their own company
directives. VDA requires the crew to confiscate and secure all
personal weapons. The crew completed their internal documents
stating the personal weapons were confiscated and sealed in a locked
container onboard the aircraft. In reality, the U.S. military
personnel serving as couriers were never approached by the aircrew in
regards to their personal weapons. In discussions between the VDA
Executive President and the DATT the VDA executive admitted his crews
rarely if ever follow this procedure because the US Army soldiers do
not like the policy. When the aircraft landed in Ras al Khaimah the
two US Army couriers walked off the aircraft in possession of their
personal weapons, which were in plain sight.


10. (C) The members of the Wicks Group asked the Mission today to
deliver a letter stating the cargo and soldiers are USG and the
aircraft was operating under a contract with the USG. Mission
informed the Wicks Group this letter and direction to deliver the
letter must come from the Department and suggested the L in State and
the Office of General Counsel in DOD as the best contacts.


11. (C) The DAO is seeking guidance from the DOD executive agent
for processing diplomatic clearances in the future. The DAO will
begin immediately to demand an accurate cargo, passenger and crew
manifest from VDA and all other commercial carriers. The DAO will
require any changes to be provided immediately and the DAO will
in-turn update the request. All concerned should know the approval
process for a diplomatic clearance is 3-5 business days after the
request is made. Any updates to a request re-start the 3-5 day
clock. All cargo, passenger and crew manifests must be accurate and
static from request to execution or we risk further incidents and
delays.


12. (C) Comment: There is an alternative solution, which VDA uses
in the U.S. VDA established and manned an office in the US to handle
all clearances. This office obtains clearances commercially rather
than through diplomatic channels. A similar arrangement could be
established in the UAE to obtain clearances. A commercial
relationship will allow VDA greater latitude and flexibility in the
cargo, passenger and crew areas of concern. This commercial
relationship would remove all USG official involvement in the
clearance issues. End Comment.


13. (C) The Wicks Group makes the argument that since the USG
secured the clearance for the aircraft the aircraft should be
considered a "State Aircraft" under the Chicago Conventions of the
International Civil Aviation Organization. Wicks Group feels this
status affords VDA the protection of diplomatic status. In essence
the VDA aircraft should be treated the same as a US Military
aircraft, Wicks says.

ABU DHABI 00000607 003 OF 003




14. (C) Action requested: Mission requests guidance on processing
future clearance requests for commercial aircraft contracted to the
USG. Our preference is that such aircraft request clearances
commercially. However, if addressees prefer we continue to request
through diplomatic channels, we need to be sure the process provides
100% accurate information on cargo, crew, etc. in advance of our
request for diplomatic clearances.

OLSON