(S) UAE DETAINS US MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON RUSSIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000583

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, SCA, AND EEB/TRA/OTP

E.O. 12958: 06/08/2019
TAGS: EAIR PTER PGOV PREL MOPS AF IZ KU AE
SUBJECT: (S) UAE DETAINS US MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON RUSSIAN
PLANES

CLASSIFIED BY DCM DOUG GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (U) This cable contains an action request. Please see para 16.


2. (C/NF) Summary: On June 3, the UAE authorities detained two
Russian IL-76 cargo planes operated by Volga-Dnepr Airlines (VDA),
which were carrying US military cargo and two US service members from
Kuwait to Afghanistan. According to UAE officials, the transiting
planes lacked appropriate clearance and documentation regarding their
military cargo and armed US military passengers. The investigation
continues; the lack of appropriate authorization is punishable under
UAE civil aviation law. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------


3. (C/NF) The two IL-76 Aircraft operated by Volga Dnepr Airlines
(VDA) are based out of the Sharjah Free Zone. The US military Air
Mobility Command (AMC) routinely awards the company contracts to
carry military cargo. Many of these contracts call for delivery to
Afghanistan originating in Kuwait or Iraq. On these flights the
aircraft land at either Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) for crew changes and/or
fuel or Fujairah for maintenance and servicing.


4. (C/NF) The routine request for diplomatic clearance to land in the
UAE was handled by the US Defense Attach Office (DAO) in Abu Dhabi,
who coordinates the clearances with the UAE Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA). In practice, the DAO receives the request from the
airline flying the mission and the airline provided details are
passed to MFA who in turn passes to the UAE Armed Forces (GHQ). GHQ
reviews the request and sends an approval back to MFA who transmits
the approval to the DAO. The DAO provides the following information
to MFA: number and nationality of crew, purpose of flight, if the
aircraft is carrying ammunition, weapons or military photo electronic
equipment, among other details. The number of passengers is not
required unless there are VIPs involved. However, the international
flight plan required to filed prior to any flight includes the number
of persons aboard the flight.


5. (C/NF) On May 25, the DAO received a request for diplomatic
clearance for three aircraft making daily flights from Kuwait City
International Airport to Bagram AB. The request from Volga Dnepr
Airlines listed the crew as five Russians. The purpose of the flight
was listed as transporting Armored Personnel Carriers. There was no
mention of weapons, ammunition or photography equipment. The stated
purpose of the flights was to carry Armored Personnel Carriers
between the two locations supporting OEF. The DAO confirmed that the
missions are being flown in support of the US Government and filed
the request with MFA (note #206) on 25 May 09. On 26 May 09 the DAO
received diplomatic clearance (# CON 4292) from MFA for the aircraft
to operate as requested.

CREW AND CARGO SEIZED
--------------


6. (C/NF) On June 3, the cargo and passengers were loaded onboard the
aircraft at Kuwait and departed for the UAE. The US military
provided cargo and passenger manifests to the VDA aircrews; according
to accepted international civil aviation procedures, all UAE and
international requirements for filing this information was the
responsibility of VDA. According to second hand information received
subsequently to the aircraft landing at Fujairah and RAK the aircrew
did not fulfill these requirements.


7. (C/NF) According to the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA),
the aircraft filed flight plans indicating no passengers were onboard
either aircraft. The VDA cargo manifest (provided to DAO by VDA
President Valery) indicates only "general military support
equipment." The DAO cannot confirm any cargo manifest was filed in
accordance with international procedures. Specific details on each
plane are:

PLANE A - VDA 6097 (FUJAIRAH): It is unclear the numbers provided for
the crew on this aircraft but the passenger count filed was zero, the
two US passengers were not listed and not included in the crew
numbers. It is unknown what if any cargo was listed on the flight
plan. US military documents indicate the cargo was mixed military
supplies and equipment.

PLANE B - VDA 6096 (RAK): The aircraft which landed at RAK listed
five crew members on the flight plan (filed with the GCAA),but 13

ABU DHABI 00000583 002 OF 003


Russian crew members and 2 US passengers arrived. It is unknown what
if any cargo was listed on the flight plan. US military documents
indicate the cargo was mixed military supplies and equipment.


8. (C/NF) The US military passengers onboard the aircraft which
landed at RAK deplaned the aircraft with weapons visible. According
to UAE government officials, the weapons were carried on the backs of
the soldiers and appeared to be unloaded. These are the personal
weapons of the soldiers they will carry into combat on arrival in
Afghanistan. When approached by the police the soldiers complied
immediately with request to stow the weapons on board the aircraft.
(Note: Accepted international procedure indicates the VDA crew should
be responsible for controlling the passengers and tell them when
visible weapons are appropriate. US procedures dictate no weapons
will leave the aircraft until the final destination is reached.
Prior to departing the aircraft, it was the responsibility of the
aircrew to direct the soldiers to secure and stow the weapons. End
Note.)

VDA PERPSECTIVE
--------------


9. (C/NF) On June 9, Defense Attache (DATT) Colonel Bret Rider met
with VDA Executive President Gabriel Valeri and Commercial Sales
Representative Dmitry Gridnev. (Valery flew in from Moscow and
Gridnev is resident in Sharjah, where he has lived since 2002.)
Valery reported the GCAA told him on June 9 that there were "minor"
technical problems with the aircraft that needed to be addressed.
However, Valery indicated that the real problem was the US Embassy's
failure to get diplomatic clearance for the passengers and their
weapons. Valery noted his crews' passports had been confiscated,
illegally, by the authorities and the crew members were under house
arrest in Fujairah and RAK. He told the DATT the US Army soldiers
were also being detained which was not the case. He showed the DATT
internal VDA paperwork that indicated the personal weapons had been
stowed in a locked container. When asked why this did not happen as
the paperwork indicated Valery said the soldiers did not like not
having their weapons and the crews never asked just filled in the
paperwork.


10. (C/NF) Later on June 9 the DATT received a call from Gene Redmon,
who introduced himself as a retired USAF Colonel and former Air
Attach who works with VDA as a consultant. The DATT explained that
his office was responsible for the aircraft diplomatic clearance and
the aircrew and airline had responsibility for the passengers and
cargo. Mr. Redmon later notified the DATT the aircrew had been
arrested by the UAEG and the Russian Embassy was being involved.


11. (C/NF) Separately, a lawyer reportedly working for VDA informed
State EEB/TRA/OTP that UAE officials had reported VDA was in
violation of UAE civil aviation code articles 13, 14, and 70. (Note:
All articles related to the authorization required to carry weapons
and other dangerous materials and the punishment for failing to
follow UAE regulations. End Note.) The lawyer, Mr. Glen Wicks has
an appointment with the DATT and other Embassy personnel for Sunday,
14 June.

US PERSONNEL
--------------


12. (C/NF) On the evening of 9 June, the US soldiers in RAK reported
they were questioned by police officials. The senior soldier told
DATT that the questioning was conducted in a conversational and
non-threatening manner. The police wanted to know the history of the
cargo as he knew the history. Following the questioning an Arabic
statement was produced and the soldier was asked to sign the
statement, he refused. Also on June 9, Fujairah authorities
requested and received the military ID cards of the two soldiers
there. Additionally, the USN personnel who are hosting the soldiers
report the security at the airport has visibly increased in the last
24-48 hours.

CARGO STATUS
--------------


13. (C/NF) The USG has requested landing clearance for two USAF C-17
aircraft to land at RAK and Fujairah in the next 24 to 72 hours, once
it becomes clear that UAEG will release the cargo. The intent is to
transship the cargo and passengers from the VDA aircraft to the
C-17s. The cargo is needed for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and
additional delays will affect the combat capabilities of the American

ABU DHABI 00000583 003 OF 003


forces in Afghanistan. The DAO has and will provide detailed cargo
lists of both aircraft and will assist any and all UAE investigations
(military or civilian) in this matter.

EMBASSY ACTION
--------------


14. (C/NF) In addition to DAO efforts, on June 8, the Ambassador
called Mohammed Mubarak Al Mazroui, assistant to Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince and Deputy Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed, to ask for his assistance. In a follow-up conversation,
Al Mazroui told the Ambassador on June 10 that the primary problem is
that the Embassy's diplomatic note on the flight did not reflect the
details of the flight's cargo. Al Mazroui said that the UAEG is
trying to implement strict export controls - as requested by the
U.S., and this is one reflection of that. The case is now being
examined by Ras Al Khaimah prosecutors, and the UAE military is
closely involved.

CRIMINAL CONCERNS
--------------


15. (S/NF) Echoing June 7 comments from Director of Military Security
Brigadier General Mahash al Hameli, Al Mazroui told the Ambassador
that UAEG had other concerns with Russian entities in the UAE.
(Note: There is some indication Russian government entities may have
smuggled weapons into the UAE in the past. End Note.) Post is aware
that Volga Dnepr has been a company of interest to OFAC due to
suspicion of past links to international arms trafficker Victor Bout.
At one time, a local contact reported to EmbOffs that Russian cargo
planes operating out of the UAE were suspected of possible
involvement in drug shipments from Afghanistan to non-UAE
destinations, although Volga Dneipr was not specifically identified
in this regard.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------


16. (C/NF) Post requests TRANSCOM, and others as appropriate, review
VDA contracts, particularly regarding clearance responsibilities.
OLSON