UAE ACTIVITY IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000148


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR GEORGE MITCHELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2034
TAGS: PREL EAID KPAL KWGB IS AE
SUBJECT: UAE ACTIVITY IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

REF: A) ABU DHABI 146 AND PREVIOUS, B) ABU DHABI 56, C) 08 ABU DHABI
1443, D) 06 ABU DHABI 2971


Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: As the UAEG hosted the "moderate camp" of Arab
ministers February 3, its role in moderating peace in the Middle East
came somewhat more into focus. The UAE is a determined player, and
consistent coordinator, in Arab efforts to secure stability; its
contributions to GCC and Arab League efforts across the board are
notable and often in concert with USG priorities. (Iraq-related
actions in 2008 offer a case in point, with senior level visits in
both directions, debt forgiveness, and dispatch of a UAE Ambassador
blazing a path of deepened Arab engagement with Baghdad.) The UAE
role in the Israeli-Palestinian equation has been limited, but
notable. UAEG budget support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
cumulative humanitarian aid have reached significant sums (estimated
over $4 billion). UAE participation in Annapolis and related
meetings has been consistently supportive of moderate solutions. UAE
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed's (AbZ) Christmas Eve foray into
Bethlehem with President Abbas seemed to suggest a desire to be even
more proactive -- an effort immediately smothered by turmoil in Gaza.
AbZ's coordination of Arab moderates highlights his potential role.
That said, the UAEG is risk-averse in setting policy precedents and
needs to be engaged quietly and consistently to deepen its role in
Palestine. End summary.

A maturing presence
--------------


2. (S/NF) As oil-enabled prosperity brings ever-increasing ambition
and confidence to the UAE, the 37-year-old nation of only 900,000
citizens has gained experience in punching above its weight. Hiding
behind the need for "GCC consensus" less often than before (that
excuse deflected discussion of Iraqi debt forgiveness through
mid-2008),the UAE has expended more effort to forge moderate
alliances within the GCC and Arab League on issues of particular
import. While it coordinates closely with the traditional
powerhouses of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it considers itself empowered
to press its larger brothers into action; indeed, the UAEG is of a
younger generation and relatively flexible in blazing new alliances
(Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed [MbZ] often comments
pejoratively on the age of his less agile Saudi and Egyptian
partners). The UAEG is skeptical -- even disdainful -- of more
radical approaches it sees in Syria and Qatar, although it engages
all Arabs on a brotherly basis and has developed some expertise in
"playing both sides." The UAEG is particularly animated when it
perceives Iran's influence encroaching on its regional (and in the
long term existential) equities.

Ties to all -- but wary
--------------


3. (S/NF) With the UAEG's emerging self-confidence, it has the
potential to play a larger role in forging a durable peace for
Israel-Palestine. It views the conflict as an impediment to the
UAE's own ambitions of a stable region in which to pursue its
economic goals, and is a natural proponent of an enduring solution.
The UAEG sees regional dynamics as too often playing into the hands
of Iran and it seeks a larger role in stunting that expansion. It
has ties to virtually all parties to the Israel-Palestinian dispute,
although some are less publicized than others. The UAEG clearly
supports a strong PA and consistently seeks to bolster President
Abbas, but also maintains some contact with Hamas. It has
facilitated Israeli business activity in the Gulf in a low key
manner, but with sufficient vigor to evidence its desire for
productive engagement. (The UAEG and Tel Aviv have some direct
dialogue on regional and security issues.) UAE leaders display no
innate anti-Jewish sentiment and are not of the generation that
remembers the emotions of partition; Israel is a fact for them. The
UAEG is stubbornly secular in its approach to governance.


4. (C/NF) That said, the UAEG has seen both Palestinian and Israeli
leaders come and go, with little progress or creative bargaining for
peace on either side, and maintains a healthy skepticism of the
various players. Israel is seen as prone to self-serving decisions,
deference to internal politics, and quick resort to military
solutions, while the Palestinian leadership of often seen as inept or
corrupt (or simply unable to manage an unwieldy and divided
population). For some UAE citizens, Hamas offers an active
alternative to the inertia of both sides, making any Hamas appeal for
support potentially attractive; there may be private flows of funding
in that direction and the UAEG is well aware of public sympathy
(locally and regionally) for "the resistance." While Hamas is
anathema to the leadership (representing both the Muslim Brotherhood
and Iranian influence -- a double threat),the UAEG has learned to
carefully navigate these choppy waters and can offer a realist's
perspective on possibilities for peace.

A dedicated donor
--------------


5. (C) The UAE's primary contribution to Palestinians may be its
estimated $4.2 billion in support for Palestinian causes from 1994 to
mid-2008 (this Emirates News Agency estimate generally matches our
assessment),with more funds now committed for Gaza
aid/reconstruction. From housing to hospitals, food aid to education
support, and medical equipment to budget support to help the PA meet
salary commitments, the UAE's contribution is significant. Much aid
has been channeled through official organizations such as the Red
Crescent and mirrors a UAE penchant for large projects on which it
can put its name (the $100 million "Khalifa City" and $62 million
"Zayed City" in the Palestinian territories, for example). The UAEG
has given vehicles and materiel as security assistance to PA forces,
paid 8 million dirham ($2.2M) towards the construction of a new
Palestinian Embassy in Abu Dhabi (and likely pays some of the
mission's operating expenses),and hosts an estimated 200,000
Palestinian residents -- many long-term.


6. (S/NF) These contributions have been made partially to appease a
UAE population demanding action to support ailing Palestinian
neighbors, but also with a genuine desire to assist the less
fortunate and an obvious interest in stabilizing the neighborhood.
The UAEG has nonetheless been burned more than once with a feeling
that its contributions were undermined, sometimes by Israeli military
action and sometimes by Palestinian capacity failings. (January 22
press reports of "Sheikh Zayed City damaged by Israeli airstrikes"
were a poignant reminder of donations negated; an air strike on a
convoy of UAE-donated ambulances in southern Lebanon in 2006 was
another sad commentary on undermined humanitarian gestures [ref D].)


7. (S/NF) In spite of a penchant for largesse, apparent Israeli
designations of key UAE charities as having potentially assisted
Hamas (Red Crescent and Mohammed bin Rashid charities) also inhibits
both the flow of funds and the depth of UAE engagement. Frustrations
aside, donations continue, increasingly through UN channels, and in
the aftermath of Gaza the UAEG hosted Arab moderates for a February
2-3 review of how best to support Palestinian ambitions. It seeks to
remain in the game.

Active coordinator among moderates
--------------


8. (C/NF) Often working in concert with USG priorities (whether
these are directly coordinated with us or simply match our moderate
motives),the UAEG actively seeks moderate solutions while working to
sideline immoderate voices (Qatar is a frequent target of disparaging
remarks). USG demarches on the eve of Arab League or GCC meetings
often meet with a UAEG comment that we are working towards the same
ends; it may be to our advantage to have a closer "inside track" into
UAEG thinking at the senior levels. UAE participation in Annapolis
and related meetings is consistently supportive of a moderate
approach. The UAE openly supports the 2002 Arab peace initiative and
refers generally to "fair" or "peaceful" solutions without specific
reference to clear policy positions (such as "two-state solution" or
other constructs that might limit its flexibility). The UAEG prefers
to avoid risks associated with getting out in front with potentially
controversial policies, yet thrives in a behind-the-scenes
coordination role generally supportive of U.S. aims.


9. (S) The UAEG is also motivated to pursue results to fend off
public cries of "inaction" in the face of tragedies like Gaza. (The
UAE is not necessarily in danger of being radicalized, yet the UAEG
needs the moderate track to bear sustainable fruit to keep it
actively in the game.) Given the preeminence of Palestine in the
Arab psyche, progress on that front would bear fruit in other areas
of UAE concern in the region as well.


10. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister AbZ's Christmas Eve foray into
Bethlehem with President Abbas seemed to suggest a desire to be even
more proactive -- an effort immediately smothered by turmoil in Gaza.
AbZ has a history of working with Levant and Palestinian issues, has
personal ties with key players, and is empowered to coordinate
foreign affairs for the UAE (in close consultation with his elder
brother Abu Dhabi Crown Prince MbZ). UAE coordination of the
moderate camp of Arab foreign ministers is yet another indication
that it is a core player ready for a more defined place in regional
peace making.

OLSON