(S) UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BADR AIR OVERFLIGHT DENIALS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000106 NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP ALSO FOR ISN/CATR AGANZER, MMITCHELL, AND MROLLERI E.O. 12958: DECL:01/26/2034 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MASS IR SU AE SUBJECT: (S) UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BADR AIR OVERFLIGHT DENIALS REFS: A) ABU DHABI 0089, B) STATE 5567, C) ABU DHABI 0031 Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d). ¶1. (S) Ambassador raised USG concerns about Badr Air operations in and through the UAE with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) January 25, summarizing the sequence of demarches delivered in recent weeks (reftels),including the fact that Badr appeared to be operating out of Sharjah. AbZ had clearly been briefed on the issue and stressed the need to know the credibility of the information and legal mechanisms for acting on it. ¶2. (S) AbZ said the UAEG's request for clarity on the reliability of the information had not been answered. Ambassador emphasized that the intelligence was deemed reliable, but as is the nature of intelligence (including our inability to specify exact sourcing) we must act on what is available to increase our collective understanding. AbZ also said the UAEG needs clear legal cover to take action, lest it be accused of hijacking an aircraft. Ambassador pointed out that while our request did include potentially having the aircraft land for inspection, overflight denial, at a minimum, would also be a helpful measure. AbZ took the point without responding. ¶3. (S/NF) This meeting was an opportunity to address the Badr Air issue in unambiguous terms at the political level, citing the risks to the UAEG of letting Badr Air's potentially destabilizing activity continue. UAE Security and military officials have consistently reminded us in earlier discussions of these demarches that they look to political decision-makers to define their options. OLSON