SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO'S VISIT TO THE UNITED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001015

FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO FROM AMBASSADOR OLSON

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2018
TAGS: PREL AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO'S VISIT TO THE UNITED
ARAB EMIRATES

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Madam Secretary: We look forward to your November 7-8 visit
to Abu Dhabi.


2. (SBU) In the past five years, the United Arab Emirates has
emerged as one of the economic powerhouses of the region (our largest
export market in the Middle East) and attained a commensurate level
of political influence. The UAE has troops in Afghanistan, is an
important political player in Pakistan, and its support is sought by
leaders throughout the Middle East, and further afield. Although a
tiny country, geographically and demographically, the UAE punches
well above its weight class in international circles.


3. (C) Our bilateral relationship has grown from a military to
military core (dating back to the 1991 Gulf war) to one in which the
full range of USG Agencies interact with UAE counterparts on
counter-terrorism, economics, law enforcement, even notionally
domestic issues like Education. The leadership of the UAE knows that
it counts on US military power for its security and on US prosperity
for its own economic well-being. Our popularity with the general
public waxes and wanes (President Obama remains incredibly popular;
not so for all of our policies). Consequently, the UAEG embraces us
privately, while publicly maintaining a more neutral line. Few are
fooled.

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Iran
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4. (S/NF) The UAE leadership sees Iran as its primary external
threat, and one that is existensial in nature. Like the rest of the
international community, the UAE finds the idea of an Iran with
nuclear weapons unacceptable and thinks this eventuality would lead
to nuclear arms race in the Middle East. At least as worrying to
Emiratis is Iran's aspirations for regional hegemony, which it
realizes through terrorist proxies (Hizballah, HAMAS, possibly
underground organizations in the Arab Gulf countries). Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) is skeptical that Iran can be convinced to
end its nuclear weapons program, and is not convinced that the
international community will adopt tough sanctions. In other words,
he sees the logic of war dominating the region, and this thinking
explains his near obsessive efforts to build up his armed forces and
the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA).

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Three Brothers and One Cousin, all Shaykhs
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5. (C) There is no single UAE counterpart to DHS, so we have
requested appointments with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ),Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Saif bin Zayed,
National Security Advisor Hazza bin Zayed, and Director of the
Critical National Infrastructure Authority Ahmed bin Tahnoun.


6. (C) Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, or MbZ in USG speak, is
the man who runs the United Arab Emirates. Officially he is the
Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the most important
principality of the seven emirate confederation) and his only federal
title is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; in fact he is
the key decision maker on national security issues. He will make
deferential noises about his "boss" (elder half-brother President
Khalifa, a distant and uncharismatic personage),but we assess that
he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil
policy and major state expenditures.


7. (C) Aged 47, MbZ is a leader not just in the UAE, but more
broadly in the Middle East, where he is seen as a particularly
dynamic member of the generation succeeding the geriatric cases who
have dominated the region for decades. He is a reformer, actively
seeking to improve the life of his citizens and the UAE's future
through better education and health care, and through economic
diversification, including investments in clean energy to prepare his
citizenry for a post-hydrocarbon future. He is proud of the fact
that despite having had the option of life of privilege, he rose
through the ranks of the UAE Armed Forces, earning his wings as a
helicopter pilot and retains a common touch that appeals to Emiratis.


8. (C) Shaykh Saif is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior. Age 41, he has been with the Ministry of Interior for his
entire career, and was recently elevated to become Deputy Prime
Minister. He is the eldest of the second largest group of Zayed's
sons (the children of Shaykha Moza),many of whom are just coming
into maturity. This emerging power base within the family may
explain the recent bureaucratic ascendance of the MOI.


9. (C) Shaykh Hazza is National Security Advisor, which is not
analogous to the eponymous US position. Rather, he is the head of

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the State Security Department (i.e., the CIA/FBI equivalent). SSD
enjoys a close working relationship with the USG, and is one of our
closest partners in the Middle East. Shaykh Hazza is not a detail
person, and will be more interested in big picture. Hazza is a
younger full brother of MbZ, one of the powerful Bani Fatima (the six
sons of Shaykha Fatima).


10. (C) Shaykh Ahmed bin Tahnoun is a cousin of MbZ's, the son of
the most senior Shaykh in the Nahyan family. He was trained as an
Apache helicopter pilot, and has a very military bearing (direct
gaze, erect posture, few words). As head of the Critical National
Infrastructure Authority he is an empowered individual with adequate
resources to fill a critical mission for the UAE.

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The Agenda
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11. (S/NF) You will be among the first Obama Administration Cabinet
Officials to visit the UAE. Accordingly, it will be important to
hear out UAE concerns in the following areas:

--Iran: MbZ will lay out his concerns about Iran, and argue for the
importance of protecting his population and critical infrastructure.
In practical terms, this means building up CNIA, which has ambitious
ideas about cooperation with the US Coast Guard (40 percent of UAE
oil facilities are offshore, and they are the most vulnerable to
Iranian attack). You can expect MbZ and Shaykh Ahmed to push hard
for a Coast Guard presence in the UAE.

--Other CNIA Issues: Shaykh Ahmed may ask about the status of his
proposals (made to U/S Beers during his July trip) for stationing TSA
personnel in the UAE and pre-clearing UAE aircraft flying to the US.
They may also brief you on plans for protecting the UAE's eventual
nuclear power generating facilities (we have just concluded a civil
nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE).

--API/PNR: We have had a series of successful engagements with SSD
on establishing a program of sharing passenger information, and you
should thank Shaykh Hazza for the cooperation to date.

--Immigration Academy: Shaykh Saif has been pushing for US
participation in an Immigration Training Academy that he is
establishing. We are currently reviewing late UAE changes to a draft
MOU.

--Cash Courier Training: After repeated urging from the USG, here
and in Washington, the UAE has established a Joint Task force with us
to deal with the threat of Taliban using cash couriers to support
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first meeting of the
task force took place on 7 September and the UAEG is currently
considering a training agenda. You should thank Shaykh Hazza for
this initiative.


12. (U) Again, Madam Secretary, we look forward to your visit to the
UAE.


OLSON