COTE D'IVOIRE: GBAGBO SAYS HE AND SORO ON THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000281 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: GBAGBO SAYS HE AND SORO ON THE SAME PAGE REF: A) ABIDJAN 246 B) ABIDJAN 244 C) ABIDJAN 091 Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L. Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Gbagbo was upbeat about the likelihood of elections in 2009 when I met with him on April ¶27. He said his key concern is no longer the identification process but achieving reunification of the country and the disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN). Gbagbo asserted that he and Prime Minister Soro see eye to eye on what needs to be done to achieve that goal and described the process exactly as Prime Minister related it to me (see ref A) in an April 15 meeting. President Gbagbo was confident that pro-Soro elements of the FAFN would join forces with the government if necessary to subdue FAFN elements that refuse to relinquish control, a strong indication that a renewed clash may be more likely than not before this crisis comes to an end. End Summary ¶2. (C) For the first time, President Gbagbo met with me with no aides present. Mrs. Sarata Ottro, who died in late April, or Ambassador Alcide Djedje (who was in New York for the UNSC discussion of Cote d'Ivoire) had always joined us in the past. It is perhaps a sign that Gbagbo has no other aides whom he trusts to handle OPA (Ouagadougou Political Agreement) issues with us, as Ambassador Koffi (Cote d'Ivoire's Ambassador to Washington) was also in town. IDENTIFICATION PROCESS CANNOT MARGINALIZE THE WEST -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Acknowledging the statement issued by the USG on March 30, President Gbagbo said he agreed that elections should take place this year and was optimistic about the prospects of that happening. He saw the biggest hurdle to completing the identification process as opening 205 registration centers that are not yet operational; he claimed 180 of them are in the west. Noting that he himself hails from the west, Gbagbo said he would be accused, justifiably, of marginalizing an entire region were he to agree to end the identification process now. I asked if there was a particular reason why so many centers in the west had not been opened. Gbagbo said he wasn't sure but thought it was due to the poor infrastructure. (Note: the west has always been the most volatile region of the country; security concerns were probably an equally important factor.) He observed that many people in the region had not been able to obtain their birth certificates and implied that the CEI (Independent Electoral Commission) understood the need to give people enough time. The president estimated that registration would be completed by the end of June and said he did not anticipate vetting of the preliminary electoral list to take more than a month (a much more optimistic timeframe than we have heard from others). Based on these calculations, he said it was possible to hold elections in October of this year. DISARMAMENT AND REUNIFICATION = THE LAST HURDLE -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Gbagbo said that he was much more concerned about reunifying the country and achieving "disarmament" before the election. He told me pointedly that he and Prime Minister Soro are in agreement on what needs to be done and went on to describe the remaining steps: 1) mixed brigades comprised of 4,000 FAFN and 4,000 FDS (Defense and Security Forces) units are established and deployed throughout the country; 2) the comzones turn over full administrative authority to the prefects; and 3) the comzones and any remaining FAFN troops regroup in barracks in four cities (Bouake, Korhogo, Seguela and Man) and surrender control of their weapons to the impartial forces. Employing a bit of theatre, President Gbagbo insisted on calling Prime Minister Soro during the meeting to ask him for a status report on the mixed brigades. Soro reported that Generals Mangou and Bakayoko (the Chiefs of Staff of the FDS and FAFN, respectively) were still drawing up their plans and were to submit a report to the PM's office by April 28. In discussing the role of the mixed brigades, Gbagbo gave the impression that all 8,000 had been identified, however, we know from other sources that the FAFN has had difficulty producing 4,000 qualified police and gendarmes. Echoing the Prime Minister's words from our earlier meeting, President Gbagbo said that once the FAFN relinquished control and the prefects were back in charge, the security conditions necessary for an election would have been met. 5.(C) Given ongoing media reports and our own information about divisions within the Forces Nouvelles, I raised with President Gbagbo the possibility that some comzones would not willingly hand over authority to the prefects. Gbagbo agreed that it could be a problem, citing the riches that the ABIDJAN 00000281 002 OF 002 comzones have amassed and readily acknowledged that force might be needed to compel compliance by all of the comzones. He hoped, however, that the presence of a substantial force committed to "implementing Ouaga IV" would be persuasive. We think that the police, the gendarmes and "the FAFN who are with us", he said, will be enough to deter or defeat resistance. Gbagbo cited Wattao (Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAFN and acting comzone of Seguela) as one of the FAFN leaders Soro could count on and referred to Cherif Ousmane (the comzone of Bouake) as leading the anti-Soro faction. Gbagbo asserted confidently that the civilian leadership of the FAFN,i.e. Guillaume Soro, is ready to end the war, and so is the FAFN's original backer, President Blaise Compaore. Gbagbo even went so far as to say that any weapons the FAFN may still be getting from Burkina Faso were not coming with Compaore's blessing. 6.(C) Comment: President Ggabgo was unshaven and looked tired in the meeting. His face appeared puffier than usual although he was perfectly alert. The Embassy has had indications for several months that the FAFN was splintering and that the pro-Soro faction had moved closer to President Gbagbo. So the biggest surprise was not what Gbagbo said but the fact that he said it openly and in a very matter of fact way. Far more striking was the absence of any of the standard FPI rhetoric. Gbagbo made no reference to the comzones disappearing, or to the FAFN totally disarming before the election -- a logical position if he is counting on elements of the FAFN to join forces with him. Whether this was a conscious effort on his part to demonstrate his commitment to Ouaga IV or the sign of a genuine gulf between him and hardliners in the FPI is impossible to say. However, I did not sense the same degree of animosity towards the FAFN that Gbagbo clearly exhibited a year ago. Nonetheless, the potential for violent clashes is very real and should not be underestimated. Gbagbo and Soro appear to be ready to join forces to defeat those in the FAFN who do not share their agenda and willing to do so by force if necessary. ¶7. (C) Comment Cont'd: With regard to the identification process, the president's comments seemed disingenuous. While it is true that the west is the most unsettled region of the country, it seems too much of a coincidence that virtually all of the remaining areas in which voters need to be registered are areas the FPI views as leaning in their favor. This could reflect plans to pad voter rolls in west, if need be, based on the results from other regions. Gbagbo's calculation that vetting of the electoral list can be accomplished in one month is also quite optimistic. Despite indications that the government will soon announce an election date in October, we remain skeptical that an election will take place unless and until the presidential camp is confident of winning it. End Comment Note: the west has always been the most volatile region of the country and security conditions are just as likely to have been the impediment. It is also natural that the president would want to have as many people as possible enrolled from his native region.) NESBITT