PRIME MINISTER PROMISES PROGRESS ON ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000246 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR EAID IV SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PROMISES PROGRESS ON ELECTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Wanda L.Nesbitt for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 15 meeting, Prime Minister Soro told Ambassador that he has sent a draft decree containing a proposed election date to President Gbagbo for approval. With the recent USG statement on HIPC and elections clearly in mind, he sought to reassure Ambassador that the Primature is doing its best to push the electoral process forward. Soro also said that a March 15 meeting he attended along with Presidents Compaore and Gbagbo resolved "ambuiguities" regarding the Ouaga IV agreement. According to Soro, the three leaders agreed on next steps: 1) Mixed brigades (i.e.joint FAFN/FDS units) are established and deployed throughout the country; 2) The comzones turn over full administrative authority to the prefects; 3) The comzones and FAFN troops destined for the new army regroup into barracks in four cities and surrender their weapons, allowing elections to take place. The Prime Minister was cautiously optimistic that he and President Gbagbo would be able to make the Ouaga IV accord work and saw sharp differences between the positions the president has taken in negotiations and the public pronouncements of his political party, the FPI. End Summary Elections This Year? Maybe -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador had hoped to see PM Soro soon after the late March World Bank/IMF Board meeting that approved Cote d'Ivoire for debt relief under the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, but his travel schedule made it impossible. In the interim, the Department issued a statement congratulating Cote d'Ivoire on reaching the HIPC decision point but reiterating that elections can and should be held this year. When Ambassador called on PM Soro on April 15, it was evident from his demeanor that our statement was on his mind. Soro volunteered that he had been working with the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) to address the conditions they said were necessary for an election in 2009 and that he was confident those conditions would be met. He told Ambassador that he had sent to President Gbagbo the day before a draft decree containing a proposed election date. (He did not say so, but we know the CEI has proposed October.) Soro was careful to say that President Gbagbo is not obligated to accept the decree. The President could sign it or call a cabinet meeting to discuss it. Gbagbo also has the option of having the Facilitator convene a CPC (Permanent Consultative Framework) to present the proposal to the main political party leaders before deciding whether to approve it. Soro stopped short of promising that elections would take place this year but was clearly signalling that he, at least, is trying to move things in the right direction. Will Ouaga IV Succeed? Maybe -------------- ¶3. (C) The FPI party has been extremely vocal recently in accusing the Forces Nouvelles, specifically the comzones, of being the obstacle to implementation of Ouaga IV (the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement) by refusing to disarm immediately and return to civilian life. First Lady Simone Gbagbo and Interior Minister Tagro have told the media more than once, for instance, that the comzones must "disappear" before elections can be held. In an April 9 meeting, Amb. Alcide Djedje, a close advisor to the president, told Ambassador that Gbagbo had offered the comzones postings abroad as Defense Attaches. (The offer is evidently under consideration.) Djedje said the comzones could stay in Cote d'Ivoire if they chose, but could not continue to play an indepdendent leadership role. Amb. Boureima Badini, the Facilitator's representative, reconfirmed to Ambassador the same day, however, that Ouaga IV requires the comzones to cede all administrative authority to the prefects but does not require them to abandon their troops. Badini reiterated his (and the Facilitator's) expectation that the comzones will return to their barracks along with the 5,000 FAFN elements destined for the new army and will remain there until after elections. The comzones, he said, will essentially become "trainers" and will prepare FAFN troops for service in the new army. 4.(C) With this perspective in mind, Ambassador asked PM Soro for his assessment of the Ouaga IV agreement, given what appear to be ongoing disconnects between the Forces Nouvelles and the presidential camp over what the agreement requires. Soro agreed that there were "ambiguities" in the text of Ouaga IV, but said these had been resolved in a March 15 meeting that he attended along with Presidents Gbagbo and Compaore. Soro said the Facilitator had been very clear about what the next steps were to be: First, the government and the Forces Nouvelles each had to identify 4,000 police and gendarmes and put them at the disposition of the ICC ABIDJAN 00000246 002 OF 002 (Integrated Command Center). The ICC is to form an agreed upon number of mixed brigades to be deployed throughout the country, not just in the north. According to Soro, Generals Mangou and Bakayoko (the Chiefs of Staff of the FDS and FAFN, respectively) were working on a deployment plan that he expected to be completed and presented to him by the end of this week (April 17). Once the mixed brigades are deployed, the PM said the comzones will hand over all administrative functions and authority to the Prefects, and regroup (along with those soldiers who are not being demobilized) into four barracks located in Man, Seguela, Korhogo, and Bouake. Their weapons will be stored and controlled jointly by the FAFN and the impartial forces (i.e. UNOCI and Licorne). Soro said that once the prefects are back in charge and have an enforcement capability at their disposal, the security conditions for an election will have been met. ¶5. (C) The Prime Minister stressed that the mixed brigades will be comprised of police and gendarmes only; FANCI soldiers will not be included. His message was clear: the Forces Nouvelles is not relinquishing military control of the north just yet. Soro also pointed out that Ouaga IV does not stipulate that the comzones must "disappear". Ambassador sought to confirm that President Gbagbo shares this understanding of Ouaga IV and asked Soro if he thought the president would follow through on implementing Ouaga IV as outlined. Soro said he was certain that Gbagbo has the same understanding because they were together when President Compaore laid out the next steps. As to implementation, the Prime Minister didn't say yes, but didn't say no. He talked instead, about how well he knows the president. An Old Alliance Still Holds -------------- ¶6. (C) Soro told Ambassador that observers should distinguish between Gbagbo and the FPI. Reviving a phrase he has used on other occasions, Soro emphasized that it was Gbagbo who signed the Ouagadougou agreements, not the FPI. Soro said he has told his own entourage never to criticize or insult the president, and boasted that he knows Gbagbo better than many in the FPI. Soro reminded Ambassador that he was the first leader from the north to join Gbagbo in the fight to allow multiple political parties to exist in Cote d'Ivoire, and had gone to jail with Gbagbo four times during the years the PDCI was in power. The Prime Minister thought that the anti-Forces Nouvelles articles and comments in the media were the work of FPI hardlines who disagree with the concessions the president has made. Ambassador noted that the media statements do, however, have an impact on public opinion and opined that the FPI had made a good case to the public about the need for the comzones to "disappear". Soro smiled at the suggestion and said that while it was true that some within the FPI would like the comzones to truly disappear, he doubted that the people who would actually have to carry out that task had the "guts" to do it. ¶7. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister expressed more sympathy for President Gbagbo in this meeting than in prior meetings, perhaps because they now share the challenge of keeping their respective camps in line. We will have to see whether this bodes well for the Ouagadougou peace process, but the change was quite striking. Soro also appeared much more comfortable in his role as Prime Minister and was clearly better prepared on substance than in the past. His insistence that President Gbagbo has agreed to the Forces Nouvelles retaining military control of the north until after the election is quite interesting and would certainly explain the FPI's recent media attacks on the comzones (venting in public may be their only option and there is always the possibility that a couple of the comzones might step aside, putting pressure on others to do the same.) However, Gbagbo has a history of signing/saying one thing and doing another, so we remain skeptical regarding his commtiment to implement what he has signed. The next few weeks will undoubtedly show whether the Ouaga IV is proceeding as planned or not. NESBITT