SCENESETTER FOR THE COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000721 SIPDIS CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA, EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSES STUTTGART GE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: HR KPAO MARR MOPS NATO PGOV PREL DEFENSEREFORM SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND MEETING WITH CROATIAN CHOD AND VISIT TO CROATIA Classified By: COL Brendan McAloon, DATT, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Sir, you will meet General Lucic (LOOT-Zitch) at your headquarters the week prior to your visit to Croatia. As of this writing, the itinerary for your time in Croatia has not been finalized. I expect, however, that your meetings in Zagreb will mirror the meetings SACEUR had while he was here this week depending on the availability of the Croatian hosts. ¶2. (C) In addition to the aforementioned visit of SACEUR, DEPSECDEF, COMNAVEUR, and DCOM, USEUCOM have all visited Croatia recently. These visits so close to the time when the Senate ratified the amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty to allow Croatia,s accession, along with the visit of President Bush in April, serve as a good reminder that the U.S. is indeed Croatia,s Strategic Partner. For its part, Croatia has continued its MAP process with an eye to full membership soon and increased its ISAF contribution from 200 to a maximum of 300 soldiers on the ground. There are 277 Croatian soldiers in Afghanistan now. ¶3. (C) Atmospherics. The NATO invitation completed the first part of Croatia,s goal to be accepted as an advanced European state. The second more distant step is an invitation to join the European Union. The Prime Minister has been a reliable supporter of U.S. positions, for example in the UNSC, while a sense of nostalgia for the good ol, non-aligned state days sometimes leads President Mesic to take what he sees as a more nuanced view of issues and seek dialogue with states like Russia and Iran. Prime Minister Sanader is a skillful politician who likes to keep his own counsel and thus rarely appoints strong ministers, and Defense Minister Vukelic is no exception to that rule. Of late, the situation in Bosnia has been the key topic both the PM and President discussed with senior U.S. visitors. Your host, General Lucic was unexpectedly reappointed for an unprecedented second five-year term as CHOD in January of this year. Lucic is President Mesic,s most trusted military advisor. Although he participated in three months of language training in the United States, his ability to speak English remains rudimentary. ¶4. (SBU) Defense Reform: Since 2001 Croatia has undertaken an intensive program of defense reform that continues until today. At that time Croatia had a conscription system that produced 47,500 service-members on active duty and 183,000 mandatory reserves and a force structure that included 6 corps, 63 brigades, a fleet of ships and four airbases. Today the volunteer system produces 20,500 service-members and 6000 contract reserves that support a force structure of no corps headquarters, 2 brigades, a naval flotilla that includes Coast Guard vessels, and two airbases. The Croatians know that there is still work to do, but they are justifiably proud of their accomplishments so far. ¶5. (SBU) OMLTs: Croatia has the only non-NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in ISAF, for which it bears all the costs except the U.S.-provided stratlift. A team from the Minnesota National Guard was here recently to plan the deployment of a combined combat-support OMLT next year. Croatia is working up the Request for Forces through SHAPE to begin the process of mobilizing the Minnesota National Guard troops for deployment. There are plans for a third, garrison-level OMLT to deploy to Afghanistan in 2009. Croatia continues to express a desire to deploy a PRT in the future, but we assess that the current focus on OMLTs is the best use of its capabilities in the near to mid term. ¶6. (C) KFOR: The Croatian Parliament has authorized the deployment of two helicopters to Kosovo in 2009. This will be the first deployment outside of Croatia for the Air Force. We expect that there will be a need to upgrade the new helicopters to NATO standards prior to deployment and that Croatia will ask us for that assistance. ¶7. (C) Peacekeeping: Croatia prides itself on its transition from a security consumer with UN Peacekeepers on its territory to a security provider. With the addition of the KFOR mission, Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) elements will be involved in 15 Coalition, UN, and EU peacekeeping operations around the globe, to include the 3 Croatian participants in the UN Mission to Georgia. Croatia deployed 15 soldiers to the EU-led mission in Chad this month. With these deployments Croatia is in the process of implementing its plans to increase and sustain its PKO contributions from around 250 soldiers in 2007 to 600 soldiers by 2010. ¶8. (C) ASPA: The U.S. FMF and IMET programs were suspended in July 2003 due to American Serviceman Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions. As a result, in the past few years the CAF depended entirely upon national resources to accomplish its NATO partnership goals and to equip its forces for ISAF. Croatia is the only ISAF partner and new NATO invitee that accomplished its transformation and financed its ISAF commitments without FMF or Coalition Support Funding. The suspension of IMET during this time has had a telling impact throughout the CAF. Most notable is the lack of U.S.-educated staff officers at the senior and mid-grade officer level to fill critical billets on the MOD, CAF, and NATO Staffs. Croatia has been identified to receive one million dollars of Global Peace Operations Initiative funds, the bulk of which will be dedicated to improve the English language capability of the CAF. ¶9. (SBU) FMF/IMET levels. Croatia did not receive any FMF in FY08, and is projected to receive only 1.8 million dollars in FMF in 2009. IMET is similarly under-funded for a NATO invitee with only 309K in FY08 (including the 9K in end-of-year fallout) and is projected to receive 500K in FY09. The proposed budget numbers trend better in FY10. ¶10. (C) Procurement Priorities. U.S. FMF funding will be directed at obtaining the necessary NATO-compatible radio equipment, night vision equipment, weapon sights, combat medical equipment, and GPS required to sustain Croatia,s forces in ISAF. Croatia currently has no Type 1 radios or Selective Availability Anti-Spoof Module (SAASM) global positioning systems in its inventory. We may also need to direct FMF funds to the upgrades needed to deploy Croatian helicopters to KFOR. ¶11. (C) F-16s. The MoD,s Long Term Development Plan calls for Croatia to replace its 12 soon-to-be post-lifecycle MiG-21 aircraft with a similar number of advanced fighters for domestic air policing. Croatia sent requests for information for Mirage, MiG-29, Eurofighter, Gripen, and F-16 (Block 15 used, Block 15 mid-life upgrade, and Block 50/52 new). Croatia now has all the answers it requested and is conducting further internal studies. Sticker shock and an inefficient procurement process means that we may not see a decision until next year or later. ¶12. (C) Coastal Radars. The Croatian Navy has had ongoing problems with its Enhanced Peregrine coastal surveillance radar system. The Peregrine radar system purchase, from a private American manufacturer without US government involvement, began in 1999. To date the Peregrine radar system has not achieved full operational capability. The Croatian government and military have invested approximately 80 million US dollars and huge political capital trying to make the system work. In June 2008, on order of COMNAVEUR, a team of US Navy radar experts visited Croatia to inspect the system and offer advice, but not to perform hands on maintenance. This subject was covered in depth during DEPSECDEF,s visit and he promised to look into the matter, thus I don,t expect it to be raised during your visit. Bradtke