NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000286 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE USNATO FOR UNDERWOOD, COCKRELL, BAEZ NSC FOR BRADLEY AND BRAUN OSD FOR NATO POLICY - DAS FATA JCS FOR SHIELDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF HR DEFENSE REFORM SUBJECT: NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING CONTINGENT REF: STATE 19516 Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Croatia has steadily expanded its contribution to ISAF and has assumed increasingly complex missions. Croatian forces are currently in their 11th rotation with 203 soldiers. The MoD plans to increase this to 280 troops this summer and has Parliamentary approval to raise this to 300 by the end of the year. The additional Croatian troops scheduled to deploy in the August 2008 rotation have already been committed to support the German contingent in RC North, while the MoD is holding the remaining 20 slots to staff emerging needs such as a D-30 artillery refurbishment initiative or a possible joint Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) with the Minnesota National Guard. The GoC continues to actively explore the possibility of taking over a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2009, but lack of experience on the civilian side of PRT operations may make Croatia better positioned to provide additional OMLTs in the near term. Based upon our conversations with senior Croatian civilian and military officials, Post believes that pursuing these deployment plans (D-30 project or joint OMLT, plus possible PRT lead) will produce better results than Reftel-proposed contributions of two OMLTs with ANA infantry battalions, and support for a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi. END SUMMARY. DISPERSED DEPLOYMENT, CRITICAL MISSIONS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Croatia's current ISAF contingent is spread among three regional commands and includes troops under the command of four different allies. - Kabul (RC Kabul): This 62-member contingent includes a military police platoon, command/staff/support elements, a 3-man national intelligence cell, embedded staff officers in the Kabul Multinational Brigade and HQ ISAF, and a 4-member medical team assigned to the Adriatic Charter medical unit under Czech command at the Kabul airport. - Mazar-e-Sharif (OMLTs): A 27-member Croatian OMLT is responsible for training and supporting the 3rd Kandak of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Croatia was the first non-NATO 
member to accept the OMLT mission and allies have praised their performance. Croatia,s OMLT is completely self-funded except for the U.S.-provided strategic lift. During late 2006, this team temporarily deployed with the 3rd Kandak to Kandahar to support operations in Regional Command South. Croatia also maintains a two-man OMLT element in the 209 ANA Corps Headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif. - Mazar-e-Sharif (RC North): This 79-member contingent includes an infantry platoon task force, staff, and military police under German command as well as a support element and intelligence team that remain under national command and control. - Chaghcharan (PRT): This 28-member contingent embedded in the Lithuanian-led PRT in RC West includes two 7-man Military Liaison and Observation Teams (MLOT),guard personnel, a CIMIC staff officer, a PSYOPS officer and a support element. - Pol-e-Khomri (PRT): A five-member team of staff officers and military police team support the Hungarian-led PRT in RC North. - Feyzabad (PRT - civilians) Three civilian diplomats and police are assigned to this German-led PRT. NEW TROOPS IN '08: GERMAN COMMITMENT, OTHER POSSIBILITIES -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Croatian contingents' August rotation will include 77 additional troops pledged to support the Germans around Mazar-e-Sharif. Exact missions and structure of the expanded contingent will be coordinated with German forces in April, according to the Croatian MoD, but a likely mission appears to be airfield security. ZAGREB 00000286 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) Croatian troops operate in Afghanistan without explicit caveats, but politicians including PM Sanader have made press statements that the contingent will remain in the north. However, MOD and General Staff are convinced that Croatian forces must move into the south for Croatia to demonstrate its commitment to being an active and engaged ally. Croatia's senior military representative to NATO has spoken with President Mesic about immediately sending staff officers to the Canadians to demonstrate solidarity with an ally under pressure and as a prelude to a more robust deployment south. ¶5. (SBU) In order to be able to respond to such contingencies and address other emerging needs, the MoD is intentionally holding back on staffing the 20 slots remaining from the 300 approved by Parliament for 2008. One possibility is a US-led project to refurbish Afghanistan's Soviet-era D-30 artillery pieces and refit them to NATO standards. Having converted its own inventory of D-30s, the Croatian military has experts capable of assisting in this effort and may well be called upon to deploy them to convert the sights of the D-30s. A second possibility is a USEUCOM initiative to leverage the National Guard State Partnership Program and form a multinational OMLT involving Croatia and the Minnesota National Guard. PRT IN CROATIA'S FUTURE? -------------- ¶6. (C) We are not aware that the GoC has had any discussions about possibly supporting a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi, and it is unlikely the Croatians see such a move as practicable. The GoC continues, however, to actively explore the possibility of taking over a PRT of its own, most likely in ¶2009. In preliminary discussions about the location of a PRT, the Croatians have focused on areas where they would be able to provide logistical support themselves. Post is supporting these efforts by sponsoring MoD and MFA participation in Marshall Center training on Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTAR) and will bring this course to Zagreb in June to ensure meaningful discussions of what is required for PRT success. COORDINATION NEEDED TO FOCUS THE CROATIAN CONTRIBUTION -------------- ¶7. (C) COMMENT: As the GoC continues to consider ways in which it can increase the effectiveness and size of its ISAF contributions, one challenge it faces is the lack of a consistent message from NATO allies on what would be most helpful. Reftel indicates that USG priorities are for OMLTs and PRTs, and that has been Post's consistent message to the GoC. Yet we see no sign that the Germans have echoed that focus on OMLTs in their discussions on what specific elements should be included in Croatia's 100-man increase in 2008. And GoC State Secretary Raboteg has told the Ambassador that Canada's Defense Minister, at the recent Defense Ministerial in Riga, also made a plea for Croatia to provide unspecified contributions to the Canadian contingent. ¶8. (C) Given these competing demands, Post believes the most appropriate course of action is to work with the Croatians to realize the efforts already under consideration and to help clarify priorities for those increases. The Croatian military is already strained to provide the necessary language-qualified personnel for ISAF missions, whether for OMLTs or PRTs. Regarding OMLTs, assigning the qualified senior NCOs and officers required for OMLTs may not add up to many bodies in theater in Afghanistan, but effectively degrades the capability of the entire unit or units from which they are drawn. Therefore, we doubt the Croatians can identify personnel for more than one additional joint OMLT with the Minnesota NG. Regarding a PRT, Croatia seems well-equipped to operate the military/security side of a PRT, but the GoC has no experience in managing international development projects. The MFA is well aware of this shortcoming and has been hesitant to commit to more than it can deliver. After the June training referred to in para 6 above, the GoC should be better able to determine its capacity to lead a PRT. In the near-term, however, Croatia may be a better candidate for increased OMLT support rather than PRT leadership. Over the course of 2008 and into 2009, ZAGREB 00000286 003 OF 003 delivering on a joint OMLT, a team to convert D-30 artillery, and possibly leading a PRT already represents an ambitious challenge for the Croatians. ISAF needs to indicate priorities even among these tasks, and then make sure that all Allies, particularly Germany, also reflect them with the Croatians. END COMMENT. Bradtke