Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ZAGREB203
2008-03-05 09:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

WHO'S RUNNING SERBIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV 
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VZCZCXYZ6360
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVB #0203/01 0650905
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050905Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8685
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFNSAA/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
UNCLAS ZAGREB 000203 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

ZAGREB SENDING FOR BELGRADE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV
SUBJECT: WHO'S RUNNING SERBIA

REF: ZAGREB 184

Summary
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UNCLAS ZAGREB 000203 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS ZAGREB SENDING FOR BELGRADE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV SUBJECT: WHO'S RUNNING SERBIA REF: ZAGREB 184 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) By keeping Serbians fixated on Kosovo, Prime Minister Kostunica has retained control of Serbian politics despite President Tadic's reelection last month. Kostunica's hard-line nationalist response to Kosovo is obstructing Serbia's path to EU integration by paralyzing the government and exposing deep political rifts. Some leaders of pro-EU parties, however, have finally begun to challenge Kostunica by trying to shift the focus back to Serbia's European path. End Summary. Kostunica Emboldened -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Kosovo has been and remains a deeply emotional issue among Serbs, as both polling and anecdotal evidence suggest. However, the February 21 protest in Belgrade -- a serious GOS undertaking in every aspect including arranging free nationwide transportation and a school holiday -- has been the only sizable public rally against Kosovo independence in Serbia since February 17. Kostunica's manufactured massive protest and the ensuing government-sanctioned attacks on embassies on February 21 in Belgrade was the latest evidence that PM Kostunica has effectively neutralized his rivals by keeping Kosovo the preeminent national issue. With President Boris Tadic and all other Democratic Party (DS) officials keeping their distance (Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic were in Romania), Kostunica shared the stage with only his coalition partner Velimir Ilic of New Serbia (NS) and the opposition Radicals (SRS). After the rally, rather than repudiating the deadly violence committed by Serbs both in Serbia and northern Kosovo, Kostunica and hard-line nationalist allies blamed the "legal violence" committed to Serbia through Kosovo's independence as a catalyst for the havoc (reftel). ¶3. (SBU) In addition to the rally's success, the slower than expected pace of countries recognizing Kosovo, as perceived by the GOS, has further emboldened Kostunica and other hard-line nationalist leaders. Contacts at the UN Office in Belgrade, who met with Kostunica on February 28, told poloff that Kostunica appeared upbeat and expressed optimism that the number of Kosovo recognitions would "not reach critical mass." Foreign Minister Jeremic, who has generally been in lockstep with Kostunica on his diplomatic offensives against Kosovo, echoed this during a gathering of regional leade
rs in Bulgaria on February 28, saying that Kosovo would only be recognized by about 40 countries "once the dust settles." Tadic Inert -------------- ¶4. (SBU) President Boris Tadic won 2.3 million of his citizens' votes just last month, but has thus far refused to fight Kostunica over the core principle that secured his reelection: Serbia's future in the European Union. Tadic and his advisers insist that Serbia's path to the EU remains open, even though Kostunica has ruled out any steps towards integration while the EU deploys its mission in Kosovo. Addressing the DS executive board on March 2, Tadic insisted that Serbia could have both Kosovo and the EU, stressing that he would both defend Serbia's "territorial integrity" but "never abandon the policy of...European integration." Tadic also said that the DS would not leave the government. ¶5. (SBU) Tadic's efforts may be limited out of fear of retribution from Kostunica and other hard-liners. According to contacts in Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic's (DS) cabinet (protect),Tadic will likely continue to remain quiet in refuting the DSS on Kosovo and pushing EU integration. Djelic's senior advisers told poloff, March 3, that Tadic is concerned that if he speaks up too much against DSS and current Kosovo policy he could be impeached by a DSS/SRS majority in Parliament for not upholding the Constitution. Unity on Kosovo -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Kostunica has called for continued unity among the governing parties on Kosovo at the expense of the government's other priorities. The DS-DSS-G17 coalition agreed at formation in May 2007 that the government would maintain five governing principles: Kosovo, EU integration, combating corruption and organized crime, increasing standard of living and full ICTY cooperation. Tadic won reelection last month based largely on delivering on EU integration, also the G17 Plus' central issue. For months, Kostunica has stressed Kosovo as more important than the EU or any other issue. Since January 2008, Kostunica has vowed to block any movement towards the EU, including the interim political agreement offered on January 28, because of EU plans to deploy the EULEX mission to Kosovo. On March 2, DSS spokesperson Andreja Mladenovic said "the DSS calls on all parties not to split the country over the issue of EU association. Instead, we must all assume a joint position that Serbia wants to join the EU together with Kosovo and Metohija as its integral and unalienable part." Conflicted Priorities -------------- ¶7. (SBU) DSS insistence that Kosovo must remain the top, and perhaps the only, issue for Serbia has exposed serious rifts within the governing coalition. DSS officials have dismissed any instability within the coalition due to a common Kosovo policy. DSS Vice President Milos Aligrudic told Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti on February 29 that the GOS was stable due to its united Kosovo policy. He said he expected decisions on EU accession to be resolved "later." DSS spokesperson Andreja Mladenovic told the press, March 2, that "it is of the greatest importance that we preserve this policy and thus maintain Serbia's state and national unity," and noted that all major parties had supported the Serbian Constitution in October 2006 which "says Kosovo is Serbia." ¶8. (SBU) DS and DSS officials both cite the government's "five principles" but Kostunica has successfully brought two of them -- Kosovo and the EU -- into direct opposition. Former Tadic adviser and Kosovo negotiator Leon Kojen told poloff February 29, that these "conflicted" priorities resulted in the "bad marriage" of the DS-DSS and dysfunctional government. Even Kosovo Ministry adviser Edislav Manetovic (protect) told poloff, February 28, that Serbia's EU track was "currently held hostage" because of different DS-DSS priorities, and he acknowledged splits "even within DSS" on Kostunica's tactics. G17, LDP & (Some) DS Ready to Change the Subject -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) As reported in reftel, some Serbian leaders have begun speaking out against Kostunica's fiery rhetoric. Officials in the three pro-EU parties (G17 Plus, LDP, DS) have publicly accused Kostunica of obstructing EU integration. In bold, pragmatic comments, G17 Plus Vice President Ivana Dulic-Markovic told a Novi Sad daily on February 27 that the GOS could fall if Serbia did not make progress towards the EU, starting with the interim political agreement. "Our position in the fight for Kosovo will be stronger if we have friends in the EU and if we are economically prosperous. If these politics of the government continue, I am afraid that we will be left without Kosovo and without the EU," Dulic-Markovic told Gradjanski List. Dulic-Markovic said that the GOS was solely focusing on Kosovo and that the GOS "has forgotten about" the other four government principles. She blamed the DSS for "obstructing" Serbia's path to Europe and urged the DS work on EU integration noting Tadic had been elected by a majority of Serbians to do so. On March 2, Economy Minister Mladjan Dinkic (G17 Plus) said on a B92 program that Kostunica had employed "Milosevic-like" strategies to stoke anti-US and anti-Western sentiments over Kosovo. Dinkic called Kostunica's strategy of entering the EU only with Kosovo "unrealistic" and the DSS-NS pre-election campaign, "Kosovo is Serbia," was the party's only and entire platform. Like Milosevic, Dinkic argued, Kostunica has used the plight of Kosovo Serbs to dominate Serbia's political scene "however, this time it will not happen." In response, DSS spokesperson Mladenovic told the press on March 4 that the DSS would no longer speak with G17 Plus and that Serbia will continue its "single state policy." ¶10. (U) The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has repeatedly invited "all democratic forces" to join together for a pro-EU coalition. On February 8, the LDP issued the statement blaming Kostunica for a "silent coup" obstructing Serbia's EU integration. On February 11, the LDP "reminded" Tadic and the DS that Kostunica is "the main obstacle to the European future of Serbia." On February 22, the LDP cited the rally and violence in Belgrade and called for "joint and resolute action" by a pro-EU coalition to "save Serbia's future." ¶11. (SBU) Though Tadic has not led the way, some in the DS are working on changing the subject. Deputy PM Djelic's advisers (strictly protect) told poloff, March 3, that Dinkic was coordinating his rebuttals against the DSS closely with DS leaders. The DS will become more vocal on changing the public debate and tone over the next month. In a sign of this shift, Djelic told the press on March 3 that Serbia still aims to sign a Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) with the EU this year. His advisers insist they are realistic, however, telling poloff "differences" within the governing coalition would prevent an SAA but that work on EU integration can still be done in the meantime. Djelic's staff cited recent progress on financial and visa facilitation agreements between Serbia and the EU, and said their aim was for Serbia to be eligible for EU candidate status once Serbia signs the SAA. Djelic said publicly, March 3, "nothing prevents Serbia from starting the implementation of the SAA so as not to lose precious time." Post has cautioned DS officials not to promise Serbians an SAA like they did during Tadic's reelection campaign and suffer the consequences of not meeting expectations. In addition, Tadic's domestic policy adviser, Nebojsa Krstic, told the press on March 4 that the DS was considering "a referendum on a European path" in the event the DSS-NS and the SRS insisted on blocking an SAA. Comment -------------- ¶12. (SBU) It is a dark time for Serbia's European future. Although the pro-EU forces in Serbia realize their imperative -- getting EU integration back on track -- Kostunica continues to successfully drown out their voices with nationalist furor on Kosovo. The United States must keep supporting pro-European efforts here, but it is incumbent upon these pro-EU forces, especially President Tadic, to build upon their majority base of 2.3 million citizens and move the political discourse in Serbia past the myth of Kosovo in Serbia and onto the promise of Serbia in Europe. End Comment. MUNTER

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