Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08YEREVAN983
2008-12-09 08:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: ARMENIA BEGINNING TO FEEL

Tags:  ECON EFIN EINV ETRD AM 
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P 090839Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8385
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1675
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0723
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY 0569
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 000983 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ETRD AM
SUBJECT: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: ARMENIA BEGINNING TO FEEL
EFFECTS, WITH MORE ON THE HORIZON

Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 000983 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018 TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ETRD AM SUBJECT: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: ARMENIA BEGINNING TO FEEL EFFECTS, WITH MORE ON THE HORIZON Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) After initially expressing only moderate concern about the impact on Armenia of the global financial crisis, GOAM officials have begun to acknowledge negative effects,and appear to be taking a prudent approach. Growth in construction, real estate sales and other investments has slowed as investors scaled back their activity, falling world mineral prices created a serious crisis in the mining industry, and loss of U.S. clients devastated the IT industry. The country's banks remain in relatively healthy condition, though they are becoming even more careful about lending and interest rates have increased as banks compete for customer deposits. The Central Bank (CBA) is crafting its monetary policy options and since October has been propping up the Armenian Dram (AMD) in order to forestall panic among depositors and protect itself from foreign exchange exposure. Armenia's primary vulnerability may come from Russia, source of most of the country's remittances, and up to 15 percent of Armenia's GDP. Although the negative effects of the crisis have been modest to this point, we expect to see further problems in the months ahead as foreign remittances decrease and sectors in the real economy--especially mining and IT--are hit. The GOAM has already asked for additional US assistance in the form of budget support as a cushion against a potential downturn, and we expect that if the situations worsens, there will be other, urgent requests for assistance. END SUMMARY. ISOLATION SEEMED TO HAVE ITS BENEFITS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As Armenia is not tightly integrated into the global financial system, and Armenian banks have not been involved in risky financial transactions, the public position of GOAM officials and financial institutions at the onset of the global economic crisis was that Armenia would avoid much of its impact. Armenia remains largely a cash-based economy, with Debt/GDP ratios of about 20 percent (compared to over 100 percent in the most-developed countries),and conservative banking standards; mortgage loan-to-value ratios are typically 70 percent (though have been increasing recently),and the capital adequacy requirement of Armenian banks is 12 percent, compared to eight percent in the U.S. In �
A;an interview with the ARKA news agency on November 10, Central Bank (CBA) Chairman Artur Javadyan claimed that Armenia's banking system is stable and properly controlled, overcapitalized and with sufficient liquidity. ¶3. (C) However, in a speech to the National Assembly on November 12, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian outlined his concerns about the impact on the economy from reduced investment, shrinking remittances, slowdowns in the construction industry and a suspension of mining activity due to the fall in global minerals prices. In an effort to minimize any panic, he added that Armenia is "ready to face challenges and make sure the crisis has a minimal impact on the country's developing economy," but also said that the country's economy will be shored up by several long-term projects, including the new nuclear power plant, the Iran-Armenia railway, the establishment of a pan-Armenian bank (by and for the worldwide Armenian Diaspora as well as Armenians here),and by mortgage-loan and investment foundations." In a meeting with EUR DAS Matthew Bryza (reftel),PM Sargsian also expressed concern that IMF plans to scale back its programs in Armenia-- because Armenia's economic growth had caused it to graduate to a category among more-developed countries--were premature, and if the economic situation were to worsen, new programs might be too little, too late. ARMENIAN BANKS - STABLE FOR NOW -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Armenian banks generally remain in stable condition, with both outstanding loans and deposits up significantly year-to-year, according to Central Bank statistics. Total deposits decreased about three percent during October 2008, to AMD 475 billion, and nearly all of that decrease came from non-residents likely concerned about country risk. The CBA is concerned about Armenians abandoning the Dram for the USD, and not without reason; AMD deposits by Armenian residents declined by AMD 9.2 billion (about USD 30 million) between September and October, with a similar increase in USD deposits during the same period. Competition for AMD YEREVAN 00000983 002 OF 005 deposits has increased, with a corresponding increase in deposit rates and interest rates for bank loans and mortgages. Mortgage interest rates have increased to 15-16 percent, with maximum lending terms reduced in most cases to just ten years from a previous norm of 15 years. Although bank liquidity ratios are within normal parameters, the CBA is now encouraging banks to seek funding from abroad, as well as encouraging them to build up their capital base. (NOTE: While one might expect increasing interest rates and increased bank capitalization to have a contractionary effect on the economy, in this case Armenia may be protected by Armenian banks' low levels of lending, and consumer and housing credit markets which are still in their infancy. Relatively few Armenian consumers hold or seek either mortgages or consumer credit. Those who do mostly are comparatively well-off, middle-class professionals -- a modest but growing segment of the labor force and consumer base. However, constricted mortgage credit and more restrictive terms may well put more downward pressure on Yerevan's anticipated glut of upscale downtown apartments now nearing completion. END NOTE) FALLING DEMAND IN KEY SECTORS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Recent months have seen a slowdown in growth in real estate transactions, construction activity and both the mining and IT sectors. Construction accounted for 23 percent of Armenia's GDP in the first nine months of 2008, though growth in this period was just 12 percent over the same period the previous year, compared to a 20 percent increase in 2007. Construction spending in October was ten percent higher than in October 2007, while in September it was 49 percent higher than in September 2007. This sector has for some time been considered a bubble ready to burst irrespective of global financial conditions, and while the global financial crisis is likely a factor, the events of March 1 and increased concerns about country risk also play a role in this reduced rate of growth. The construction industry may still be poised for a slowdown, as sales of building materials have reportedly declined significantly in recent months, and only five of the country's nine main quarries for building stone are currently operating, and even those only at partial capacity. ¶6. (SBU) In addition, the mining sector, which accounts for four percent of GDP but whose effects are amplified since activity is concentrated in the southern Syunik region--which offers few other employment options--has seen many operations suspended as a result of the 60 percent decline in copper and molybdenum prices since July. The IT sector, with many U.S. customers, is also in crisis, with some of the major firms announcing significant layoffs or shutting down their operations entirely. We will report on the mining and IT industries septel. PRESURE ON DRAM, AND PREVENTING PANIC -------------- ¶7. (C) While the USD has appreciated in recent months against the Euro and the Pound, it has held steady all year against the Armenian Dram (AMD)--at roughly AMD 300/USD. While earlier in the year the CBA had been selling Drams to prevent further AMD appreciation, in October it reversed course and sold USD 62 million of its estimated USD 1.5 billion reserves and another 43.1 million in November. The CBA is apparently concerned about preventing a panic and a possible run on deposits (and conversion to USD; see above)--which would put further downward pressure on the Dram--if depositors anticipate a significant decline against the USD. ¶8. (C) The IMF has advised against this CBA intervention, even warning that it may suspend new financing programs if the CBA continues on this course. While a significant decline in the value of the Dram would erode the value of Armenians' Dram-denominated assets, letting it decline would increase the value of foreign remittances, most of which are dollar-denominated. In addition, a cheaper Dram would reduce prices of Armenian exports and help shrink the country's mounting trade deficit. MAJOR VULNERABILITY TO RUSSIA -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Armenia remains highly exposed to worsening economic conditions in Russia, on several fronts. Russian firms own major parts of the Armenian economy, including several banks, most of the energy infrastructure, both mobile telephone YEREVAN 00000983 003 OF 005 providers, and several mining operations. Russian Railways also operates Armenia's railway system, the South Caucasus Railway. The collapse of a Russian parent company could potentially take even a well-performing Armenian subsidiary down with it. Armenia's other major Russian exposure is the presence of as many as one million Armenians working in Russia who in 2007 remitted USD 1.3 billion to Armenia. This comprised 80 percent of foreign remittances sent to Armenia, which in turn accounted for roughly 15 percent of the country's GDP. Officially-recorded remittances from January to September 2008 were USD 1.2 billion, an increase of 33 percent over the prior year, and an unknown but significant quantity of additional monetary inflow is believed to take place through unregulated/informal money transfer services and by hand-carried cash. ¶10. (SBU) However, there are already signs that the growth in remittances will slow for the rest of 2008 and the CBA is projecting zero growth in remittances (and possibly a decline) for 2009. In addition, if the Russian economy experiences a prolonged decline, it is possible that Armenian workers will be laid off and return to Armenia, thereby increasing the ranks of the unemployed and creating the potential for social and political unrest. (Note: Armenia's official October unemployment rate was 6.3 percent. However, a more accurate methodology, an annual household survey, usually puts the true employment rate at over 20 percent, not including the half-million persons who have gone to work abroad. End Note). MACROECONOMIC AND BUDGET PROJECTIONS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The annual inflation rate fell to 8.6 percent in October, and the IMF estimates that 2008 inflation in Armenia will be between five and six percent, and five percent or less in 2009. Armenia's GDP, which has grown at double-digit rates for each of the past six years and will be close to ten percent in 2008, is more likely to be about eight percent in ¶2009. The IMF's worst-case projection is for 4.5 percent growth, though this is based on 20 percent declines in remittances, FDI, and exports, as well as 20 percent AMD depreciation. The Armenian economy received something of a reprieve in October when the GOAM negotiated a new gas supply contract with GazProm that defers a 40 percent price increase--initially expected to take effect on January 1--to April 1, 2009, after peak winter demand. ¶12. (SBU) The financial crisis poses some risks to the GOAM's budgeting. With a significant reduction in mining--expected by many observers to last at least six months--and a slowdown in the growth of construction, the GOAM seems unlikely to meet its revenue targets in 2009 without a tax increase or increased effectiveness in its tax administration; Armenia's 2007 tax/GDP ratio of 16.1 percent was the lowest among CIS states. (Note: Another theory about the CBA's propping up of the AMD is that this allows the GOAM to maximize imports and their associated VAT collections. A fall in the AMD would lead to a reduction of imports and consequently reduce needed budget revenues. End Note). IMF AND WORLD BANK PROGRAMS -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The IMF Executive Board on November 17 approved a new Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) program for Armenia. Usually available only to the class of poor countries from which Armenia has graduated, the funds in this program carry an interest rate of one-half percent, but the loan is for just USD 14 million over three years. The GOAM has also requested that the IMF undertake an accelerated country review, which is likely to occur in February. At that time, IMF may initiate another program, either augmenting the PRGF it approved in November--which would be limited to about USD 50 million--or a much larger "standby" program, which could involve a loan of several hundred million dollars, though at market-level interest rates. ¶14. (SBU) The GOAM is also trying to obtain funds for SME Lending so that expected labor migrants who have lost jobs in Russia will have access to loans to establish businesses. It has already committed USD 50 million from the state budget and is negotiating with the World Bank for another USD 250 million. World Bank officials have told EmbOffs that they are unlikely to approve more than USD 50 million now, and perhaps a maximum of USD 150 million over three years. This program, which would provide USD to the Central Bank at LIBOR plus YEREVAN 00000983 004 OF 005 about five percent (bringing it up to just under eight percent),would then be lent out to Armenian banks and on to SMEs, bringing additional liquidity into the financial system. CBA STRATEGIES -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The CBA's overall goal is to maintain macroeconomic and monetary stability, and Armenia's relatively low inflation and flat unemployment rates suggest that it is largely succeeding. In its Monetary Policy Program issued on October 2, the CBA outlined its monetary policy approach over the coming 12 months in response to the financial crisis. The CBA has crafted strategies under two scenarios: mild (Scenario "A") and severe (Scenario "B") recessions. Under Scenario "A," with a mild global recession with no further financial shocks and estimates of USD 1.5-2 trillion in losses to the world economy, the CBA plans to carry out a more flexible monetary policy and reduce interest rates in order to boost domestic demand while maintaining low inflation rates (the "repo"--or overnight lending rate--increased from 4.5 percent in June 2007 to 7.75 percent in September 2008). Tightened monetary and fiscal policies and the recent decline in international food and fuel prices are expected to bring inflation down to about 7.5 percent by the end of 2008. ¶13. (SBU) Scenario "B" envisions more severe damage to the global economy, including significant reduction in global economic growth, massive transfers of investments from financial to commodity markets, and higher volatility and inflationary pressures on commodities prices, despite shrinking world demand for commodities. Under this scenario, the CBA would attempt to maintain inflation in a target range of four percent (plus/minus 1.5 percent) by increasing the "repo" rate. The CBA expects that all sectors of the economy would be negatively affected by the international financial crisis, except for agriculture, which will not be seriously affected in the short run. ¶14. (SBU) Under Scenario "A," the CBA predicts 10-11 percent GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 (the IMF projects 10 percent),and six to nine percent growth under Scenario "B." While the main drivers of economic growth will remain construction and services, construction would be expected to grow 12-13 percent under Scenario "A" and 8-10 percent under "B," due to decreased external financing. Reduced real income of the population, due to decreased growth in salaries and foreign remittances, would also bring down the growth rate of the services sector, with an estimated 2-3 percentage point difference between the two scenarios. ¶15. (SBU) With respect to exports, under Scenario "A" they are projected to grow 7-10 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 15-20 percent in the first three quarters of 2009. Slower GDP growth will also be reflected in the decreased growth rate of internal demand, and in reduced growth of imports -- 22-27 percent under Scenario "A" and 12-17 percent under "B." In both scenarios, the CBA is expecting inflationary pressures to weaken, falling to 3.5 percent under "A" and five percent under "B." COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) While Armenia's relative isolation from the global financial system may help insulate it in part from the worst effects that are being felt by other countries and institutions, it remains vulnerable to a number of developments, in particular the collapse of mineral prices and a downturn in the Russian economy. This could create a "one-two punch" if Armenian workers in Russia return home to Armenia unemployed: the remittance payers who prop up the Armenian economy would instead become an added demand on Armenia's already-weak social safety net at home. Thus far the GOAM appears to be managing the crisis prudently, ensuring that banks maintain adequate liquidity and capitalization and attempting to forestall panic in the population that could create a financial crisis as self-fulfilling prophecy. But the real test for the authorities may come over the winter, when the full effects of the crisis on remittances become more clear. ¶17. (C) At the USATF on November 21 we received a request from the GOAM for budget support payments to offset the negative effects of the financial crisis. Absent an YEREVAN 00000983 005 OF 005 unexpected increase in our assistance budget for Armenia, we will not be able to meet that request. However, as the magnitude of the crisis becomes more apparent over the coming months, we will probably receive further such requests. We will need to consider whether this kind of assistance is warranted, and whether the USG would be in a position to provide it. We will continue to review the economic situation and the GOAM's response to these developments in the months ahead. YOVANOVITCH

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