MEDVEDEV'S VISIT FUELS ANXIETY ABOUT HASTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000855

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR DAS MATT BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU AM
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S VISIT FUELS ANXIETY ABOUT HASTY
NAGORNO-KARABAKH RESOLUTION

Classified By: AMB Marie Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b/d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Domestic reactions to Russian President Dmitriy
Medvedev's October 21-22 visit to Armenia have primarily
focused on Medvedev's announcement in Yerevan that he hopes
to host the next meeting of Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks
between Armenia's and Azerbaijan's presidents, as early as
the beginning of November. Medvedev's announcement and
comments that the two neighbors appear ready to "search for a
solution" and that talks have reached an "advanced stage"
prompted intense speculation on Russia's intentions to host
the talks. Local observers have immediately assumed the
worst, that Russia will use the meeting to hijack the Minsk
Group framework, force a settlement on Armenia that goes
against its and Nagorno-Karabakh interests, and secure a
Russian transit route for Azerbaijani hydrocarbons. They
also explained Medvedev's seemingly abrupt initiative as a
Russian counter-attack to Washington's renewed diplomatic
activity, and Turkey's recent engagement, in the South
Caucasus. END SUMMARY.

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MEDIA REACTION ON MEDVEDEV'S VISIT
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2. (SBU) Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev paid his first
official visit to Armenia on October 21-22, and said that he
had discussed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in detail with
President Sargsian. The opposition media immediately
responded, declaring that the sole purpose of the Russian
president's visit was to accelerate a resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The "Hraparak" daily said that
"Russia is taking on the role of a sole mediator," and that
"if Medvedev manages to keep possession of the ball, he will
preside over the signing of the framework agreement to settle
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict." Another opposition daily,
Haykakan Zhamanak, agreed that "the main purpose of
Medvedev's visit was to announce the meeting of the three
presidents," and that the meeting would automatically block
any Turkish involvement in the Karabakh peace process.


3. (SBU) On the theme of U.S.-Russian competition in the
South Caucasus, the pro-government "Respublika Armenii"
published excerpts of A/S Fried's October 17 press conference
during Medvedev's visit, claiming that Fried's visit should
be viewed as an "activation of a rivalry" between Moscow and
Washington in the region. The opposition Haykakan Zhamanak
chimed in, asserting that President Sargsian agreed to
Russian mediation during Medvedev's visit, in spite of
Fried's mission to prevent it from happening. The daily also
cited the concurrent visit of "U.S. Diplomats and high-level
military officers in Armenia" which was allegedly planned to
"control" the Sargsian-Medvedev visit. (COMMENT: The daily
was likely referring to the totally unrelated Business
Executives for National Security (BENS) visit sponsored by
the Department of Defense which the Embassy hosted on October
21-22. END COMMENT.)

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THINK TANKS FEAR WORST IN MEDVEDEV'S SUMMIT INITIATIVE
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4. (C) At a quickly arranged roundtable hosted by one of
Yerevan's leading think tanks on October 23, two foreign
policy experts sounded the alarm on what they perceived to be
nefarious Russian intentions behind Medvedev's invitation to
hold a trilateral meeting with Presidents Sargsian and Aliev.
They claimed that the Kremlin would use the meeting to sell
out Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) in exchange for Azerbaijani
pledging to export its gas and oil across Russian territory.


5. (C) The experts explained Russia's abrupt initiative as a
response to unprecedented U.S. diplomatic activity in the
region, in the wake of the August Russo-Georgian war, with
visits by the Vice President, Deputy Secretary of State,
Assistant Secretary of State, and a solo visit by America's
Minsk Group co-chair to the region in the last month. They
stated that the Russians fear being outmaneuvered by
Washington, want to repair their image in the South Caucasus
by facilitating a resolution, and most importantly, want to
guarantee a transit route of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons across
Russian territory.


6. (C) The experts and participants in the discussion, which
was standing room only, and attended by media and numerous
representatives of the diplomatic corps, agreed that Russian

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intentions could only lead to ill consequences for Armenia.
One of the experts said "the acceleration of Russia
mediation" is dangerous, and has "unpredictable
consequences," while comparing it to Saakshvili's launching
of the August war with Russia. Others insisted that no
agreement would be possible without first consulting the
people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Others warned that neither
Armenian nor Azerbaijani society was prepared for the
compromises that will be forced upon the parties. Some
commented that the Russians will pull out all the stops to
bring about a deal, including pressure personally exerted by
Prime Minister Putin if Medvedev fails to accomplish the job.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) With the renewed diplomatic attention to settling the
NK conflict, as conveyed through A/S Fried and President
Medvedev's recent visits, Armenia's rumor mills are churning
at full bore. Coupled with last weekend's fear-mongering by
ex-President Ter-Petrossian that President Sargsian will cave
to outside pressure and give away the store on Karabakh,
Armenia's political classes have begun to fear the worst.


8. (C) Insular by nature, Armenian society can be paranoid
when it comes to "the major powers" settling NK for them.
Inured to 14 years of a cold peace that followed their bloody
military victory in NK, Armenians have grown accustomed to
the status quo of a cease-fire that requires few
visiblesacrifices of them. Former President Levon
Ter-Petrossian and his supporters are bitter at the prospect
that President Sargsian may succeed in settling NK on terms
almost identical to those which led to Ter-Petrossian,s
ouster in 1998, in the face of a popular outcry, and
Ter-Petrossian and his cronies have shown they are not above
trying to manipulate public opinion on the issue for selfish
political ends. Other political parties and public figures )
and likely many Armenians in the worldwide Diaspora -- are
sincerely anxious that Armenia will be pressured into
accepting a bad deal. It remains to be seen how adroitly, or
otherwise, President Sargsian will navigate these treacherous
political waters: negotiating the deal and preparing public
opinion, while maintaining his political standing.

YOVANOVITCH