EUR A/S HIGHLIGHTS REGIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000844 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM AJ TU RU AM SUBJECT: EUR A/S HIGHLIGHTS REGIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND DEMOCRACY FLAWS WITH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER YEREVAN 00000844 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: EUR A/S Fried outlined his hopes for an Armenia "opened up" by resolution of the Turkish and Nagorno-Karabakh, ending Armenia's reliance on Georgia as its main trade outlet. Fried commented that this could all happen by the end of this year, transforming the region. President Sargsian was visibly encouraged by EUR A/S Fried's assessment of Turkish commitment to agree October 25 on a rapprochment plan. Sargsian had more doubts on prospects of a Nagorno Karabakh settlement, but remained committed to the negotiating process. Fried also pushed the democracy agenda -- especially highlighting the need to release political prisoners, and mentioning it would be best to get this done before December MCC Board meeting. Sargsian pushed back, saying that all judicial processes must happen before any amnesty could be considered. Sargsian asked Fried's support with Saakashvili for Armenia's proposed Yerevan-Batumi road project, and Fried agreed. Sargsian also complained about Radio Liberty's hiring of an opposition activist as bureau chief. The Prime Minister updated Fried on domestic reform priorities, and spoke of the need to transform mentalities -- his own and society's -- to lead Armenia into the modern global economy. END SUMMARY ¶2. (S/NF) RENEWED ENTHUSIASM ON TURKEY: EUR A/S Fried led with the Turkish rapprochement issue during his October 17 meeting with President Serzh Sargsian. Fried reported he had just spoken with the Swiss negotiator, Swiss MFA Political Director Ambuhl, as well as with Turkish MFA Under Secretary Apakan. Fried conveyed his conviction that the Turkish side is serious about reaching an agreement with Armenia. He said Apakan had told him the Turks hoped to sign a deal working from the September 24 text and the "two papers" approach on October 25 when the two sides have their next meeting. Sargsian initially seemed discouraged on chances of Turkish rapprochement, evincing Armenian discouragement over perceived negotiating roadblocks that had arisen since President Gul's September 6 Yerevan visit. Fried pointed out that the GOT had been flexible on two major points of Armenian concern: agreeing to two papers instead of three, and to stick with the September 24 text after Armenia had balked at the subsequent Swiss draft of September 26. Fried argued that if the GOT were interested in stalling the process, they could easily have wasted a month or more arguing about these procedural matters, but instead had readily changed their position. Fried said that this behavior clearly showed that the Turks were interested in getting to a real result quickly. He noted that "tricky issues of timing and sequencing remain" but was confident that a deal was "doable" October 25. Sargsian visibly perked up at these arguments, and grew more expansive and upbeat on the topic, saying he was "very encouraged" and this would be "brilliant" and "a major achievement." He cautioned, however, that "I have made my gesture" and given Turkey deference as a major regional power, "If they want more than that from me," he trailed off in a gesture of impossibility. Fried said that the GOT had asked him to convey a message of their seriousness of purpose in reaching an agreeement, and Sargsian asked Fried to return the same message from him to Ankara. ¶3. (C) NAGORNO KARABAKH: Fried noted that, aside from one late-campaign speech that he himself disliked, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had been remarkably restrained in eschewing bellicose rhetoric in recent weeks. Fried said he thought that Aliyev, too, was serious in his desire to reach a settlement. Sargsian complained that Aliyev's speech Fried mentioned was puzzling and dismaying to him. Why, at the very end of a campaign that Aliyev was poised to sweep with huge margins, had Aliyev felt it necessary to make such an unhelpful speech. Sargsian said "We are ready to continue negotiations in the framework of the Basic Principles and the Madrid document." He complained, however, about recent rhetoric placing undue emphasis on "territorial integrity" as the most fundamental principle. "Are we negotiating over the document on the table," he groused, "or are we starting from the principle of 'territorial integrity'?" He said the two approaches were incompatible, and there was nothing for Armenia in the latter version. Fried assured Sargsian that he was reacting to a "badly mis-reported remark" and that U.S. policy remained exactly the same: there are several principles at issue; territorial integrity was one, but not the only one; the Basic Principles were the basis for our efforts. Sargsian said that was good, and with that understanding he was prepared to continue negotiations. Sargsian noted that he would accept President Medvedev's invitation to meet President Aliyev in Moscow, but that he, Sargsian, had "no concrete proposal" to take to Moscow. Fried noted that EUR DAS Bryza would be present for the Moscow meeting, and this would be an opportunity to advance YEREVAN 00000844 002.2 OF 004 the dialogue. Fried hoped that the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial might provide an opportunity to announce an agreement, if the two sides were able to reach one by then. Sargsian did not exclude this possibility. Fried offered whatever good offices Washington could provide in sealing a deal, noting that President Bush and Secretary Rice are fully briefed on the NK issue, and ready to weigh in if the two parties believe it would help. ¶4. (C) REGIONAL RELATIONS: Fried commented that the U.S. interest is for the three South Caucasus countries to be free, sovereign, stable, prosperous, and independent, with complete freedom of choice in their future place in the world. He emphasized that the United States is not in competition with Russia, whatever Russia might think, and said that Armenia should have friendly relations with Russia as well as the West, according to its own choice. Fried pointed out that Armenia and Azerbaijan now share the same "strategic vulnerability" in that both countries are overly dependent on the trade route through Georgia to the Black Sea. While, of course, we all wish Georgia peace, success, and stability, events have reminded that we cannot count on this. Armenia needs to repair relations with Turkey and with Azerbaijan to give all of these countries more strategic choices and freedom of action. Fried commented that a possible silver lining of the Russia-Georgia war would be if it proves to have concentrated minds in a way that "unlocked" the long-standing conflicts between Armenian-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Sargsian replied that he agreed "100 percent" with these comments. These unsettled conflicts made all three South Caucasus countries isolated and vulnerable. Sargsian pointed out that Armenia's good relations with Russia had not prevented Armenia from reaching out to Georgia during the recent Russia-Georgia conflict. Russia had not been any obstacle to Armenia's increasing NATO engagement in recent years, including the conduct of a major NATO exercise (Cooperative Longbow/Lancer) on Armenia's territory going on right now. Russian relations had been no obstacle to Armenia sending peacekeeping troops to Iraq and Kosovo. Sargsian also commented, at another point, that he was "deeply confident" that Russia had no interest in obstructing a Nagorno Karabakh settlement, drawing a contrast with Russia's role in the South Ossetia/Abkhazia conflicts. Fried and Sargsian spoke briefly about the significance of Russia's discounted natural gas prices for Armenia. Sargsian suggested this provides Armenia an economic benefit for now, but in the future Armenia will not need the discount; in the meantime, it would be foolish to spurn the temporary advantage. ¶5. (C) GEORGIA-RUSSIA: Sargsian asked Fried's views of the current situation between Russia and Georgia, asking if Russia would moderate its positon. Fried said he did not think that Russia would rescind its decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, though they may regret that decision more and more as time goes by. He thought the Russians had tasted real failure, having failed in their war aim to topple President Saakashvili, and embarassingly failed to win significant internationl recognition of the break-away provinces. He noted he had just come from the October 15 Geneva talks on Georgia, and thought Deputy FM Karasin seemed embarassed by the behavior of the Ossetians and Abkhazians, who had been empowered by Russian recognition. Fried thought that with the recognition, Russia had lost a significant measure of influence and control over the Abkhaz and Ossetians. Fried disagreed with the conventional wisdom he said was developing that the Russians came to Geneva intending for the talks to fail. Rather, he felt, that the Russians had wanted to make limited progress, but the negotiations were undone by the Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives. Fried noted that Georgia has a lot of adjusting to do as well. Georgia must "get used to the idea that it will not govern in Abkhazia or South Ossetia for many years to come." He said that Georgian authorities must be cool and disciplined on this issue from now on, there is no room for melodramatics. ¶6. (C) YEREVAN-BATUMI ROAD: Sargsian asked Fried to encourage Georgian President Saakashvili to move forward with Armenia's proposal to cooperate with Georgia on building/re-building a sound road connection to Georgia's Black Sea port city of Batumi. Sargsian said this would be good for both Georgia and Armenia. Already "tens of thousands" of Armenian tourists flock to Batumi's beaches in the summer, with most taking the train. A good road would put Batumi within four hours of Yerevan, which would dramatically increase the volume of Armenians vacationing there, and especially of more affluent Armenians who dislike the train. Sargsian pointed out that this would also be an important alternative trade corridor, and noted that Georgia itself would benefit from an alternative road between Tbilisi YEREVAN 00000844 003.2 OF 004 and Batumi, as recent events showed. Fried promised to convey this message to Saakashvili for Sargsian. (Note: There is an existing road connection between Armenia's Bavra land port of entry and Batumi, but these roads are abysmal, as Yerevan emboffs know from firsthand experience. A decent highway along this route would cut hours from the journey, and create a viable trade corridor that currently is not viable. Armenia attempted to bring a convoy of fuel trucks from Batumi down this corridor to ameliorate Armenian fuel shortages at the height of the Russia-Georgia crisis, and it proved a slow and grueling trek. End note.) ¶7. (C) UNWLLING TO MOVE ON DETAINEES: Fried also raised with President Sargsian the need to clear the decks of lingering problems from Armenia's post-election crisis. He highlighted the roughly 75 political prisoners that the government has jailed on politically-motivated charges after March 1. Fried commented that finding a way to deal with this problem and get those political activists out of jail would remove a dark cloud from Armenia's internation reputation and from the bilateral relationship. Fried noted that the Millennium Challenge Corporation Board will have to make its next review of Armenia's eligbility in December, and it would be very helpful if Armenia had managed to resolve the political prisoner problem by then. Sargsian pushed back firmly, commenting that "the cloud is bigger than the actuality." He said that the trials for these defendants are ongoing, and would be handled with transparency, under the eyes of OSCE observers. He was sure that the opposition would then appeal all convictions to the European Court of Human Rights, and of course if the ECHR did not find in their favor would accuse President Sargsian of having illicit influence in the Strasbourg court as well. Sargsian said that all of these processes must unfold properly before "we can even speak about any kind of amnesty or pardon." Fried pressed Sargsian to find a quicker resolution, in the interests of Armenia's domestic political stability and democratic development. Sargsian strongly urged the U.S. not to link Millennium Challenge to domestic political issues. Fried reminded Sargsian that MCC has explicit criteria built into the program, and this is part of the deal, unlike other traditional bilateral assistance. Sargsian commented that Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian had spoken about this to Secretary Rice and had reported her comment that "MCC is not an examination, but a process we undertake together." President Sargsian had been heartened by this comment. ¶8. (C) RADIO LIBERTY: President Sargsian complained to Fried that "all of Radio Liberty's behavior shows they think they can do whatever they want" in Armenia. He said "now they have even hired a Levon Ter-Petrossian man as their bureau chief in Yerevan." He asked why Radio Liberty was making itself into a partisan outlet promoting the opposition. Fried said he was aware of the GOAM's concerns about Radio Liberty's Armenia Service, and we were looking further into the balance and objectivity of the programming. He said he understood RFE/RL President Jeffrey Gedmin had expressed willingness to visit Armenia and discuss these issues with President Sargsian. ¶9. (S/NF) IRAN EXPORT CONTROL: Fried reminded Sargsian that Secretary Rice had raised an issue related to Iran arms and export control, and had foreshadowed that an expert team would visit Yerevan to go over the details. Fried urged Sargsian to meet with the team when it arrived, within a few weeks, so that this issue can be resolved. Sargsian, seemingly more receptive than he has yet been on this issue, said that the GOAM would be happy to meet the team, and that he looked forward to "finally hearing what exactly it is we are talking about." ¶10. (C) PRIME MINISTER REVIEWS WASHINGTON VISIT: Fried met Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian immediately after seeing the president. Fried reprised his points on the need and oppotunity of "unlocking" the South Caucasus region after the Russia-Georgia conflict, as well as on democratic reforms and political prisoners. The PM reviewed his recent trip to Washington, which he considered very successful. He commented he had returned to Yerevan with renewed purpose and optimism after meeting with Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rice, Commerce Secretary Gutierrez, MCC CEO John Danilovich, and USTR Ambassador Susan Schwab. He appreciated U.S. offers to send technical experts to help Armenia boost its trade relations with the United States. On regional relations, the PM said Armenia's approach with Turkey is to look toward the future, and not dwell on divisive issues of the past. He reminded that Armenia strongly supports Turkish membership in the European Union, as this will help develop Turkey into the kind of neighbor Armenia prefers to have. ¶11. (C) ...AND HIS REFORM AGENDA: Speaking of his reform YEREVAN 00000844 004.2 OF 004 program, PM Sargsian said his biggest goal was to change the prevailing mentality in Armenia -- starting with his own -- to re-tool Armenian thinking to be more successful in an open and inter-connected world. He commented that normal relations and an open border with Turkey -- though it would be valuable economically -- would be even more beneficial politically and in fostering an open society in Armenia. He also mentioned Secretary Rice's comment that MCC was "not a pass/fail test, but a process." He said he had told her that Armenia's domestic reforms would show major results in three years. He highlighted tax reforms. Armenian businesses need to feel that the tax authorities treat everyone equally and fairly; this is where the rule of law touches many people directly. Getting this right would lead the social mentality changes and respect for legal norms he was trying to bring about. This would be the foundation for robust civil society and more deeply and broadly rooted democratic institutions. Economically, PM Sargsian's biggest fear was collapse in Europe or Russia. Europe is Armenia's largest trading partner, whereas Armenia gets some 1.5 billion dollars worth of remittances from Armenians in Russia each year. ¶12. (U) EUR A/S Fried has cleared this cable. YOVANOVITCH