EUR DAS BRYZA,S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000778 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2018 TAGS: PREL SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA,S MEETING WITH ARMENIAN PRESIDENT SARGSYAN AND FOREIGN MINISTER NALBANDIAN REF: YEREVAN 733 (NOTAL) YEREVAN 00000778 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Classified by DCM Joseph Pennington for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Matthew Bryza met with Armenian President Sargsian and Foreign Minister Nalbandian on September 13 to discuss Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, Nagorno-Karabakh (NK),and the Russia-Georgia war. On Armenia-Turkey relations, Sargsian viewed the visit of Turkish President Gul to Yerevan on September 6 as an important step forward and opined that negotiations on normalizing relations were proceeding in the right direction, with an agreement already penned on sales of electricity from Armenia to Turkey. On the NK conflict, Sargsian and Nalbandian felt now was the time to reach a deal on the Basic Principles, and welcomed U.S. leadership in pushing through an agreement. On the conflict in Georgia, both Sargsian and Nalbandian railed against Saakashvili for making the mistake of taking on Russian forces and for failing to communicate with Armenia during the crisis. They denied Russian aircraft had attacked Georgia from the Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia. Reftel reported Bryza's discusion about Iran. End Summary. -------------- Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement -------------- ¶2. (C) President Sargsian began the dinner conversation with EUR DAS Bryza by saying that his historic meeting with Turkish President Gul on September 6 in Yerevan to watch the Turkish-Armenia soccer match had turned out well. Sargsian said Gul had shown real political courage, and had seized the moment to push for a breakthrough in relations. He thanked Bryza for U.S. support for the initiative. Sargsian noted that Armenia had passed a new version of its proposal to Turkey during the latest round of meetings in Bern, and Turkish FM Babacan had endorsed the general direction in which the talks were headed. Sargsian also noted that he had received a letter from Gul endorsing the negotiations. Improved relations were already yielding tangible benefits, with Armenia having recently signed an agreement to sell 1.5 billion kilowatts of electricity per year to Turkey, for roughly $800 million USD. (Note: Since this conversation, the electricity deal seems to have encountered political snags in Ankara. DFM Kirakossian told CDA here that the Turkish company which signed the deal had later appealed to the GOAM for help in persuading the GOT to let the plan go forward. Septel. End Note) Sargsian reported that Armenia had already renovated the railroad line on its side of the border, and Turkey could finish the necessary renovations on its side &within two months8 if an agreement on opening the border were reached. Sargsian said he was willing to make internal changes in the government, if necessary, to keep the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement proceeding smoothly. -------------- Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶3. (C) On Nagorno-Karabakh (NK),Bryza began by noting that Secretary Rice had sent him to the region to demonstrate U.S. commitment to resolving the conflict and noted high-level U.S. involvement in seeking to resolve the last remaining differences on the Basic Principles. Sargsian agreed the moment was right for an agreement on the Basic Principles, which he thought represented the best approach for finding a compromise between the sides. Turkish President Gul had offered to help by complementing the efforts of the MINSK Group Co-Chairs through Black Sea economic initiatives and the establishment of regional links. Bryza agreed that Turkey-Armenia rapprochement could have a positive impact on the NK negotiations if it led Yerevan to show greater flexibility, and noted that Turkey was in fact a member of the MINSK Group, even if it was not a Co-Chair. Sargsian noted Turkey,s interests were not congruent with Azerbaijan,s and thought Turkey could even play the role of a neutral mediator. Nevertheless, the MINSK Group Co-Chairs should still play the central role of mediating a solution, while Turkey,s role should be supportive. ¶4. (C) On the subject of the Lachin corridor linking Armenia to NK, Bryza explained that his trip to NK a day earlier had vividly demonstrated how the corridor was a lifeline for the population of NK. Bryza asked Sargsian if he could speak openly with Azerbaijani President Aliyev about a constructive solution to the corridor. Sargsian replied that he hoped he could, but that during their introductory meeting in St. Petersburg in June, Aliyev had mostly talked about how Azerbaijan was a rising power that the U.S. and Russia would YEREVAN 00000778 002.2 OF 002 have to contend with. Sargsian said he would broach the topic of the corridor when the time was right, and asked Bryza not to go into details during his upcoming trip to Baku (September 17-18). Bryza asked whether, if Aliyev were to sign a legally-binding Non-Use of Force agreement, Armenia might soften its insistence that the future status of the corridor be the same as the future status of NK, and instead accept a formulation specifying that Armenia would retain &control8 over the corridor. Sargsian replied that he was not exactly sure what the word &control8 entailed, and Nalbandian added that meaningful security guarantees for NK would have to come from Armenia, not Azerbaijan. Both Sargsian and Nalbandian agreed that guarantees for the security of NK were critical, but claimed that Aliyev first needed to build trust with Armenia before such issues could be resolved. ¶5. (C) On the subject of U.S. leadership in seeking an agreement, Bryza asked if Armenia could agree to U.S.-hosted meetings with the two Foreign Ministers or the Presidents. Sargsian replied that he had no problem meeting outside the Minsk Group format. Sargsian enthusiastically endorsed the idea of a possible meeting between FM Nalbandian and FM Mammadyarov hosted by Secretary Rice in New York at the UN General Assembly. -------------- Bitterness over Georgian Behavior during the Russia-Georgia War -------------- ¶6. (C) On the conflict in Georgia, Bryza noted the situation in the South Caucasus had changed dramatically with Russia,s willingness to behave as a belligerent now clear. Simmering conflicts could erupt quickly into wars and impact the entire region. Sargsian agreed with Bryza,s general assessment of Russia,s motives, but argued that in the recent conflict Saakashvili had made a foolish decision and left Russia no choice but to attack Georgia. If Georgia had retaken Tskhinvali without encountering Russian resistance, Russia,s reputation as a military power would have been devastated. Bryza countered that the South Ossetian militia reported through a chain of command led by Russian officers, who played a role in the events leading up to August 7. Sargsian shrugged and noted that it was obvious what Russia,s role had been, but it was nevertheless &idiotic8 of Saakashvili to have fallen into the trap with Russia standing so ostentatiously behind its South Ossetian clients. Sargsian said he had warned Saakashvili numerous times not to succumb to any provocations. Sargsian also complained to Bryza that Saakashvili had waited three days to return his phone call at the start of the conflict, while Georgian FM Tkeshelashvili had refused a 4 am meeting with FM Nalbandian at the Yerevan airport during a stopover en route to Tbilisi (Nalbandian had offered to drive out in the middle of the night to meet her). Sargsian also complained about the Georgian failure to facilitate the loading of gas trucks in the port of Batumi that were bound for Armenia. -------------- Domestic Issues -------------- ¶7. (C) On the domestic front, Sargsian boasted that Armenia,s inflation had fallen to just 3.7 percent, while GDP was growing at 10 percent for the first part of the year. Separately, Sargsian complained that a confidante of former President Levon Ter-Petrossian (LTP) had been offered a seat on the board of directors of Voice of America (Note: Sargsian may have confused VOA with RFE/RL),which he said was a slap in the face at him. Bryza pushed back and asked how he could possibly oppose a decision by an independent media outlet to appoint their preferred candidate to their board. Sargsian replied that it was &unnecessary politicization8 of the media. YOVANOVITCH