ARMENIA AND MCC ELIGIBILITY: DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000734 SIPDIS FOR MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE BOARD FROM COM JOSEPH PENNINGTON STATE FOR S, F, D, P, E, EUR/FO, EUR/CARC, EUR/ACE, EEB, DRL USAID FOR ADMINISTRATOR WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR MCC FOR CEO DANILOVICH NSC FOR MARIA GERMANO TREASURY FOR SECRETARY AND MCC-RELATED POLICY STAFF E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2018 TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM AM SUBJECT: ARMENIA AND MCC ELIGIBILITY: DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE SOMEWHAT BETTER, BUT NOT THERE YET REF: A. YEREVAN 426 ¶B. YEREVAN 429 YEREVAN 00000734 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Reftels in late May predicted that Armenia would deserve termination of its MCC Compact this year. Three months on, the GOAM has noticeably improved the tone and outlook of the democratic climate here, even though performance still lags in key areas. The public mood has shifted considerably from anti-government outrage to "wait and see," as many average Armenians find themselves pleasantly surprised by President Sargsian's efforts. Government insiders have hinted quietly that the October-November timeframe will bring the next wave of reforms. We must not let the GOAM off the hook with a pre-mature return to business as usual. The roads funding package should remain on ice until at least the December MCC Board meeting -- lifting that freeze now would send absolutely the wrong message. Post recommends that the September MCC Board should review Armenian progress and decide to defer any decision on Compact status until the December Board meeting, after new scorecards have been released. END SUMMARY -------------- STATUS OF REFORM ITEMS -------------- ¶2. (C) Ref A provided an update on the items which we had urged upon the Armenian government in the wake of the March 1-2 crisis. We review progress on these items below. SHORT-TERM ACTIONS: -- Lift State of Emergency: This has been done, though the legislation abruptly passed March 19 which gives authorities carte blanche to deny public assembly at will remains in effect. Today, September 15, marks the first significant government-authorized opposition rally to take place since March 1-2. Three previous major opposition rallies took place in June-August which were formally banned by authorities but tacitly permitted in fact. Authorities continue occasionally to disrupt, sometimes with moderate force, the opposition's "political promenades" at Northern Avenue, which typically involve 200-300 persons walking and chatting in a public space. In late August, authorities seized posters and placards related to an unauthorized sit-in protest at Northern Avenue. -- Allow peaceful public demonstrations: As noted above, there has been limited progress in this regard, though less than the right to freedom of assembly would demand. -- End political arrests and prosecutions: Arrests have stopped. Prosecutions continue, often convicting defendants based on highly questionable evidence. There have been hints that once the trials are all complete, the president may pardon most or all of the defendants as a means to resolve this issue. A number of prominent opposition politicians have been freed on suspended sentences or on personal recognizance pending trial, some on HEALTH grounds. The single most prominent political prisoner, Alexander Arzumanian, remains in pre-trial detention. Arzumanian, who is the husband of an AmCit, a former Armenian foreign minister and UN Ambassador, was the campaign manager for Levon Ter-Petrossian's 2008 presidential campaign. -- End LTP's de facto house arrest: This has been done. -- Release those detained for non-violent offenses and ensure fair trials for remainder: This has not been done, as noted above. -- Media freedom: In the months since President Sargsian's April 9 inauguration, there have been periods of more robust opposition television coverage, but this has diminished recently. The parliament enacted a snap media law September YEREVAN 00000734 002.2 OF 003 10 -- passing two legislative readings back to back during an unannounced late-night session -- which bars new television licenses from being issued until 2010. This seems aimed at preventing opposition-leaning broadcasters from getting licenses restored before then. Armenian authorities lost a European Court of Human Rights case decided earlier this summer pertaining to the wrongful revocation of A1 television's license, but the ECHR declined to order that the license be restored, choosing instead to assess only a modest financial penalty. Media freedom remains at the discretion of the authorities. -- Launch national political dialogue: This has not formally been done, but we have been encouraged to see a range of quiet, informal contacts. Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian made a point to converse extensively with a wide range of opposition leaders at the U.S. Independence Day reception, which was a welcome, positive signal. Senior Ter-Petrossian lieutenants and Heritage Party members have spoken privately on a number of occasions with ruling party leaders, especially Republican Party Secretary Samvel Nikoyan. There have been modest signs of meeting of the minds between moderate voices in both the government and opposition camps, though the public rhetoric remains strident, especially on the part of Ter-Petrossian. -- Investigate/prosecute election law violations: No change since Ref A. No signficant progress nor hint there will be any. -- Public/non-partisan or international commission of inquiry into March 1-2: Though not structured as we would have liked, the parliament's ad hoc commission of inquiry has been by far the most positive initiative to take place since the March 1-2 events. Although opposition parties have boycotted the commission, arguing correctly that the structure gave ruling coalition parties a dominant position, the pro-government parties have nonetheless done a surprisingly credible and responsible job of probing the government's official version of events. The commission chair, Republican Party Secretary Samvel Nikoyan, has been joined by both Dashnaksutyun representatives, and by the ULP party chairman Gurgen Arsenian, in asking probing and skeptical questions of senior police and government witnesses testifying in open session. Armenians have never before seen senior police, prosecutors, security service personnel, and other government officials subjected to anything like the kind of provocative questions that the commission members are putting to them on a weekly basis. Several opposition politicians have conceded quietly to emboffs that the Nikoyan commission has done good work and that they regret their boycott. The parliamentary commission will soon be joined by an independent experts commission, based on PACE Human Rights Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg's negotiations with President Sargsian. The new commission will not be government-dominated, and may include one international representative appointed by Hammarberg. We are working to bring several former staffers from the U.S. 9/11 Commission to Armenia October 5-11 to work with both the Nikoyan commission and the new experts panel. LONGER TERM ACTIONS: -- Nothing has been done on any of these items. -------------- -------------- THE BROADER TONE IS BETTER THAN THE SPECIFIC RECORD -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite the lackluster record noted above, there is reason to be more hopeful than we were in late May about President Sargsian's broader direction. The new president has set a positive tone in a number of ways, and has won grudging public respect, even from many skeptical Yerevantsi who had strong opposition sympathies after the March 1-2 events. Sarsgian has appointed a respected reformist prime minister, Tigran Sargsian (no relation),who has set about improving efficiency and integrity in government. The new administration made an early example of customs and tax YEREVAN 00000734 003.2 OF 003 reform, with several high-profile officials sacked, and there is a public perception that the government is slowly addressing the corruption issue. More remains to be done. Sargsian has also sacked a number of the senior police officials who were responsible for March 1-2, though without any explicit linkage to those events. The national police commander was fired and replaced with a well-respected figure, and the former head of Armenia's State Protective Security Service (the presidential security service) who had been personally tasked with keeping ex-President Ter-Petrossian under house arrest was also replaced. ¶4. (C) The most dramatic gesture undertaken by President Sargsian was his invitation to Turkish President Abdullah Gul to visit Armenia September 6 for the Turkey-Armenian World Cup qualifying match, which Gul accepted. This "soccer diplomacy" was an unqualified success, and a breakthrough that would have been unthinkable under the previous president, Robert Kocharian. Armenia's frozen non-relations and closed borders with Turkey have been a major drag on the Armenian economy. Armenians were stunned that Gul accepted the invitation and actually came, and respect Sargsian's statemanship in achieving this thaw. This was a huge boost to Sargsian's popular legitimacy and support, although Armenians remain wary of Turkish intentions and have yet to see tangible benefits. Armenians also seem broadly satisfied with Sargsian's neutral and nuanced performance during the Russia-Georgia crisis, which threatened to impose enormous economic costs to Armenia had it continued. These early foreign policy successes have bought Sargsian some domestic legitimacy and political capital that he can apply to his reform agenda. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Although the record remains decidedly mixed, we are more optimistic now than we were three months ago that Armenia may be moving fitfully down the right track. We continue to push Armenian authorities hard on the democracy agenda, and this is no time to be complacent. It is imperative, in our view, that the MCC Board not/not prematurely bless Armenia's incomplete progress by lifting the tacit sanction imposed by MCC's decision to delay the major road-funding tranche. The Armenian government has already ensured that this delay will do no harm by its decision to self-fund the roads projects through the end of 2008, and there will be ample time to complete the remainder of the Compact-funded roads before the end of the Compact period. Post's recommendation is that the MCC Board review Armenia's progress at the current Board meeting, urge Armenia to continue its progress on repairing its democratic record, and defer any decision on possible termination -- or releasing funding on the roads package -- until the December Board meeting. PENNINGTON