LIKELIHOOD OF STREET PROTESTS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000117 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, S/ES-O-CMS, DS/ITA, CA/OCS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV ASEC CASC AM SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF STREET PROTESTS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE, AFTER FEBRUARY 19 ELECTION Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Armenian political scene is growing more, rather than less, unpredictable as Election Day draws near. It is clear to us that both ex- President Levon Ter-Petrossian's (LTP) and PM Serzh Sargsian's camps are each "all in" on this election outcome. Neither will be prepared to accept a loss at the ballot box, whether fairly or otherwise. Both sides seem to be girding themselves for a post-election fight. This is LTP's last, best chance to return to power and avenge his 1998 ouster, while Sargsian's only electoral advantage is incumbency -- if he should fall now, he has little chance to make it back. Sargsian could conceivably lose the presidency, and still manage to hold onto a dominant political position from his prime ministerial perch, but this strategy depends on the risky proposition that he can hold his parliamentary faction together when all the momentum is running the other way. Both the timing and outcome of the showdown remains hard to call. Critical unknowns are how many people LTP can mobilize to the streets, how determined will be protesters' resolve, and whether authorities can really count on the security services to crack down hard on the opposition should events come to that extreme pass. ¶2. (C) BOTTOM LINE: Our best estimate is that LTP will probably fail to bring out the critical mass of determined protesters necessary to threaten regime control. Most likely is that the protest rallies will be quickly dispersed by authorities with minimal violence and without ever gaining traction. We cannot rule out the possibility, however, of a serious clash. A final possibility is that LTP's camp may fail to galvanize sufficient numbers even to make a credible attempt, and the whole thing will evaporate without a murmur. END SUMMARY -------------- PROTEST IS THE PLAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Post has concluded that key opposition political forces (led by LTP) have as their core strategy the intention to take to the streets after the upcoming presidential election, claiming that the election was stolen by authorities. Their hope will be to gather a critical mass of protesters somewhere in downtown Yerevan with an eye toward creating a "Rose8 or &Orange Revolution"-style public uprising, which they hope would create enough pressure on authorities to force the government to step down. Our judgment -- reinforced by private sentiments we have heard from government insiders over past months -- is that the authorities are equally resolved to win at any cost, and would sooner resort to violence than risk losing their grip on power. Moreover, our sense is that the authorities are fully sensitized to the possibility of an attempted uprising, and will be prepared to be as firm as they deem necessary to control events. LTP's faction probably hopes there will be enough divided loyalties within the security services that authorities will not be able to bring decisive force to bear on the protests, and that that failure will add momentum to the movement. -------------- WHEN WILL IT HAPPEN? -------------- ¶4. (C): There are many unknowns that complicate our ability to predict the timeline, extent, or outcome of street protests. The first question is whether Prime Minister Serzh Sargsian will genuinely win or YEREVAN 00000117 002 OF 003 perhaps fraudulently claim to win in the first round of balloting February 19, and how soon those results will be announced. In this scenario, street protests might be called for February 20, or might be delayed one or two days beyond that, until results have been announced by authorities and the opposition has had time to gather itself. The recent buzz has been that the ruling party is determined to win in the first round, by fair means or foul. In that event, sources close to LTP have hinted that protests would be organized swiftly, perhaps as early as election night. ¶5. (C) It is also quite possible, however, that no candidate will be found to have a majority of votes, which would lead to a second round run-off election on March 4. In that scenario, opposition street protests would likely be deferred until after the second round. However, it is also possible that the opposition would choose to ramp up its protest campaign after the first round. This scenario might unfold if Levon Ter-Petrossian is not/not among the two finalists slated to participate in the second round. This possibility becomes more likely if the second round comes down to PM Sargsian and a run-off opponent who is not considered a "real" opposition candidate. Vahan Hovannissian (Dashnaks) would be the best fit for such a stalking horse candidacy, but it is not unthinkable for Artur Baghdassarian to be cast in that role. -------------- COULD LTP ACTUALLY WIN? -------------- ¶6. (C) We also cannot rule out the possibility that Levon Ter-Petrossian or another opposition candidate might actually attract enough votes to legitimately win, though that seems unlikely at this point. We have no polling data that we can truly rely on to assess how many voters are fed up with the current government, versus how many are relatively content, and where the protest votes might ultimately go. Many voters seems to be in a quandary, not much liking Serzh Sargsian, not much liking Levon Ter-Petrossian, not sure about whether Vahan Hovannissian is really prepared to stand against Sargsian, and not sure if Artur Baghdassarian has what it takes to stand up against regime pressures. There is plenty of mistrust of all four of the leading candidates' motivations, records, and consistency. Vazgen Manukian rides the fine line between serious and frivolous candidates -- less disliked than any of the main three Sargsian rivals, but also having the smallest and least effective campaign organization and political base. Still, even Manukian could be the beneficiary of a sizeable "pox on all their houses" vote. Also unclear is whether a real anyone-but- Sargsian movement might yet galvanize a grand coalition of strange bedfellows behind a second- round Sargsian rival. -------------- YERKRAPAH WILD CARD -------------- ¶7. (C) We continue to hear unconfirmed reports from various sources that the Yerkrapah association of Nagorno Karabakh war veterans will back LTP, and Yerkrapah members will serve as a key source of pro-LTP muscle on Election Day and in any subsequent confrontations. Deputy Defense Minister General Manvel Grigorian (most commonly known simply as General Manvel) is the head of the Yerkrapah organization. Our senior DAO FSN specialist reported a conversation he had with a friend he considers reliable, who is an inner member of LTP's campaign organization. The source tells us that General Manvel backs LTP's campaign, and has made clear to fellow senior MOD staff that his Yerkrapah members would keep a close watch on the polling procedures in polling places across Armenia. Our DAO FSN also tells us YEREVAN 00000117 003 OF 003 that the MOD corps commander in Lori region is General Manvel's close friend, war buddy, and former deputy, while Manvel's son is a regimental commander in the same corps. Other Yerkrapah members and sympathizers may be sprinkled elsewhere in the army hierarchy, potentially raising the question of some disunity in the army ranks if called upon to quell demonstrators. ¶8. (c) COMMENT ON YERKRAPAH: Yerkrapah's true extent, political unity, and fervor, remain difficult for us to measure. In 1999, the war veterans group threatened President Kocharian's hold on power. It is widely understood that General Manvel's senior MOD post (with its lucrative portfolio overseeing military construction) was and remains purely a matter of buying Manvel's support. The true relationship between Manvel and his superiors in government is not well known to us, but it is plausible that these relations are chilly. If Yerkrapah is indeed mobilized to support LTP, the next unknown is whether Yerkrapah's members remain as fervently committed and as tough as they were nine years ago, when all were younger and more recently returned from the fields of battle. END COMMENT) -------------- EAC TO MEET -------------- ¶9. (C) Post will convene an Emergency Action Committee meeting February 14 to review the scenarios outlined in this cable and assess whether Embassy or Department action, such as a possible security notice, public statement or warden message, may be appropriate. PENNINGTON