NO ARMENIAN FIRST-WAVE RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO --

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS OSCE UNMIK YI SR AM
SUBJECT: NO ARMENIAN FIRST-WAVE RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO --
KOSOVO HITS VERY SENSITIVE DOMESTIC POLITICS

REF: A. A) STATE 13716

B. B) STATE 14284

Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Polchief met with the savvy and plugged-in director
of the MFA Americas Department, Armen Yeganian, to deliver
points from reftels. We left a slightly-slimmed down
version of the two cables' talking points -- redacted
somewhat in consultation with EUR/CARC to downplay
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) sensitivities -- as a non-paper.
Yeganian told us that Armenia was unable to join the first
wave of recognitions on Kosovo, because the issue touches
so many complicated sensitivities here. He assured that
Armenia would also not join the Russian/Serbian camp in
fighting the DI. He was not immediately familiar with the
OSCE Berlin Mechanism, but agreed with the point that forum
shopping seemed inappropriate. Yeganian assured that
Foreign Minister Oskanian would closely scrutinize "every
sentence" of our non-paper, to inform his decision on this
very challenging issue for Armenian policy.


2. (C) We have had an ongoing conversations with Yeganian
and with the Foreign Minister's adviser Salpi Ghazarian on
this issue. Yeganian reminded us of Armenia's difficulties
concerning Kosovo. First, Armenia has never formally
recognized the breakaway, ethnic-Armenian Azerbaijani
province
of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK),because of ongoing international
sensitivities and Minsk Group peace negotiations over NK.
This lack of NK recognition has caused domestic political
controversy in Armenia periodically, most recently in
parliament this past fall. The GOAM would likely face
domestic criticism for recognizing Kosovar independence
immediately, while never having done so for its close
cousins in NK whose independence declaration is more than a
decade old. Second, Armenia has serious worries that the
international community will over-emphasize (as the
Armenians see it) the uniqueness of the Kosovo situation,
and go overboard in declaring "never again anywhere," which
may do great harm to the NK negotiating process and to
Armenia's core foreign policy goal of seeking the
regularization and international recognition of NK's de
facto status. A third complication is the fact that
Armenia's traditional partner Russia also has strong views
on the Kosovo issue.


3. (C) COMMENT: The current presidential election season,
with election day February 19, has proved surprisingly
high-stakes. NK negotiations have been a key theme in the
race, with two sides trading exceptionally harsh rhetoric
on NK, with each side accusing the other of national
betrayal during the NK negotiations. No matter how much we
would like to persuade the South Caucasus countries of
Kosovo's uniqueness and non-precedental value, there is
no avoiding the reality that Kosovo is closely and
nervously watched as a precedent by all sides to the NK
dispute. It is extremely unlikely that the GOAM will make
any kind of move on Kosovo recognition until it gets
through its fractious election, including a possible second
round March 4, and any post-election protests that are
likely to ensue. Even after that, it will move cautiously.
PENNINGTON