ARMENIA ON POST-2008 PLANS IN IRAQ (C-DI7-02264)

S E C R E T YEREVAN 000108 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR INR/I (SMCCORMICK),EUR/CARC, NEA/I-PM (SEPTSTEIN) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: PINR PREL MARR MOPS IZ AM SUBJECT: ARMENIA ON POST-2008 PLANS IN IRAQ (C-DI7-02264) REF: A. STATE 9941 ¶B. STATE 4865 ¶C. 2006 YEREVAN 1251 DTG 170618Z OCT 07 Classified By: CDA JOSEPH PENNINGTON, REASONS 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (S) In response to reftels, the Defense Attache (DATT) and two PolOffs met February 5 with Armen Yedigarian, Head of the Department of Arms Control and International Security at the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire about GOAM intentions in Iraq after the eventual expiration of the Chapter VII UNSC resolution in December, 2008. ¶2. (S) Yedigarian, who served in Washington as Deputy Chief of Mission for five years in the first half of the decade, and who was intimately involved in 2003-04 negotiations to contribute Armenian forces to the MNF-I, said the GOAM was taking a wait-and-see approach before deciding on any future steps. ¶3. (S) Yedigarian said that the process for extending Armenian troop contributions in Iraq after the expiration of the UNSC resolution at the end of the year, or changing their composition, ultimately depended on decisions that will be made at the government's highest levels, in this case Armenia's next President and Prime Minister. (NOTE: Armenia chooses a new president on February 19, 2008. The President then appoints the Prime Minister based on the composition of political parties in the country's unicameral parliament. END NOTE.) Referring to the December, 2007 extension of Armenian forces in the MNF-I through the end of 2008, Yedigarian characterized the legislative process as fairly pro-forma, but lengthy (May-December time frame),once the President and Prime Minister provide their go-ahead. He said the MOD and the parliament take their cues from the two leaders on such politically-sensitive issues, and this would continue to be the case in the future. He also pointedly stressed that even if there were a change in the composition of Armenian troops in Iraq in the future, it definitely would not involve a decrease in troop numbers. ¶4. (S) Yedigarian said he did not see any drastic changes on the horizon in the GOAM's thinking on supporting the MNF-I, or other international peacekeeping operations around the world for that matter (ie, Kosovo). He noted that Armenia is even considering contributing troops to Afghanistan in the future. He stated that Armenia needed to be involved in such international efforts, that participation in them supported its international image, provided experience to Armenian forces, and enhanced the Armenian military's interoperability with foreign militaries. He noted that Armenia had already started the process to upgrade its peacekeeping forces from a battalion-sized element to a brigade-sized element. The second peacekeeping battalion began its manning and equipping at the end of 2007. In further support of his claim that Armenia increasingly favored participation in peacekeeping operations, he quoted PM Sargsian's oft-stated line that "Armenia must not only be a consumer of international security, but a producer as well." ¶5. (S) Yedigarian said the GOAM would watch how the USG conducts its negotiations for its post-2008 defense relationship with Iraq before it declared its position on a potential third-party defense cooperation agreement (DCA) that would tie Armenia into a bilateral US-Iraq DCA. In a veiled reference to the approaching US presidential election, Yedigarian hypothetically stressed that Armenia would want to avoid a potential scenario where it might be "marooned" in Iraq if the US were ever to abruptly change gears on Iraq policy and its military presence there. ¶6. (S) DATT and PolOffs asked whether Armenia's February 19 presidential election could have a possible impact on GOAM thinking vis-a-vis its troop contributions to the MFN-I. Yedigarian said that it is conceivable that policy could be changed in the event that an opposition candidate wins the presidency. He noted that there is still a part of the Armenian public that wonders why it is in Armenia's interest to send troops to Iraq. He said so far two factors have contributed to tamping down any public opposition to the MNF-I, those being a) no Armenian casualties to date, with the exception of a serviceman who lost his leg; and b) no religion-hued backlash in Iraq (and by extension, the rest of the Arab world) against ethnic Armenians living in the Middle East. ¶7. (S) On possible USG incentives to support Armenian troops in post-2008 Iraq, Yedigarian said the GOAM appreciated all of the technical and logistical support that Armenian forces had received from the United States in Iraq, and hoped it would continue as long as Armenian forces played a role in the MNF-I. ¶8. (S) COMMENT: Current prime minister (and long-time defense minister) Serzh Sargsian is the front-runner for the presidency. Should he win, as expected, we would expect him to deliver on his promise (Ref C) to double Armenia's Iraq contingent after the elections. However, should the elections prove messy -- for example, if Sargsian wins in a way that provokes sharp criticisms from the USG and international community -- it is possible he would retaliate by ending Armenia's Iraq deployment. Should, against all odds, a rival candidate win the presidency, it is an open question whether the new president would support continued deployment there. The detailed mechanics and legal technicalities of the deployment are considerably less important than the views of the political leadership. If there is a high-level political will to continue Armenia's Iraq deployment, they will not let technical details stand in the way. PENNINGTON