Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08YEREVAN1035
2008-12-24 08:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR AM 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYE #1035/01 3590821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240821Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8456
C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 001035 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: A. A. SECSTATE 120019

B. B. SECSTATE 124815

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 001035 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2018 TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR AM SUBJECT: ARMENIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: A. A. SECSTATE 120019 ¶B. B. SECSTATE 124815 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: There have been no major terrorism-related developments in Armenia in 2008. Armenia continued to be a constructive partner of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Armenian Government (GOAM) made measured progress in implementing border security and anti-smuggling measures, and continues to participate in several multilateral counterterrorism initiatives. Widespread corruption, however, continues to hamper full implementation and enforcement of laws that would improve Armenia's counterterrorism posture and response capability. Per reftel instructions, the following is an update of Armenia,s 2007 Country Report on Terrorism. END SUMMARY. -------------- FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION -------------- ¶2. (U) In 2008, Armenia continued to be a valued partner of the United States in the GWOT. This partnership included granting blanket over-flight clearance and ad hoc landing rights to U.S. military aircraft, deployment of a peacekeeping contingent to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),and participation in bilateral assistance programs that strengthened its capacity to monitor illicit financial flows and confront trafficking in hazardous substances. ¶3. (U) In the summer of 2008, the government of Iraq informed Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) that it would not require the same level of international security assistance in 2009. In response to this reduced requirement, the Armenian 46-man peacekeeping contingent returned from OIF in October after successfully completing its assigned missions. Since that time the Armenian Ministry of Defense has expressed active interest in sending a peacekeeping contingent to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This year Armenia also entered into negotiations with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on participating in the Biological Threat Reduction Prevention (BTRP) Program, which would greatly improve Armenia's ability to respond to regional biological threats. As of December, DTRA had conducted a successful table top exercise in Armenia and expected to sign a BTRP implementation agreement with the GOAM early in 2009. ¶4. (U) Armenia was an active participant in severa
l bilateral and multilateral assistance, security, and training initiatives targeted at strengthening its ability to combat terrorism finance and the smuggling of illicit and hazardous materials. These initiatives included: the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICANT),the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI),and related training programs sponsored by the resident offices of Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). -------------- MEASURED PROGRESS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) By December, Armenia had achieved measured progress in implementing border security and anti-trafficking measures. These measures included: 1) the installation of Radiation Portal Alarms at all land ports of entry (POEs) and at its main airport; 2) the installation of sensors for and increased monitoring of Armenia's green border with Georgia; and 3) the Armenian Border Guard Service expected to have full connectivity of its automated Border Management Information System (BMIS) with all POEs, which would reduce the possibility of passport and visa fraud. (Note: The BMIS contains criminal and terrorist watch-lists as updated by the Republic of Armenia's Police and National Security Service. End note) ¶6. (SBU) In May, Armenia revised its law on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF Law). This revision significantly expanded the range of reporting entities required to report suspicious transactions to the Financial Monitoring Center (FMC),a specialized intelligence unit within the Central Bank that is responsible for combating money laundering and terrorism financing. The FMC continued to share information internationally with other FIUs through its membership in the Egmont Group. To date, no transactions involving watch-list designees or other suspected terrorist financing cases have been uncovered. -------------- CHALLENGES -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Lack of institutional capacity and endemic corruption at all levels of government continued to hamper Armenia's ability to fully implement and enforce many of the legislative and organizational changes that it has made in recent years to improve its counterterrorism posture. During an October Cross Border Workshop sponsored by EXBS and the OSCE, an Armenian expert in border security and smuggling issues stated that "for a bribe of USD 10,000, you can smuggle anything you want" into and out of Armenia. Similarly, Emboffs have frequently encountered apathy when dealing with the Customs service, Police, and Border Guards on issues related to the smuggling of radioactive substances and trafficking in persons. -------------- RELATIONS WITH IRAN -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Throughout 2008, Armenia demonstrated continued interest in strengthening its ties with Iran. In May President Serzh Sargsian declared support for expanding joint projects in the energy and transportation sectors. This was followed by the visits of at least two cabinet level officials to Tehran in the fall to discuss cooperation in security, political, economic, and cultural spheres. And as a reciprocal visit, Armenia hosted the Deputy Secretary of Iran's Security Council in December to discuss bilateral cooperation further. As a result of the increased diplomatic activity, Armenia continued to be reluctant to participate in international efforts that criticized or placed pressure on Iran for its non-compliance on issues related to nuclear proliferation and terrorism finance. -------------- TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is reported to have a limited official presence in Armenia, primarily for fundraising purposes among the local Kurdish minority. However there is no evidence to suggest that it is conducting military training or operations in the country. ¶10. (C) Separately, the Regional Security Office (RSO) noted possible surveillance incidents of the U.S. Embassy involving Iranian nationals and Iranian diplomatic plated vehicles. -------------- POST ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In 2008, Armenia continued to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities and enhance its cooperation with the United States and regional security structures such as NATO, OSCE, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It was a contributing member of peacekeeping forces in OIF and Kosovo, and actively participated in a number of international initiatives that countered nuclear terrorism and smuggling. As of December, there were no registered terrorist incidents, and Armenia did not serve as a safe haven to terrorist groups. Armenia was a relatively insignificant player in money laundering and terrorist financing activities. However, widespread governmental corruption, a large organized crime presence, and a shadow economy made the country potentially vulnerable to money laundering schemes and other illicit activities. Furthermore, Armenia's geographic location along established trafficking routes between Iran and the Former Soviet Union (FSU),and its loose visa regime, also made it a potential transit corridor for traffickers of illicit materials, persons, and finances. -------------- POST POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Post POC on general terrorism issues is PolEcon officer Nigel De Coster; e-mail: decosterna@state.gov; tel. ( 374 10) 46-47-00 ext. 4628. YOVANOVITCH YOVANOVITCH

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