CAMEROON: GOV'T OFFICIALS ON IMPENDING BAKASSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YAOUNDE 000762 SIPDIS STATE ALSO FOR AF/C, AF/W AND AF/RSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 TAGS: CM EAID MOPS NI PBTS PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SOCI MASS SUBJECT: CAMEROON: GOV'T OFFICIALS ON IMPENDING BAKASSI HANDOVER Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Linnisa Wahid for reasons 1.4 b&d ¶1. (C) Summary. The Government of Cameroon (GRC) is not well-positioned to understand or deal with on-going violence in Bakassi and likely will not be so until well after the planned August 14 handover, according to meetings the Ambassador had with GRC officials and others during the week of July 23. On July 23 and 25, the Ambassador held a series of discussions about Bakassi with Nigerian High Commissioner Philip Ali Douada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henri Eyebe Ayissi and the Secretary General at the Presidency, Laurent Esso. Esso argued that it was the Government of Nigeria's (GON) responsibility to secure Bakassi until the August 14 handover to Cameroon. After the handover, Esso said, President Paul Biya will install five new sub-governors in Bakassi and the GRC would be in a better position to develop a solution to the insecurity. Ayissi appealed to the Ambassador for development and intelligence assistance, a message that was delivered to other COMs in a series of highly publicized meetings. Douada stressed the need for a delicate approach to Bakassi, while expressing fear that the GRC would use a heavy hand. Despite the approaching August 14 handover, none of the officials knew how the handover would take place. Given the escalation in attacks against the GRC military and the subsequent GRC counter-offensive, we anticipate a stronger response from the GRC leading up to and after August 14, making continued USG engagement--on mil-mil training and in fostering GRC-GON communication--all the more important. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On July 25, Ambassador called on the Secretary General at the Presidency Laurent Esso, who told the Ambassador that the Bakassi problem was "simple:" the Greentree Agreement gave the GON full latitude to organize their departure and provide security in Bakassi. The Cameroonian army had no access to the zone, and so could not effectively address the insecurity. After the formal transfer, President Biya planned to appoint five new prefets (sub regional authorities) in Bakassi after which the GRC would determine the best course of action against the pirates. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the GRC was planning to send the highly trained and equipped Battalion d,Intervention Rapide (BIR) to stabilize Bakassi. Esso evaded the question, repeating that the security response would depend on the nature of the problem, which could not be determined until after the installation of the prefets. The situation in Bakassi is new, he added, as there had never been a military intervention in the region. However, Esso said there are "professionals to battle with the pirates". August 14 Handover -------------- ¶4. (C) Esso stated that the GON had two years since the signing of the Greentree Agreement to secure Bakassi, but they did not. He said that the GON was pushing for the August 14 handover to occur in either in Ikang or Abuja, Nigeria because the GON said they could not secure Bakassi. Esso added that the GON Minister of Justice would soon visit Cameroon to discuss the modalities of the August 14 handover ceremony. International Community -------------- ¶5. (C) Esso told the Ambassador that as witnesses to the Greentree Agreement, the USG, Germany, France and the UK had an obligation to ensure that the agreement was implemented. He suggested that the USG pressure the GON to pay attention to the Bakassi problem. The GON needs to "manifest its political will", Esso argued. The USG should stress to the GON, particularly the National Assembly, that the International Court of Justice decision was clear: Bakassi must return to Cameroon. He stressed that neighboring countries must cooperate to secure the area and cited the "Gulf of Guinea Commission" which was established to examine the problem of security. Esso said that the GRC was ready to join the Commission, but that the GON would not agree to the treaty because it does not want to defer to the ICJ in cases of disputes. In terms of joint patrols between the GON and the GRC, Esso said that if the GON wanted to cooperate, Cameroon would be willing to go along. He added that the YAOUNDE 00000762 002 OF 003 situation in Bakassi had implications for the operations of the Douala port, which has major economic implications for Cameroon and others in the region. Minister of Foreign Affairs Calls in Ambassador -------------- -- ¶6. (C) On July 25, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henri Eyebi Ayissi convoked the Ambassador with the purpose of "giving the latest information to the international community" on Bakassi, one of a series of highly publicized meetings with members of the diplomatic corps. Ayissi said the GRC appreciated the support of the countries who witnessed the Greentree Agreement. He said there was a strong public commitment by the GON and the GRC to the peaceful transfer of Bakassi, but suggested that the situation on the ground did not mirror public commitments. He requested that the USG publicly condemn the attacks and provide intelligence and development assistance. Ayissi added that the GRC had taken the needs of Bakassi into account in the FY09 budgeting process. Ambassador meets with Nigerian High Commissioner -------------- --- ¶7. (C) On July 23, the Ambassador called on Nigerian High Commissioner Philip Ali Douada, who said he still did not have details of the handover ceremony. He opined that the handover ceremony could occur in Calabar or Atabong in Nigeria and promised to share more information within the next two weeks. ¶8. (C) Douada said that the internal debate in Nigeria was about whether the National Assembly had ratified the Greentree Agreement. He added that there was evidence that the Agreement had been tabled in the Assembly and that due to the Assembly's inaction the agreement had not been ratified. Douada stated that the new National Assembly was discussing the Greentree Agreement in order to appear relevant to their constituents. ¶9. (C) Douda said he had assured Nigerian leaders in Cameroon that Nigerians in the region would not see any immediate changes, such as an influx of Cameroonians, after the handover. Douada cautioned that that the GRC military needed to be careful not to harass the people in Bakassi, but predicted that the GRC would intentionally send non-English speaking gendarmes to English-speaking Bakassi and use the language barrier as an excuse for the increased harassment of the population. In response to whether there was connection with the Niger Delta rebels and the Niger Delta Defense and Security Council (NDDSC),which has claimed responsibility for the Bakassi attacks, Douada said the forces were separate and in competition with one another. He added that the Niger Delta rebels had no reason to be in Bakassi because the Niger Delta was more financially rewarding. In response to Ambassador's question about joint GON-GRC security patrols, Douada said a Joint Commission (set up before the 2002 ICJ ruling) that was supposed to work on joint security patrols in the Gulf of Guinea had not continued. He added that the GON and the GRC were attempting to re-implement the Commission. Comment: USG Engagement All the More Important -------------- -- ¶10. (C) The planning for the August 14 handover ceremony appears to be stalled until the arrival of the Nigerian representative. At this point, however, it looks unlikely that the ceremony will be held in Bakassi due to security concerns. With the planned appointment of five new prefets, it appears the GRC will make a significant effort to administer the region. If the GRC does move ahead with reported plans to train a new Battalion d,Intervention Rapide (BIR) for Bakassi within the next year, it will be a strong signal of the GRC's determination to secure the region. But the GRC will be unable to secure the region without cooperation and support from the GON and the international community. As a witness to the Greentree Agreement, the USG should encourage and facilitate increased cooperation between the GON and GRC. Military training is especially important because gendarmes, not the BIR, are the first armed forces on the ground in Bakassi. The people of Bakassi and the international community will closely monitor YAOUNDE 00000762 003 OF 003 their actions. If the military in Bakassi uses a too heavy hand it could spell a long, protracted conflict with the people and the armed elements, bringing more instability to Cameroon. End comment. GARVEY