CAMEROON RIOTS SPUR GOVERMENT ACTION, BUT TO WHAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YAOUNDE 000330 SIPDIS SIPDIS TREASURY FOR FRANCOIS BOYE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV KCOR ECON EFIN PINR CM SUBJECT: CAMEROON RIOTS SPUR GOVERMENT ACTION, BUT TO WHAT END? REF: A. YAOUNDE 313 ¶B. YAOUNDE 237 ¶C. YAOUNDE 193 Classified By: Political Officer Tad Brown for Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. In the month since violent social unrest rattled Cameroon's highly touted stability, the Government has responded with uncharacteristic celerity and a flurry of highly publicized economic decisions. President Paul Biya on March 7 called a rare Cabinet meeting, issuing firm instructions aimed at addressing the rising cost of living, unemployment and corruption. The Government of Cameroon hustled to implement a civil service pay raise, suspension of taxes and duties on basic commodities, and a number of high-profile economic development projects, especially in the energy sector. Even after Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni announced austerity measures to keep official spending in check and the police rounded up a half-dozen senior current and former officials for corruption, many observers wonder whether these measures are intended to address the grievances underlying the February riots or to lay the groundwork for Biya's removal of constitutional term limits, perhaps as soon as next week, and other measures to solidify his hold on power. End summary. First Step: Acknowledge There is a Problem -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Biya's February 27 speech to the nation in the midst of the riots that week was widely panned for ignoring the population's grievances (ref c). However, once the unrest was subdued, Biya called an extraordinary meeting of his cabinet on March 7. According to his published, unusually frank statement to the Cabinet, he acknowledged, "for many Cameroonians, especially in the urban areas, life is difficult" and "the population's impatience is understandable, given the sluggish pace of reform." Admitting that economic reform will take many years, Biya nonetheless lamented "I am not sure we have done everything we could have" to address the population's plight. Biya instructed his government to take immediate action on three fronts: improve purchasing power, create employment, and fight corruption. Second Step: Buying Love -------------- ¶3. (U) To address cost-of-living issues, at the Cabinet meeting Biya announced pay raises for civil servants (including the military and police) and suspended taxes and import duties on a slate of basic commodities like rice, wheat, flour, fish, cooking oil, and cement. To address unemployment, Biya promised the GRC would expedite government hiring, especially of teachers and security forces. Without making concrete commitments, Biya said the GRC would also study the price regimes for petroleum products, mobile telephone charges and banking services. Third Step: A Publicity Offensive -------------- ¶4. (U) Since receiving Biya's instructions, the GRC has worked in an unprecedented flurry of activity to implement--or, at least, be filmed implementing--Biya's directives. For example, a South Korean company that had seen its proposed cement factory stalled for two years by bureaucratic snags was called back to Cameroon and the project given expedited handling, all with front page coverage. Prime Minister Inoni, accompanied by many members of the cabinet (and the Ambassador),presided over a public ceremony to lay the cornerstone of a new power plant in Dibamba, to be constructed by American firm AES SONEL. Minister of Energy Bernard Sindeu led a high-profile delegation to Europe to secure financing for the long-stalled Lom Pangar power project; headlines in the state-owned media trumpeted that they received much more funding than they had requested. Fourth Step: Getting Tough on Corruption -------------- YAOUNDE 00000330 002 OF 003 ¶5. (U) Having checked the boxes for cost-of-living and unemployment, the GRC turned to anticorruption with the March 31 arrest of six senior officials from the Ministries of Finance and Health, including the former ministers (ref a). Minister for Justice Amadou Ali, speaking on March 28 before the National Assembly, promised that the arrests would continue, indicating he was working from a list of 20 high-profile suspects. But Can We Cash These Checks? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Even before the civil servants celebrated their pay raises (which in any case won't come through until the end of April),there were questions about how the GRC, which recently emerged from a long debt-forgiveness process, would pay for these measures. Minister of Finance Essimi Menye estimated the pay hikes would cost 96 billion CFA (about $230 million, or 4 percent of the current budget) while the suspension of taxes and duties would cost about 45 billion CFA (about $100 million, or 2 percent of the budget). In a March 13 meeting with the Ambassador, Essimi Menye said Biya's surprised pay raise announcement simply accelerated a decision that was already in the works. Saying that finance officials were furiously reworking the budget numbers, Essimi Menye estimated that the GRC could reduce spending by 30 percent in the first quarter of FY08 with simple austerity measures. In a March 27 meeting with the cabinet, Prime Minister Inoni was uncharacteristically passionate, reportedly slamming his hand on the table for emphasis as he ordered a freeze on the purchase of new vehicles, a reduction in foreign travel, and a diminution of the size of personnel on each foreign delegation. Comment: To What End? -------------- ¶7. (C) The state-run press and some interlocutors comment that the GRC's unprecedented activism is evidence that Biya is sympathetic to the population's complaints and determined to whip his government into action. Other contacts, including members of the ruling party, have suggested that the publicity offensive is aimed at smoothing the way for Biya's "fifth step": push ahead with the removal of constitutional term limits. There is no indication that the fiscal measures will succeed in lowering prices. A customs official told Poloff on April 2 that the provisions on cement had not resulted in any new imports and that he perceived the economic cartels in Cameroon to be sufficiently powerful to frustrate any attempts at competition on other products like rice. Prices for many commodities have not declined, with many traders claiming to still possess stock bought before the recent measures. ¶8. (C) While we have long wished for a more active GRC, we remain unconvinced that Biya's emergency measures will have the desired impact and we fear that his motivations are misplaced. The population's pocketbook woes are caused by decades of mismanagement that has handicapped Cameroon's economy--a mismanagement that has persisted because the lack of democracy in Cameroon has insulated Biya and GRC decision-makers from the population's ire. Such a government--out of touch with the population and in thrall to entrenched economic interests--is unlikely to be the agent of the thorough reform that is needed. We maintain our faith in Essimi Menye's determination to enact long-term reform in the government budget, but Biya's measures have a distinctly short-term air about them, lending credence to the accusation that they are driven more by political than economic calculations. ¶9. (C) Biya's spending measures risk exacerbating Cameroon's already worrying inflation and will not help address the fundamental problem that Cameroon's productive capacity is not growing. The arrest of the former Finance and Health Ministers was long overdue but, we fear, motivated more by political calculations--to weaken the group of upstarts seeking to usurp Biya (ref b)--than a genuine anti-corruption purge. Nevertheless, we continue to receive signals that a cleansing cabinet shuffle and more expansive arrests may be imminent. As much as we welcome the renewed focus on anticorruption and the GRC's frenetic efforts to jumpstart the economy, the objectives are shortsighted--to weaken Biya's opponents and consolidate his rule--and YAOUNDE 00000330 003 OF 003 therefore unlikely to help Cameroon address its long-seething economic and political problems. NELSON