SHOW ME THE MONEY! CAMEROON FOCUSES ON ASSET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 001034 SIPDIS LAGOS FOR LEGATT PRETORIA FOR DHS TREASURY FOR FINCEN DOJ FOR OIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: KCOR EFIN ECON PREL CM SUBJECT: SHOW ME THE MONEY! CAMEROON FOCUSES ON ASSET RECOVERY REF: YAOUNDE 913 Classified By: Political officer Tad Brown for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. In the midst of an ongoing anti-corruption drive--the most aggressive in Cameroon's history --Cameroonians, from government officials and journalists to the proverbial man on the street, are increasingly fixated on the prospects of asset recovery. With dozens of senior officials on trial or in prison, the appetite for further arrests is waning amid a growing sentiment that arrests are meaningless unless the looted funds are recovered. Officials from the U.S. Departments of Justice and Treasury met with their counterparts in Yaounde during the week of October 6 to explain the American legal system, specifically the modalities of asset recovery. The visit revealed the Cameroonians' strong desire for such cooperation, but also laid bare the lack of basic capacity and infrastructure to effectively track stolen funds. Post will continue to liaise with USG counterparts to identify opportunities to advance U.S. interests in anti-corruption and in combating financial crimes. End summary. ¶2. (C) Motivated by the imperative for debt relief and the realization of how corrupt his government had become, President Paul Biya launched an anti-corruption drive (dubbed "Operation Epervier" or "Operation Sparrowhawk") in early 2006, with the arrest of three senior officials. Other arrests have followed, making Operation Epervier the most ambitious anti-corruption drive in Cameroon's history, albeit one subject to allegations of political undertones and insufficient due process. As the population's clamor for high-level arrests has been sated, the focus of public opinion has shifted to asset recovery, with many observers opining that further arrests will be meaningless unless they involve asset recovery. ¶3. (C) Hoping to identify assets stashed abroad (and, perhaps, to obtain damning information on members of his government),Biya solicited services of French national Francis Dooh Collins, a self-styled financial investigator who received millions in payments from the GRC treasury while alienating potential allies and casting doubt on the GRC's seriousness (ref a). Post is aware that Dooh Collins succeeded in obtaining some actionable information from authorities in Luxembourg and perhaps some other European countries, but his most significant legacy may be in convincing the GRC authorities that they are better off dealing directly with other governments rather than through shadowy intermediaries. Seeking assistance from USG counterparts, Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Justice Amadou Ali and other judicial officials (including prosecutors and judges) have written requesting information on US-based assets of officials suspected or convicted of embezzlement and other financial crimes. Post has transmitted these letters rogatory to USDOJ, but an initial review revealed that the requests did not contain the investigative elements necessary for a USG response. ¶4. (C) In this context, Post invited Patricia Petty from USDOJ's Office of International Affairs, and NiiBen Ayivorh from the Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN),to visit Yaounde the week of October 6 for meetings with their counterparts in Cameroon's Ministry of Justice and Financial Intelligence Unit, known as ANIF. Their meetings, which included a day-long seminar at the Embassy for 40 prosecutors and judicial officials, succeeded in answering GRC officials' questions about the American legal system, especially regarding the threshold of information required for U.S. authorities to act on a request for legal assistance. GRC officials appreciated the outreach (noting that no other government had offered the same level of cooperation),but expressed concern that their capacity would fall short of what was needed to pursue asset forfeiture. ¶5. (C) Specifically, Cameroonian justice officials were skeptical that their investigators (mainly from the Judicial Police branch of the National Police) will be capable to meet the USG's request for a detailed, step-by-step chain of evidence linking the crime in Cameroon to the assets in the YAOUNDE 00001034 002 OF 002 US. To illustrate the particular challenges of the Cameroonian context, one prosecutor explained that his case (involving embezzlement at the Cameroon Shipyards) is complicated by the primary suspect's practice of removing large sums (as much as $800,000) from government accounts in cash, whereby the evidence trail disappears. USG officials urged their Cameroonian colleagues to be imaginative and look to see where such looted funds might have "re-surfaced" (and noted parenthetically that the ease with which funds were embezzled proves the need for more robust legislation and regulation to prevent corruption and aid investigators). ¶6. (C) The Cameroonians further noted their frustration with what they perceived to be the lack of cooperation from other countries, particularly the French. One prosecutor relayed his experience trying to freeze assets in a French bank (for which he had a trail of bank transfers),only to find that the bank allowed the suspect to transfer the funds out through other accounts before freezing them. ¶7. (C) Comment: Operation Epervier represents an unprecedented opportunity, albeit an imperfect one, to advance USG interests in combating corruption and other financial crimes. Political will is uneven, at best, and there are some easy wins the GRC has yet to advance, like implementing asset declaration for senior officials. At the same time, however, GRC law enforcement is more open than ever to involving USG officials in the details of their investigations. Minister Ali and his team spent more than three hours with the FINCEN and DOJ visitors, going over procedures and specific cases, and afterward told Pol/Econ Chief that he thought the session was "excellent." The Embassy seminar served to bring Cameroonian officials together (it was evident that some of them had never met, much less collaborated),and they stayed after hours to review specific cases with the trainers. ¶8. (C) The DOJ/FINCEN visit revealed gaps in the GRC's basic capacities, especially in tracking financial information. ANIF lacks basic computer systems and keeps its financial records in paper files. Despite these lacuna, which would frustrate even the most robust anti-corruption efforts, many Cameroonian officials evinced a desire to improve their efficacy in fighting corruption and other financial crimes. Post will reach out to appropriate offices at State, Justice (including Legatt Abuja),DHS and Treasury to discuss further opportunities for training and collaboration, including steps that might be taken within the U.S. (with correspondent banks, for example) to aid GRC authorities in their efforts. GARVEY