POLAND AND MISSILE DEFENSE: 95 PERCENT DONE OR 95

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000813

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T AND ISN/MDSP
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/FO, EUR/NCE AND EUR/PRA
SECDEF FOR USDP EDELMAN AND DASD B.GREEN AND D.FATA
EUCOM FOR ECJ-5 BG MAYVILLE AND ECJ-2 BG CARR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PL RS IR
SUBJECT: POLAND AND MISSILE DEFENSE: 95 PERCENT DONE OR 95
PERCENT DEAD?

Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) As Washington sits down to lunch today, President
Kaczynski will be trying to cajole/pressure Prime Minister
Tusk into concluding negotiations with the US on Missile
Defense (MD). Kaczynski will draw on an agreement privately
reached between the two last March in Urata, when, according
to advisors to the President, Tusk reportedly agreed to
conclude a BMDA with the US in return for, inter alia,
Kaczynski's signature on the Lisbon Treaty. Roughly two weeks
ago, Kaczynski lost faith that Tusk would deliver on MD, and
began to inserted himself forcefully into the BMDA
negotiations.


2. (C) Kaczynski is attempting to be both menacing and
helpful on MD, if that is possible. Sending former FM and
current Presidential Advisor Anna Fotyga to Washington to
assert control over the BMDA negotiations was almost
stupifying in its brazenness, but no less so than his
pronouncement on the opening day of MD talks in Washington
that he saw no reason to sign the Lisbon Treaty. July 4,
shortly before the Prime Minister's Press Conference to
announce his dissatisfaction with the US offer on MD,
Kaczynski summoned Foreign Minister Sikorski to demand the
turnover of all cables, memos, and emails concerning the
negotiations, taping the session formally to put Sikorski on
notice.


3. (C) At the same time, Kaczynski, according to advisors
Fotyga and Mariusz Handzlik, does not want MD to become a
political football in Poland. While not shying away from
every constitutional lever he can muster, Kaczynski's
advisors say the President is ready to let Tusk and Sikorski
get top-credit for a MD deal -- just as long as there is a
deal. Kaczynski, according to Handzlik, is even prepared to
praise Sikorski publicly, if that will convince the FM to
declare victory and close the negotiations.


4. (S) Foreign Minister Sikorski has been no less dramatic in
his handling of the negotiations. From numerous well-placed
sources we have heard that Sikorski has been systematically,
if not fanatically, controlling the flow of information about
the negotiations to Tusk. He spiked a memo prepared by
Polish negotiator Witold Waszczykowski outlining the benefits
to Poland of the BMDA agreement, accusing Waszczykowski of
being a mouthpiece for the Americans. Sikorski took
Waszczykowski off the negotiations on his return to Warsaw
July 3, and undertook to brief Tusk himself on the talks with
U/S Rood last week. In a phone conversation with the
Ambassador July 4, Sikorski criticized Waszczykowski for
publicly announcing agreement on the BMDA text, saying he was
not authorized to do so.


5. (C) Sikorski's efforts are clearly paying off. He has not
only convinced the Prime Minister to hold out for more from
the Americans, he fenced Tusk in domestically by convincing
the PM to publicly associate himself on July 4 with
Sikorski's ambitions for the negotiations, i.e. permanent
stationing of Patriot batteries and stronger security
commitments from the U.S. In the lead up to his July 4 press
conference, we saw two versions of the Prime Minister's
remarks. In the end, the tougher version drafted by Sikorski
prevailed. In his July 3 conversation with the Ambassador,
Tusk candidly admitted that he is dependent on his advisors
to tell him what would be a good deal on MD, and Sikorski is
the person to whom the PM turns almost exclusively.


6. (SBU) Ironically enough, public support for MD appears to
be rising -- perhaps because the public feels assured that
the Tusk government is standing up for a good deal from the
Americans. Spot polls show support for MD has risen by 10
points in the last month to 42 percent -- the highest level
of support for MD since late 2005. That said, most Poles
(over 80 percent) don't think Poland owes the U.S. any favors
in these talks, and an overwhelming majority (71 percent) do
not expect the U.S. to pay for Poland's military

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modernization in exchange for MD. Our read suggests that
Tusk still has a fair bit of latitude to define victory, and
the public will go along with him, provided he asserts he
struck a tough bargain with the world's superpower.


7. (C) Going into the meeting with Tusk today, Kaczynski is
reportedly very confident of his success -- significantly
more than we are. We agree that ceding credit to Tusk, and
above all to Sikorski, is key to closing these negotiations
soon, but Sikorski still needs to be convinced to put down
his battering ram. Sikorski's meeting and phone call with
the two major U.S. Presidential candidates this week, along
with his off-handed comment to the Ambassador July 4 that "we
will safeguard the MD sites for another year" suggest
Sikorski maybe a bit too ready to take his chances with a new
administration. The President, meanwhile, is certainly
trying to make it more dificult for the Prime Minister to
allow our MD talks to fail. Lisbon is near and dear to the
Tusk administration, which above all is trying to shift is
focus to Europe. But to agree to MD, Tusk will also need to
be able to argue credibly that the milestones set out for him
by his Foreign Minister have been achieved.
ASHE