POLAND AND MISSILE DEFENSE: 95 PERCENT DONE OR 95

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000813 SIPDIS STATE FOR T AND ISN/MDSP STATE ALSO FOR EUR/FO, EUR/NCE AND EUR/PRA SECDEF FOR USDP EDELMAN AND DASD B.GREEN AND D.FATA EUCOM FOR ECJ-5 BG MAYVILLE AND ECJ-2 BG CARR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PL RS IR SUBJECT: POLAND AND MISSILE DEFENSE: 95 PERCENT DONE OR 95 PERCENT DEAD? Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) As Washington sits down to lunch today, President Kaczynski will be trying to cajole/pressure Prime Minister Tusk into concluding negotiations with the US on Missile Defense (MD). Kaczynski will draw on an agreement privately reached between the two last March in Urata, when, according to advisors to the President, Tusk reportedly agreed to conclude a BMDA with the US in return for, inter alia, Kaczynski's signature on the Lisbon Treaty. Roughly two weeks ago, Kaczynski lost faith that Tusk would deliver on MD, and began to inserted himself forcefully into the BMDA negotiations. ¶2. (C) Kaczynski is attempting to be both menacing and helpful on MD, if that is possible. Sending former FM and current Presidential Advisor Anna Fotyga to Washington to assert control over the BMDA negotiations was almost stupifying in its brazenness, but no less so than his pronouncement on the opening day of MD talks in Washington that he saw no reason to sign the Lisbon Treaty. July 4, shortly before the Prime Minister's Press Conference to announce his dissatisfaction with the US offer on MD, Kaczynski summoned Foreign Minister Sikorski to demand the turnover of all cables, memos, and emails concerning the negotiations, taping the session formally to put Sikorski on notice. ¶3. (C) At the same time, Kaczynski, according to advisors Fotyga and Mariusz Handzlik, does not want MD to become a political football in Poland. While not shying away from every constitutional lever he can muster, Kaczynski's advisors say the President is ready to let Tusk and Sikorski get top-credit for a MD deal -- just as long as there is a deal. Kaczynski, according to Handzlik, is even prepared to praise Sikorski publicly, if that will convince the FM to declare victory and close the negotiations. ¶4. (S) Foreign Minister Sikorski has been no less dramatic in his handling of the negotiations. From numerous well-placed sources we have heard that Sikorski has been systematically, if not fanatically, controlling the flow of information about the negotiations to Tusk. He spiked a memo prepared by Polish negotiator Witold Waszczykowski outlining the benefits to Poland of the BMDA agreement, accusing Waszczykowski of being a mouthpiece for the Americans. Sikorski took Waszczykowski off the negotiations on his return to Warsaw July 3, and undertook to brief Tusk himself on the talks with U/S Rood last week. In a phone conversation with the Ambassador July 4, Sikorski criticized Waszczykowski for publicly announcing agreement on the BMDA text, saying he was not authorized to do so. ¶5. (C) Sikorski's efforts are clearly paying off. He has not only convinced the Prime Minister to hold out for more from the Americans, he fenced Tusk in domestically by convincing the PM to publicly associate himself on July 4 with Sikorski's ambitions for the negotiations, i.e. permanent stationing of Patriot batteries and stronger security commitments from the U.S. In the lead up to his July 4 press conference, we saw two versions of the Prime Minister's remarks. In the end, the tougher version drafted by Sikorski prevailed. In his July 3 conversation with the Ambassador, Tusk candidly admitted that he is dependent on his advisors to tell him what would be a good deal on MD, and Sikorski is the person to whom the PM turns almost exclusively. ¶6. (SBU) Ironically enough, public support for MD appears to be rising -- perhaps because the public feels assured that the Tusk government is standing up for a good deal from the Americans. Spot polls show support for MD has risen by 10 points in the last month to 42 percent -- the highest level of support for MD since late 2005. That said, most Poles (over 80 percent) don't think Poland owes the U.S. any favors in these talks, and an overwhelming majority (71 percent) do not expect the U.S. to pay for Poland's military WARSAW 00000813 002 OF 002 modernization in exchange for MD. Our read suggests that Tusk still has a fair bit of latitude to define victory, and the public will go along with him, provided he asserts he struck a tough bargain with the world's superpower. ¶7. (C) Going into the meeting with Tusk today, Kaczynski is reportedly very confident of his success -- significantly more than we are. We agree that ceding credit to Tusk, and above all to Sikorski, is key to closing these negotiations soon, but Sikorski still needs to be convinced to put down his battering ram. Sikorski's meeting and phone call with the two major U.S. Presidential candidates this week, along with his off-handed comment to the Ambassador July 4 that "we will safeguard the MD sites for another year" suggest Sikorski maybe a bit too ready to take his chances with a new administration. The President, meanwhile, is certainly trying to make it more dificult for the Prime Minister to allow our MD talks to fail. Lisbon is near and dear to the Tusk administration, which above all is trying to shift is focus to Europe. But to agree to MD, Tusk will also need to be able to argue credibly that the milestones set out for him by his Foreign Minister have been achieved. ASHE