A/S FRIED MEETINGS WITH NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 000081 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR U/S ROOD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PL SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETINGS WITH NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT FOCUS ON MISSILE DEFENSE Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A/S for European and Eurasian Affairs Dan Fried during his January 16-17 visit discussed Missile Defense (MD),Iraq, and Afghanistan during his meetings with President Lech Kaczynski, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski, Speaker of the Sejm Bronislaw Komorowski, and the leadership of the Left and Democrats (LiD) opposition in the Sejm. During government meetings A/S Fried emphasized that Poland's recent press statements critical of MD had raised questions in Washington about whether Poland wanted a deal at all and had hurt efforts to build support in NATO for the MD project. He asked a calming of discussion in the media. Polish officials took the point. Fried described U.S. efforts to bring Russia into cooperation on MD. He also relayed that SecDef Gates had conveyed to Polish Minister of Defense Bogdan Klich that we recognize Poland's interest in increased security cooperation, especially on air defense. For their part Polish officials asked that we respond to their proposed Security Cooperation Agreement and what they acknowledged were unrealistic security assistance requests to let them know what sort of cooperation might be possible. PM Tusk in particular emphasized the need for Poland's security to be increased, both in real terms and in the public perception, for an MD agreement to go forward. Both sides agreed that the upcoming calendar of visits, starting with the planned February 1 FM visit to Washington, provide a context for moving forward. On Iraq, Fried assured officials that we accept their commitment to have all troops out of Iraq by October 31, but ask that Poles work with us to remain in Iraq and active as long as possible at as high troop strength as possible. On Afghanistan, he thanked Poles for their addition substantive contribution. End Summary. -------------- -------------- FM Sikorski- and a possible timeline for progress on MD -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) A/S Fried met one-on-one with FM Sikorski for 30 minutes before being joined by the Prime Minister's Chief of Political Cabinet, Slawomir Nowak, MFA Deputy Minister Witold Waszczykowski, the Directors for the Americas and for �00A;Security Policy, and other staff. A/S Fried was accompanied by the Ambassador, PolCouns and Poloff (notetaker). During the one-on-one meeting, Fried bluntly told Sikorski that Poland's public offensive on MD was unhelpful, and had raised questions whether Poland sought a deal at all. It had to stop. If Poland wanted a deal, we needed to intensify our efforts. Sikorski accepted the point on the Polish public tone and promised to change it. He agreed that both sides can get to a deal on MD if we work hard at it. Fried conveyed that Secretary Gates had acknowledged in his meeting with MinDef Klich that Poland's security, in particular its air defense, can be discussed. Fried also thanked Sikorski for Poland's increased troop commitments to Afghanistan, and for its contribution to the effort in Iraq. He affirmed that the U.S. respects the Tusk government's political commitment to have the troops home from Iraq by October 31, but urged that Poland keep troops there at as high level possible and active for as long as possible, and that Poland backload, rather than front load, its withdrawal. Sikorski said that the exact timetable was negotiable. He made a commitment to raise this with the Prime Minister. ¶3. (C) The expanded meeting opened with the Ambassador presenting to Minister Nowak a letter from the President inviting PM Tusk to Washington March 10, setting a positive tone for the discussion. After reviewing their one-on-one discussion for the larger group, Sikorski described his recent MD consultations with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak. Waszczykowski chimed in, speaking somewhat sarcastically, that the Russians came with the "information" that there is no threat from Iran, that Iran is far from developing an ICBM, that it cannot possibly reach Poland or any other European country, and so the U.S. position that the MD project is designed to protect Europe is not legitimate. He said Kislyak argued that the proposed MD site in Poland was really part of the U.S. plan to encircle Russia. Kislyak did not want to discuss MD-related confidence building measures, but rather rejected the premise for MD. Kislyak threatened the Poles that, if the site is built in Poland, it will lead to an arms race; Russia will put missiles near Poland's borders. A/S Fried said that through our consultations with the Russians we had offered a joint architecture, and said we will continue this dialogue. We do not know how seriously to take Russia's threats, but we know Poland must take them seriously. We will continue to work WARSAW 00000081 002 OF 004 with the Russians to seek cooperation, not confrontation on MD. ¶4. (C) Fried said he would be constructive in discussing Polish-U.S. MD talks in public, adding that we have much work to do if we are to reach an agreement. Sikorski acknowledged we are entering a "delicate stage" and agreed that more discretion was necessary in public discussion of the negotiations. (Sikorski used almost this exact language in the follow-on press conference.) He said the public is concerned about tension between Russia and Poland, asking that we help calm public sentiment. Sikorski then asked about a "calendar" for moving discussions forward. Fried noted that the upcoming sequence of visits and meetings (Sikorski's February 1 lunch with the Secretary; Tusk's March 10 meeting with the President; the April NATO summit in Bucharest) provided a good framework. By the time of Sikorski's visit to the U.S. some elements needed to be in place. He acknowledged that the details of military cooperation had to be further addressed not to "buy" Poland's support on MD, but as a goal in its own right in response to Russian threats. Fried emphasized that Poland's earlier requests had been unrealistic. Sikorski acknowledged that elements of the list presented to us were "outdated," but asked that the U.S at least respond to the proposed Security Cooperation Agreement and be willing to discuss security cooperation. He said that a "deal," if it could be worked out before the PM's visit, had to be on a whole package, and not just the basing agreement. Also, Poland wants a Security Cooperation Agreement to be a government-to-government agreement and not just a political statement. Fried reiterated that if we are to go forward, we need to have elements in place by the time of Tusk's March visit, even if details remained to be worked out. -------------- Deputy Minister of Defense Asks We Respond on Security Assistance Request -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Fried also began the meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense Stanislaw Komorowski with a one-on-one meeting, before joining a larger meeting at which Komorowski was joined by several military advisors and the head of the Defense Policy Division. He reiterated the same message: that the recent press campaign had raised questions in Washington about whether Poland wanted a deal, and had created difficulties in arriving at an agreement on MD language for the NATO summit--an effort we had undertaken partly in response to Poland's request. He noted our efforts to work with Russia on MD (which Poland also had asked us to do),and reiterated that Secretary Gates had acknowledged the need to discuss military modernization including air defense. Describing his meeting with Sikorski, Fried noted we want to make use of the upcoming FM and PM visits to make swift progress on the MD discussions. He emphasized the benefits of success, particularly that Poland and much of Europe will be defended, that an installation will create a whole new level of day-to-day military cooperation, that contingency plans for the base would of necessity impact Poland more broadly. He described the way ahead as discussed with the Foreign Minister, and suggested using his February 1 visit to outline the shape of a final agreement, so that there is something ready by the time of the PM's visit in March. He urged that Poland not take a transactional approach to MD, and emphasized that, although Iran may pose less of a threat to Poland than to the U.S. or U.K., NATO security must be indivisible. Regarding the NATO effort, Fried asked Komorowski that Poland be active in bringing NATO allies back on board, to urge France and Germany to be more supportive of MD. We have been working on them, but need Poland's help. ¶6. (C) Komorowski expressed pleasure with Fried's description of a calendar, and for his acknowledgment that Poland had real concerns about its security because of statements Russia had been making. The Prime Minister has made clear, he said, that the outcome of MD negotiations must be that Poland is more secure; without a secure Poland there will not be a secure NATO. Regarding the military assistance requests, he, like Sikorski, complained that we had not even responded to the requests, other than to say they needed to be more realistic. He urged that we tell them what would be more realistic, to provide them some feedback. Fried undertook to convey this message. Komorowski emphasized that Minister Klich was pleased with his meetings, but that he wanted to reiterate that Poland was concerned that there was a real threat from Russia over the proposed base, and that Poland's air defense, in particular, needed to be strengthen WARSAW 00000081 003 OF 004 in conjunction with this. Addressing this and the overall modernization of military forces would contribute to a positive outcome of the discussions. "We need as much progress as possible on security cooperation," he said, for the Prime Minister to be able to tell the public that MD would make Poland safer. ¶7. (C) On the Iran threat, Komorowski asked for more material to enable the Poles to counter Russia's arguments that there was no real Iran threat. Fried undertook to arrange a briefing for Komorowski should he visit Washington, and outlined our continuing concerns about Iran's ongoing activities in developing missiles and enriching uranium, noting that even if Iran did not intend to use such missiles, the threat would have a bad impact on Europe. He also urged Komorowski to think ahead 10-15 years, and consider the other countries of concern that might develop ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. We don't want NATO to be left only with the less desirable options of either pre-emptive strikes or retaliation against Iran. ¶8. (C) On Iraq, Fried reiterated our commitment to get Polish troops out of Iraq by October 31, but urged Poland work with us to make the withdrawal as close as possible to that date. Komorowski responded that, if Poland is to do this, they will need more of your help to transport the troops. He said they do not expect much equipment to be transported from Iraq to Afghanistan. On Afghanistan, Komorowski noted Klich's request to Secretary Gates that Poland consolidate its efforts in one province, either Paktika or Ghazni. He noted the lack of an airfield in Ghazni, expressing hope that one would be constructed should Poland take over this province (Sikorski also made this request). He emphasized that PM Tusk felt that consolidating the troops would provide them with more visibility, which would help build public support for the continued deployments. -------------- Prime Minister Tusk -------------- ¶9. (C) Fried met briefly with PM Tusk prior to his departure January 17. Tusk, accompanied by FM Sikorski, Chief of Staff Nowak, Deputy FM Waszczykowski, and Security Policy Director Kupiecki, emphasized that he thought the current series of meetings could advance our cooperation overall, particularly on MD. A/S Fried repeated our appreciation for Poland's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and hope that Poland can structure its withdrawal from Iraq as late as possible, reviewed our efforts on Russia, and reviewed his discussions on MD, including the desire to use upcoming visits to advance our discussions. He emphasized that a strong Poland in Europe was better for us. Tusk recalled a conversation with Fried two years ago when Fried had emphasized that it was important for Poland to have good cooperation with its neighbors--especially Germany and Russia--if it were to play a strong role in Europe, something his government was trying to achieve. With better relations with those neighbors, Poland could help more in the region and the world. But Poland needs a real sense of security, something that can be subjective, and the key to this is partnership with the U.S. Our efforts on MD must, he said, increase Poland's real security and its sense of security. We need to work out the details on financing and other technical issues, and have a joint political strategy to make sure the project is accepted in the region. He expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts in international organizations (NATO) to build acceptance for MD, and said he believes that in coming weeks discussions will clarify the whole project. Fried emphasized that the upcoming visit of FM Sikorski would be a substantive one, as would the PM's visit in March, reflecting the depth of our relations. -------------- Meetings with Opposition and Sejm Leadership -------------- ¶10. (C) A/S Fried met with the leadership of the opposition Left and Democrats (LiD) at a breakfast on January 17 with Ambassador Ashe and separately with Sejm Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski. Most of the breakfast discussion concerned MD and the Assistant Secretary,s meetings with the government. Former FM Cimoszewicz questioned whether an incoming U.S. administration might walk away from Poland, or at least the project. Marek Borowski, formerly Speaker of the Sejm and Minister of Finance, and a long-time opponent to MD, offered WARSAW 00000081 004 OF 004 that the security threat to Poland posed by Iran was exaggerated, and the United States had failed to engage seriously with Poland, particularly with respect to the needs to upgrade Polish air defenses. LiD party leader Wojciech Olejniczak criticized the government for failing to widen the debate to include the opposition, calling the Tusk government "more nationalistic" than its predecessor. Solidarity icon Bogdan Lis voiced concern that other pro-American leaders in Europe, citing French President Sarkozy and former British PM Blair, had misgivings about the viability of MD. Fried responded to each of these concerns, and also discussed Iraq, Afghanistan, and briefly discussing Russian foreign policy goals. He reiterated similar points to Sejm Speaker Komorowski. ¶11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable. ASHE