DOMESTIC POLITICAL SQUABBLE DELAYS LISBON TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000361 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV PL SUBJECT: DOMESTIC POLITICAL SQUABBLE DELAYS LISBON TREATY RATIFICATION REF: WARSAW DAILY REPORTS 3/18/08 WARSAW 00000361 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David Van Cleve for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Prospects for ratifying the EU's Lisbon Treaty in the Polish parliament are anything but clear, as the treaty has taken center stage in a domestic political ruckus pitting PM Tusk against the Kaczynski brothers. After hard-headed negotiating by President Kaczynski over Poland's (and other smaller states') ability to block EU decisions and their opt-out of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, Poland was expected to ratify the Lisbon Treaty easily. Although his twin brother negotiated Poland's deal, former PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski has mounted a spirited opposition to ratification, vowing to expel any Law and Justice (PiS) member who votes in favor of the treaty. This has nothing to do with family politics, but everything to do with a Kaczynski-made political tempest, aimed at gaining domestic political points. Nevertheless, President Kaczynski's efforts to play a statesman's role with an eye to brokering a solution may backfire since Poles by an increasingly lopsided margin support the EU, and view this the dust-up as essentially politically motivated. For his part, PM Tusk has vowed to hold a national referendum on the EU treaty, his least bad option, should ratification in the Sejm fail. Unfortunately, President Kaczynski is again the subject of bewilderment and criticism in Europe, at a time when he hoped to champion the cause of Ukraine and Georgia at the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest. End Summary. -------------- Kaczynskis Use Lisbon Treaty for Domestic Politics -------------- ¶2. (U) After then-PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski and President Lech Kaczynski won concessions in their hard negotiations over the Lisbon Treaty in the summer of 2007, they declared the EU treaty as a great foreign policy success. Now leading the opposition, Jaroslaw seeks to derail the ratification of the treaty, with the support of his brother, arguing that Poland must have preambular language that facilitate blocking EU decision-making (the "Ioanina" mechanism),and that Poland must be permitted to opt out of the treaty's Charter of Fundamental Rights. When the ratification bill was brought to the Sejm Jarek Kaczynski and PiS argued against the bill unless a preamble was added asserting Polish sovereignty and affirming the Ioanina mechanism and Poland's opt out of the Charter. This began a political storm that derailed what had been planned as a quick ratification. President Kaczynski called the political parties to the Palace the evening of March 17 reportedly to find a compromise, efforts that may have been undone by what was billed as the President's address to the nation. ¶3. (C) In what looked remarkably like a campaign commercial, President Lech Kaczynski appeared in a slickly produced program, complete with a music soundtrack. Speaking of the Lisbon Treaty, Kaczynski said that there should be no "unjustified degradation" of Poland within the EU, bashing the government of PM Donald Tusk for doing just that. Kaczynski claimed to have negotiated a good treaty for Poland that had been hijacked by those interested in promoting homosexual marriages and acceding to specious property claims in northern and western Poland--clearly speaking about claims made by Germans for land that became Polish after borders shifted following World War II. The piece was produced by Law and Justice (PiS) insider Jacek Kurski, who gained notoriety in the last Presidential elections by charging that Donald Tusk,s grandfather was in the Nazi Wehrmacht. That comment drummed him out of PiS for a time, but he is now back at his inflammatory, mud-slinging best. Kaczynski promised a settlement to the political crisis over the Lisbon Treaty, saying that at such times ONE must "set aside party interests and think of ONE thing: Poland." FM Radek Sikorski said that the President was committing political hara kiri and Tusk publicly criticized the suggestions about homosexual marriage and property claims. ¶4. (C) PiS efforts to stop Poland,s ratification bear all the markings of a "Kaczynski-made" political tempest to gain political ground. President Kaczynski,s efforts to play a presidential role and offer some form of elegant solution fell flat with the over-the-top "speech" and his brother Jaroslaw,s vow to expel any PiS deputy who breaks party discipline and votes for the treaty. Nonetheless, some PiS politicians, including former Deputy PM Ludwik Dorn and former Minister of HEALTH Zbigniew Religa, have said they will vote in favor. Former PiS Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Pawel Zalewski said he is confident there WARSAW 00000361 002.2 OF 002 will be enough to hit the required two-thirds super majority. The government can count on its own deputies (Civic Platform and the Polish Peoples' Party) plus the Left and Democracy opposition, but even with those it would fall just short of two-thirds. It needs either 6 PiS deputies to vote for the treaty in the Sejm (with 6 PiS votes also required in the Senate),or for that number of deputies to be absent when the vote is called. President Kaczynski may still refuse to sign the treaty, which is required for the treaty to come into force. ¶5. (U) On March 18, PM Tusk said that if the ratification vote falls short in the Sejm he will call for a national referendum. His only other option would be to resign (which led Jaroslaw Kaczynski to say would be "the best news in months for Poland.") and call for new elections. Either option is potentially politically perilous. Only 34% of Poles said they would vote in a referendum, but a 50% majority is required for the vote to bind. And although the government is riding high in popularity polls, no ONE has the appetite for another swift round of elections. Public opinion is assessed to be more anti-PiS than pro-PO. -------------- Observers Agree Politics Behind the Problem -------------- ¶7. (C) The Lisbon Treaty was the subject of considerable conversation March 17 at the Irish Embassy's St. Patrick's Day Reception. The Irish Ambassador told Acting DCM that when he saw President Kaczynski earlier that day to present a bowl of shamrocks their conversation focused on the political furor over ratification. The Irish Ambassador said that Kaczynski blamed PO for stirring up the problems, and said he was looking for some kind of a compromise. Kaczynski told the Irish Ambassador that he is concerned that a future government could undo the commitments the Polish government got in negotiating the treaty with regard to the Ioanina Mechanism and could lift Poland's opt out on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. He wanted to see the ratification passed as a law so that these elements could not be changed simply as a matter of policy by some future government. German PolCouns affirmed to our acting PolCouns that EU Embassies in Warsaw are wholly preoccupied with the political brawl over ratification of the Lisbon treaty. ¶8. (C) Like other experts, Pawel Swieboda a former senior MFA official now with the pro-EU DemosEuropa think tank was hopeful President Kaczynski would find a compromise but certain of the political motives for the squabble. Swieboda offered that some kind of a preamble asserting Polish sovereignty and affirming the Ioanina mechanism and the Charter opt out was not a big problem and would not impact the validity of Poland's ratification of the treaty. He continued that the real issue was domestic politics, and "who will control Polish politics in coming years." PiS was making a desperate grab to shore up or rebuild its constituency by raising the threat of German property claims and homosexual marriage. It was a failing strategy that did not work in the elections, and he dismissed the Kaczynskis as "ideologically obsessed." For its part PO was, he said, "looking to crush PiS once and for all," including by floating the idea of early elections should there be a failed referendum. Think tanker Lena Bobinska also interpreted developments as purely a function of domestic politics, again wondering why the Kaczynskis thought there was anything to be gained by appealing to the Radio Maryja crowd. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) This latest political "crisis" bears all the markings of the Kaczynski brothers, who are hardwired to stoke conflict when they believe they can gain political momentum. With support for PiS plummeting, their about face on the Lisbon Treaty looks a little desperate, and not the stuff of hard-nosed leadership, as they might wish. But despite the hopes of pro-Lisbon observers that a compromise can be found the strategy holds risks for the Kaczynskis and endangers what should have been an easy ratification process. It comes at a potential immediate cost for U.S. interest as well. PM Kaczynski's speech has been ridiculed both at home and more broadly in Europe, reviving a sense across Europe that he is an anachronism, reducing his standing and thus his influence at a time when he is reaching out to champion the cause of Georgia and Ukraine at the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest. ASHE