CODEL SCHWARTZ/POLAND - NATO, EU MUST DO MORE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 001437

SIPDIS

EUR, DRL, H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CG PL
SUBJECT: CODEL SCHWARTZ/POLAND - NATO, EU MUST DO MORE ON
GEORGIAN SECURITY

Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) Polish National Security Advisor Wladyslaw Stasiak and
prominent Polish MPs, including Sejm Foreign Affairs
Committee Chair Krzysztof Lisek, told CODEL Schwartz that
NATO must do more to address Georgia's security problems. If
NATO does not offer MAP, it must offer something tangible to
reassure Georgia that it is close to NATO. Polish MPs said
there is no credible alternative to Saakashvili, but
acknowledged he must do more to promote democratic reforms.
Russia's invasion of Georgia was a "strategic mistake" that
mobilized the EU to take a consolidated position. Georgia
was confused by the EU's subsequent reversal on negotiating a
new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) During a December 16-17 stop in Warsaw en route to
Tbilisi, Georgia, Members of the House Democracy Assistance
Commission (HDAC) -- HDAC Chair Rep. Allyson Schwartz (D-PA),
Rep. David Dreier (R-CA),Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA),Rep.
Donald Payne (D-NJ),and Rep. Bill Shuster (R-PA) -- met with
Polish National Security Advisor Wladyslaw Stasiak and his
deputy Witold Wasczykowski. The CODEL also met with members
of the Sejm (lower house of parliament) Foreign Affairs
Committee (FAC) and the Polish-Georgian Parliamentary
Friendship Group, including FAC Chair Krzysztof Lisek (Civic
Platform, PO),Elzbieta Jakubiak (Law and Justice, PiS),
Michal Szczerba (PiS),and Pawel Zalewski (Independent).


3. (SBU) Rep. Schwartz expressed appreciation for Polish
efforts in support of building democratic institutions in
Georgia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and
stressed the importance HDAC places on maintaining Georgia's
integrity. Schwartz provided an overview of the CODEL's
agenda in Georgia and requested Polish interlocutors' views
on the situation.

SECURITY PARAMOUNT


4. (C) The four Polish MPs, each of whom had visited Tbilisi
within the past month, expressed agreement that Georgia's
main problem is security. Pointing out that Russian forces
fire shots across the demarcation line every day, Lisek
argued that European -- and possibly American -- peacekeepers
should be sent to Georgia. If Russian forces cross the
current demarcation line -- even if they fall back
immediately -- they will show they have the upper hand. This
would send a clear signal not just to Georgia, but also to
Azerbaijani President Aliyev and other Caucasian leaders.
National Security Advisor Stasiak offered a similar
assessment, stating that Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan are watching the situation in Georgia closely,
trying to evaluate U.S. and EU interest in regional
stability. He argued that a strong Georgian security
apparatus (both military and civilian) is essential to the
success of reconstruction efforts.


5. (C) Stasiak said it is important for Georgia to feel that
it is "close to NATO." If NATO does not offer MAP to
Georgia, it must offer something else -- e.g., joint planning
and exercises, training centers, formal political
consultations, and/or support for Georgia's military
transformation. "NATO has to be involved in Georgia's
security," he said. Lisek identified an urgent need to
consolidate NATO's position on Georgia and to operationalize
Article V guarantees toward the Baltic states. He argued
that NATO also needs to improve contingency planning in order
to provide military and political guarantees. Waszczykowski
said it was not enough to provide Georgia with a checklist.
No matter how well Georgia prepares, other NATO members have
to be convinced to admit Georgia. Szczerba expressed
concerns about divisions in NATO, pointing out that Italian,
German, Greek, and Spanish MPs at the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly in Valencia had pushed for softer language on
Russia's "disproportionate use of force" in August.

"NO ALTERNATIVE" TO SAAKASHVILI


6. (C) Lisek said he had been impressed by how skillfully the
GoG had advanced reconstruction, noting that 9,000 houses had
been built in 2.5 months. He lauded Georgian President
Saakashvili's leadership in establishing effective government
institutions. Lisek reported that he and other Polish MPs
had met with opposition leaders in Georgia and had held a
follow-up meeting with former Speaker Nino Burjanadze in
Warsaw during the week of December 8. "We do not see any
alternative to Saakashvili," Lisek said, to the agreement of
the other Polish MPs. In addition to lacking public support

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and a viable party organization, Burjanadze and other
opposition leaders are unable to articulate a clear vision
that differs from Saakashvili's. "Burjanadze would not be
able to mobilize the country the way Saakashvili has. In the
countryside they refer to him as 'Our Misha,'" Lisek said.


7. (C) Jakubiak asserted that Russia is trying to destabilize
Saakashvili by disseminating rumors that the USG plans to
oust him in favor of Burjanadze. The GoR knows that the
opposition would not be able to govern effectively, she said.
Putting the opposition in power will cause Georgian power
structures to crumble and allow Russia to draw Georgia back
into its sphere of influence. Jakubiak said many EU Member
States support the opposition because they are tired of
Saakashvili. "Although Burjanadze seems like Margaret
Thatcher," Jakubiak argued, she has no supporting
organization.

DEMOCRATIC REFORM NEEDED


8. (C) Noting that HDAC's primary goal is to promote vibrant
democracies, Schwartz asked MPs for their views on efforts to
encourage Saakashvili and the GoG to enact reforms that will
let the voices of the opposition be heard. Stasiak said it
was a pity that NATO had not offered MAP to Georgia, as it
would have provided an opportunity to outline specific
expectations for reform and hold out a prize for demonstrable
progress. If the GoG fears for its future, he argued, it has
little incentive to undertake democratic reforms or to
promote transparent governance and coherent legal systems.


9. (C) Szczerba argued that Georgia would have to undertake
democratic reforms in order to ensure its credibility within
the international community. The EU and USG must "speak
loudly" and outline clear expectations. Jakubiak stressed
that Georgia is a weak state with poor transportation and
communication networks, almost no military command and
control system, and inadequate border controls. "Georgian
society is in turmoil and in dire need of economic support.
We cannot put all the blame on Saakashvili," she said.
Jakubiak argued that more reconstruction assistance is needed
to create space for democratic development and noted that
winter fuel shortages could further destabilize the country.


10. (C) Lisek acknowledged the importance of democratic
reform, but cautioned that the situation on the ground had
changed dramatically since August 7 -- "if the playing field
were level, it would be easier." He advocated a more
delicate approach, particularly given the preponderance of
Russian influence and the fact that Georgia is the only
democracy in the region. In addition to building a strong
party, Saakashvili has created an effective administration
and a loyal police force. He speculated that this was the
reason Russian forces stopped at Gori. Moreover, he
continued, opposition parties are weak not simply because of
limited access to media and financing, but mainly because
they do not offer credible alternatives. Georgia's last
elections delivered results that correspond to public
opinion.

EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS


11. (C) Although the invasion of Georgia had positive
implications for Russian public opinion, Zalewski said, many
Russian politicians believe it was a "strategic mistake."
The GoR did not achieve its goal of regime change and
Russia's reputation was damaged. Even worse, Russia's
actions mobilized the EU to act in concert -- "this is
Russia's worst nightmare" and an "unprecedented" development,
particularly when compared to the European reaction to the
Balkans crises in the 1990s. Prior to August 7, the GoR had
perceived Europe as divided. Now, Poland and Lithuania are
no longer isolated inside the EU. Zalewski added that the
Georgians believe the EU can play a critical role in
strengthening the conflict zone demarcation lines, which
Russia has effectively blurred through their troop movements.


12. (C) Lisek agreed that the Russian invasion had briefly
given the EU a "raison d'etat," but expressed regret that the
consolidated position had been short-lived. The EU's
decision to resume negotiations on a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA),Lisek said, was confusing for
the Georgians, who had expected the EU to continue to condemn
Russian activity. Although some EU countries believe a new
PCA is needed to address energy concerns, Russia does not
have as much leverage as some believe, he said. He pointed
out that Russia's high-sulfur oil can only be refined in
Europe and argued that Russia needs a European market as much
as Europe needs Russian gas.


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RUSSIA'S ENDGAME


13. (C) Asked about Russia's endgame in Georgia,
Waszczykowski asserted that Russia is trying to regain its
former sphere of influence. Russia is interested in
reconstructing a bipolar world or, at least, re-establishing
the "concert of powers" arrangement that existed in Europe
for 300 years, in which Russia was one of a group of elite
countries that acted over the heads of smaller states.
Similarly, Russia prefers to deal with the "most important"
NATO and EU countries rather than with all of their member
states.


14. (C) Contrary to perceptions in parts of Europe,
Waszczykowski said, Poland is not reflexively anti-Russian.
"We view our relationship with Russia as an opportunity.
Unfortunately, there are more problems on the other side."
Polish interlocutors expressed interest in the incoming
administration's views on Russia. Zalewski and Waszczykowski
cautioned the USG against abandoning "values" and
"principles" in favor of practical cooperation. Zalewski
said it was obvious that Putin and Medvedev were trying to
test President-elect Obama by being "excessively
provocative."


15. (U) Rep. Schwartz has cleared this message.
ASHE