POLAND/GERMANY - ALL SMILES, BUT HALTING PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 001392

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SENV PL
SUBJECT: POLAND/GERMANY - ALL SMILES, BUT HALTING PROGRESS

REF: 07 WARSAW 691

Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On the eve of German Chancellor Angela
Merkel's visit here, GoP officials are pointing to an
improved Polish-German relationship as one of the top
accomplishments of the government's first year in office.
However, despite the Germans' poorly hidden preference for
Prime Minister Tusk over his predecessor, the GoP's strategy
of engagement has produced few concrete results. Tusk has
little to show beyond the positive atmospherics, while even
the unconsummated bilateral flirtation has provoked
opposition charges of Polish "submissiveness." Although the
German Embassy asserts that Tusk has been more effective than
his predecessor in advancing Polish interests with Germany,
Tusk received an embarrassing "nein" to his public suggestion
that the Germans and Poles build a common war memorial in
Gdansk, rather than two separate ones. To date, the most
tangible Polish-German gains have been chiefly economic and
cultural, driven as much by EU-wide forces as bilateral ones.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) When he assumed office in November 2007, Prime
Minister Donald Tusk identified improving Polish-German
relations as a top priority. One year later, on the eve of
Chancellor Angela Merkel's December 9 visit to Warsaw, there
is widespread agreement that while atmospherics of the
relationship have improved dramatically, Tusk's strategy has
achieved little else. Critics, including President Lech
Kaczynski and opposition Law and Justice leader (and former
PM) Jaroslaw Kaczynski claim that the improvement has come
about primarily because the GoP has opted not to press
Germany on difficult or sensitive, historical issues.

TUSK'S STRATEGY


3. (C) Under Tusk's leadership, GoP officials have worked
closely with German counterparts to improve the tone of
Polish-German relations. Both sides have committed to close
coordination and cooperation on commemorations of
controversial historical events. The two governments have
conducted a series of high-visibility, high-level meetings
over the past year, including parliamentary exchanges.
Polish media took notice when Merkel opted to attend
ceremonies commemorating the 90th anniversary of Poland's
re-established independence -- instead of Armistice Day
events in France. Media have also reported extensively on
"informal" meetings between Foreign Ministers Sikorski and
Steinmeier, as well as both ministers' participation last
week in the first meeting of the Polish-German Forum in three
years. The two governments are working to develop a joint
Polish-German history textbook to address sensitive,
historical issues.

WHAT HAS TUSK ACHIEVED?


4. (C) In November, Jaroslaw Kaczynski characterized Tusk's
engagement strategy with Germany as a "glaring return to
submissiveness, to the concept of Poland being an
unattractive unmarried woman without a dowry." Tusk
responded by telling media "immodestly -- they like Tusk in
Europe, but that doesn't mean he abandons his own interest."
Tusk conceded that Germany had not abandoned plans for the
Russian-German Nordstream gas pipeline and could only point
to one concrete achievement -- the FRG decisions to recast
plans for a documentation center for post-WWII German
expellees and to remove the controversial Erika Steinbach as
the project's leader. (COMMENT: Tusk was personally -- and
publicly -- embarrassed in June 2008 when Merkel refused his
proposal to build the documentation center in Gdansk, instead
of Berlin. Tusk refused Merkel's counterproposal that Poland
appoint a representative to the center's oversight body. END
COMMENT.)


5. (C) Tusk also (erroneously) claimed that his engagement
had prompted Merkel to state more explicitly the FRG's
opposition to German expellees' claims against Poland for
compensation or restitution of former German private property
lost after WWII. (COMMENT: Merkel made similarly explicit
statements during a March 2007 visit to Warsaw, but was
criticized by then-PM Kaczynski because she did not undertake
to change German law so as to completely prohibit such claims
against Poland (reftel). END COMMENT.)


6. (C/NF) German Embassy Political Counselor Peter Kolb
argued that Tusk has been "tougher" in defending Polish
interests than either Kaczynski brother, because Tusk is
"always nice" and it is more difficult for European leaders
-- Merkel included -- to say "no" to. Kolb was unable,

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however, to point to a case where Merkel had said "yes" to
Tusk. When it comes to the EU, President Kaczynski "is out
of the game." Merkel and French President Sarkozy are "fed
up" with Kaczynski. "No one is fed up with Tusk. If
anything, Poland has more influence now." Polish MFA
Minister-Counselor for Polish-German Relations Andrzej Szynka
pointed out, however, that Merkel has tried to strike a
balance between Tusk and President Kaczynski by meeting
regularly with both.

THE RUSSIA QUESTION


7. (C) Despite German Embassy assertions that Poland and
Germany have tactical, but not analytical, differences on
Eastern Policy, the two countries remain sharply divided over
how to deal with Russia. GoP views generally mirror deeply
entrenched popular suspicions of German motives on Russia.
One high-level official told U.S. counterparts that Polish
interests are served when Russia and Germany compete. "When
they cooperate, we start to worry." While Germany favors
direct engagement of Russia without preconditions, the GoP
prefers to assert -- sometimes quietly, sometimes more
bluntly -- conditions. (COMMENT: While the GoP did not
publicly oppose the resumption of negotiations on the
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, GoP
officials reiterated their preference for conditionality on
the Agreement's implementation. END COMMENT.)


8. (C) While Germany reportedly played a key role in drumming
up Member State support for the Polish-Swedish Eastern
Partnership, which aims to deepen EU relations with former
Soviet neighbors, Germany strongly opposed Polish proposals
for visa-free travel and accelerated EU membership.
(COMMENT: This reflects more a convergence of interests than
a hard-fought Polish victory. Germany's 2007 EU Presidency
also aimed to strengthen EU relations with countries on the
EU's eastern boundary. END COMMENT.) The question of
extending NATO Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia
remains another sharp point of contention, so much so that
some German media claimed that the Poles almost physically
pressured Merkel to give the green light at the April NATO
Summit in Bucharest. In Afghanistan, high-level Polish
officials identify the Germans as a key obstacle to lifting
the "caveats" that restrict so many ISAF partners'
effectiveness; they have asked U.S. executive and legislative
officials to help lobby the Germans to lift the caveats.

ENERGY SECURITY AND NORDSTREAM


9. (C/NF) Tusk and Sikorski have privately expressed strong
criticism of Germany's failure to develop diverse energy
suppliers and German cooperation with Russia to construct the
Nordstream gas pipeline. They believe the pipeline
jeopardizes Poland's energy security by creating a direct
conduit between Russia and Germany. Polish resentment may
not have fully receded, despite the increasing likelihood
that delays and cost increases will make the project
financially unviable. The brunt of high-level Polish
officials' anger seems directed at former German Chancellor
(now Gazprom agent) Gerhard Schroeder. Several high-level
officials reportedly harbor suspicions that Steinmeier -- who
remains close with Schroeder -- also stands to benefit
financially from the Nordstream project's completion.


10. (C) Nordstream aside, Poland remains reluctant to embrace
solutions to dependence on Russian gas supplies that involve
reliance on Germany, in part due to suspicion of German
motives vis-a-vis Russia. Interconnection of the Polish and
German gas grids, for example, would eliminate the strategic
challenge of Nordstream, but only if Poland could count on
German support in a crisis. This they do not yet appear ready
to do.

ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE


11. (C) The December 9 Polish-German "intergovernmental
consultations" -- with eight ministers from each side -- will
focus primarily on the global economic crisis and the EU's
climate and energy package. Merkel and Tusk will meet
one-on-one for an hour, followed by a one-hour plenary
meeting and lunch. Kolb expressed doubt that either meeting
would go into great depth, noting that half of the hour would
be taken up by consecutive translation. Kolb also expressed
doubt that Merkel would be successful in pushing for a
compromise in time for the December 11 European Council,
adding, "it does not bode well that President Kaczynski is
also going to Brussels."

NON-GOVERNMENTAL TIES


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12. (C) Despite the lack of concrete achievements in
Polish-German relations, the two governments have tremendous
potential to build a deeper relationship on the basis of
close working-level contacts and increasingly strong economic
and cultural relations. Notwithstanding political tensions
under the previous Kaczynski government, Polish-German
relations have steadily improved since 1989, in large part
because of closer economic ties, cross-border cooperation,
and the large number of Poles who have worked or studied in
Germany. Despite German employment restrictions, Poland's
accession to the EU's border-free Schengen zone in December
2007 further strengthened economic ties. Poles can open
businesses and buy property in the eastern part of Germany,
and are doing so in increasing numbers. Reciprocally,
Germany remains one of the largest sources of foreign direct
investment in Poland. Civic Platform (PO) Sejm deputy Pawel
Gras told us that German and Polish regional governments
along the border have worked well together to obtain EU
funding for joint projects.

COMMENT


13. (C) Despite the improvement in atmospherics at the
political level and closer people-to-people ties, a
significant cross-section of Polish society remains
suspicious of German motives, particularly with respect to
Russia. Similar concerns persist that Poland not transfer
too much authority to the EU Commission, where Germany and
France are perceived as having undue influence. While
overcoming historical distrust of Germany is likely a
question of generational change, Tusk's engagement strategy
with Germany has prompted a growing realization that Poland's
security interests and economic development are enhanced, not
threatened, by closer cooperation with Germany and greater
engagement inside the EU.

ASHE