POLAND/GERMANY - ALL SMILES, BUT HALTING PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 001392 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET SENV PL SUBJECT: POLAND/GERMANY - ALL SMILES, BUT HALTING PROGRESS REF: 07 WARSAW 691 Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On the eve of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit here, GoP officials are pointing to an improved Polish-German relationship as one of the top accomplishments of the government's first year in office. However, despite the Germans' poorly hidden preference for Prime Minister Tusk over his predecessor, the GoP's strategy of engagement has produced few concrete results. Tusk has little to show beyond the positive atmospherics, while even the unconsummated bilateral flirtation has provoked opposition charges of Polish "submissiveness." Although the German Embassy asserts that Tusk has been more effective than his predecessor in advancing Polish interests with Germany, Tusk received an embarrassing "nein" to his public suggestion that the Germans and Poles build a common war memorial in Gdansk, rather than two separate ones. To date, the most tangible Polish-German gains have been chiefly economic and cultural, driven as much by EU-wide forces as bilateral ones. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) When he assumed office in November 2007, Prime Minister Donald Tusk identified improving Polish-German relations as a top priority. One year later, on the eve of Chancellor Angela Merkel's December 9 visit to Warsaw, there is widespread agreement that while atmospherics of the relationship have improved dramatically, Tusk's strategy has achieved little else. Critics, including President Lech Kaczynski and opposition Law and Justice leader (and former PM) Jaroslaw Kaczynski claim that the improvement has come about primarily because the GoP has opted not to press Germany on difficult or sensitive, historical issues. TUSK'S STRATEGY ¶3. (C) Under Tusk's leadership, GoP officials have worked closely with German counterparts to improve the tone of Polish-German relations. Both sides have committed to close coordination and cooperation on commemorations of controversial historical events. The two governments have conducted a series of high-visibility, high-level meetings over the past year, including parliamentary exchanges. Polish media took notice when Merkel opted to attend ceremonies commemorating the 90th anniversary of Poland's re-established independence -- instead of Armistice Day events in France. Media have also reported extensively on "informal" meetings between Foreign Ministers Sikorski and Steinmeier, as well as both ministers' participation last week in the first meeting of the Polish-German Forum in three years. The two governments are working to develop a joint Polish-German history textbook to address sensitive, historical issues. WHAT HAS TUSK ACHIEVED? ¶4. (C) In November, Jaroslaw Kaczynski characterized Tusk's engagement strategy with Germany as a "glaring return to submissiveness, to the concept of Poland being an unattractive unmarried woman without a dowry." Tusk responded by telling media "immodestly -- they like Tusk in Europe, but that doesn't mean he abandons his own interest." Tusk conceded that Germany had not abandoned plans for the Russian-German Nordstream gas pipeline and could only point to one concrete achievement -- the FRG decisions to recast plans for a documentation center for post-WWII German expellees and to remove the controversial Erika Steinbach as the project's leader. (COMMENT: Tusk was personally -- and publicly -- embarrassed in June 2008 when Merkel refused his proposal to build the documentation center in Gdansk, instead of Berlin. Tusk refused Merkel's counterproposal that Poland appoint a representative to the center's oversight body. END COMMENT.) ¶5. (C) Tusk also (erroneously) claimed that his engagement had prompted Merkel to state more explicitly the FRG's opposition to German expellees' claims against Poland for compensation or restitution of former German private property lost after WWII. (COMMENT: Merkel made similarly explicit statements during a March 2007 visit to Warsaw, but was criticized by then-PM Kaczynski because she did not undertake to change German law so as to completely prohibit such claims against Poland (reftel). END COMMENT.) ¶6. (C/NF) German Embassy Political Counselor Peter Kolb argued that Tusk has been "tougher" in defending Polish interests than either Kaczynski brother, because Tusk is "always nice" and it is more difficult for European leaders -- Merkel included -- to say "no" to. Kolb was unable, WARSAW 00001392 002 OF 003 however, to point to a case where Merkel had said "yes" to Tusk. When it comes to the EU, President Kaczynski "is out of the game." Merkel and French President Sarkozy are "fed up" with Kaczynski. "No one is fed up with Tusk. If anything, Poland has more influence now." Polish MFA Minister-Counselor for Polish-German Relations Andrzej Szynka pointed out, however, that Merkel has tried to strike a balance between Tusk and President Kaczynski by meeting regularly with both. THE RUSSIA QUESTION ¶7. (C) Despite German Embassy assertions that Poland and Germany have tactical, but not analytical, differences on Eastern Policy, the two countries remain sharply divided over how to deal with Russia. GoP views generally mirror deeply entrenched popular suspicions of German motives on Russia. One high-level official told U.S. counterparts that Polish interests are served when Russia and Germany compete. "When they cooperate, we start to worry." While Germany favors direct engagement of Russia without preconditions, the GoP prefers to assert -- sometimes quietly, sometimes more bluntly -- conditions. (COMMENT: While the GoP did not publicly oppose the resumption of negotiations on the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, GoP officials reiterated their preference for conditionality on the Agreement's implementation. END COMMENT.) ¶8. (C) While Germany reportedly played a key role in drumming up Member State support for the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership, which aims to deepen EU relations with former Soviet neighbors, Germany strongly opposed Polish proposals for visa-free travel and accelerated EU membership. (COMMENT: This reflects more a convergence of interests than a hard-fought Polish victory. Germany's 2007 EU Presidency also aimed to strengthen EU relations with countries on the EU's eastern boundary. END COMMENT.) The question of extending NATO Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia remains another sharp point of contention, so much so that some German media claimed that the Poles almost physically pressured Merkel to give the green light at the April NATO Summit in Bucharest. In Afghanistan, high-level Polish officials identify the Germans as a key obstacle to lifting the "caveats" that restrict so many ISAF partners' effectiveness; they have asked U.S. executive and legislative officials to help lobby the Germans to lift the caveats. ENERGY SECURITY AND NORDSTREAM ¶9. (C/NF) Tusk and Sikorski have privately expressed strong criticism of Germany's failure to develop diverse energy suppliers and German cooperation with Russia to construct the Nordstream gas pipeline. They believe the pipeline jeopardizes Poland's energy security by creating a direct conduit between Russia and Germany. Polish resentment may not have fully receded, despite the increasing likelihood that delays and cost increases will make the project financially unviable. The brunt of high-level Polish officials' anger seems directed at former German Chancellor (now Gazprom agent) Gerhard Schroeder. Several high-level officials reportedly harbor suspicions that Steinmeier -- who remains close with Schroeder -- also stands to benefit financially from the Nordstream project's completion. ¶10. (C) Nordstream aside, Poland remains reluctant to embrace solutions to dependence on Russian gas supplies that involve reliance on Germany, in part due to suspicion of German motives vis-a-vis Russia. Interconnection of the Polish and German gas grids, for example, would eliminate the strategic challenge of Nordstream, but only if Poland could count on German support in a crisis. This they do not yet appear ready to do. ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE ¶11. (C) The December 9 Polish-German "intergovernmental consultations" -- with eight ministers from each side -- will focus primarily on the global economic crisis and the EU's climate and energy package. Merkel and Tusk will meet one-on-one for an hour, followed by a one-hour plenary meeting and lunch. Kolb expressed doubt that either meeting would go into great depth, noting that half of the hour would be taken up by consecutive translation. Kolb also expressed doubt that Merkel would be successful in pushing for a compromise in time for the December 11 European Council, adding, "it does not bode well that President Kaczynski is also going to Brussels." NON-GOVERNMENTAL TIES WARSAW 00001392 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Despite the lack of concrete achievements in Polish-German relations, the two governments have tremendous potential to build a deeper relationship on the basis of close working-level contacts and increasingly strong economic and cultural relations. Notwithstanding political tensions under the previous Kaczynski government, Polish-German relations have steadily improved since 1989, in large part because of closer economic ties, cross-border cooperation, and the large number of Poles who have worked or studied in Germany. Despite German employment restrictions, Poland's accession to the EU's border-free Schengen zone in December 2007 further strengthened economic ties. Poles can open businesses and buy property in the eastern part of Germany, and are doing so in increasing numbers. Reciprocally, Germany remains one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment in Poland. Civic Platform (PO) Sejm deputy Pawel Gras told us that German and Polish regional governments along the border have worked well together to obtain EU funding for joint projects. COMMENT ¶13. (C) Despite the improvement in atmospherics at the political level and closer people-to-people ties, a significant cross-section of Polish society remains suspicious of German motives, particularly with respect to Russia. Similar concerns persist that Poland not transfer too much authority to the EU Commission, where Germany and France are perceived as having undue influence. While overcoming historical distrust of Germany is likely a question of generational change, Tusk's engagement strategy with Germany has prompted a growing realization that Poland's security interests and economic development are enhanced, not threatened, by closer cooperation with Germany and greater engagement inside the EU. ASHE