POLAND SUPPORTS RESTARTING OF EU-RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001295

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR MORRIS AND PIERANGELO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV GG RS PL
SUBJECT: POLAND SUPPORTS RESTARTING OF EU-RUSSIA
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT TALKS

REF: STATE 115017

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (C) SUMMARY. An MFA official told us November 12 that the
GoP had shifted policy and now supported the November 10 EU
decision to re-initiate negotiations with Russia on a new
partnership agreement, despite Russia's failure to meet its
commitments in Georgia. The official denied press reports
that Poland dropped its objections to talks with Russia in
exchange for EU concessions to Warsaw on carbon emission
ceilings. He argued that the EU would have a stronger
position in talks with Russia than individual countries
engaging Russia bilaterally. Nevertheless, the MFA was
disappointed that the EU did not attach a roadmap of
conditions that Russia would have to meet before talks
resumed. Regarding Georgia, the official argued it was
unrealistic to expect Russia to meet the terms of French
President Sarkozy's cease-fire agreements and withdraw its
troops to pre-invasion positions -- in his view, Russia's
recognition of the "independence" of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and related troop presence there are likely
irreversible. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, Director of the MFA's Eastern
Policy Department, adamantly denied press reports that Poland
dropped its objections to talks with Russia in exchange for
EU concessions to Poland on carbon emission ceilings. In a
November 12 meeting with Poloffs, he gave three arguments for
Poland's support of the EU decision to re-engage with Russia
on a new partnership agreement: 1) the EU is more interested
than Russia in negotiating a new partnership agreement
because such an accord would address hot-button issues, such
as human rights, democratization, and market access; 2) it is
better to have a common EU position than to allow Russia to
negotiate with individual EU members (i.e. Nordstream
experience); 3) the EU can best exert pressure on Russia by
engaging in dialogue. From France's perspective, Bratkiewicz
said, there was a danger the upcoming Czech and Swedish EU
presidencies would not seek to engage Russia, hence the
urgency of starting the talks again under the French
presidency. Bratkiewicz expressed disappointment that the EU
did not accept the Polish request to put explicit conditions
on resuming the talks, particularly a condition that would
grant EU monitors access to Georgia's breakaway territories.


3. (C) Bratkiewicz said he attended the GAERC meeting, which
avoided discussion of Georgia. He stated that the EU had
been presented with a "fait accompli" by Russia. It would be
unrealistic to expect Russia to meet the terms of the Sarkozy
cease-fire agreements and withdraw its troops to pre-invasion
positions since Moscow's recognition of the "independence" of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the related troop presence
there, are likely irreversible. He added that Russian troops
were critical to support the "puppet states" in the two
breakaway provinces.


4. (C) Regarding the Russian proposal for a pan-European
security treaty, Bratkiewicz described the EU mood as
"skeptical" and said Russian President Medvedev had not
elaborated on the concept. Bratkiewicz speculated that it
might be Russia's effort to strike against the OSCE after
Moscow's proposal to create a security council in the OSCE
had been rejected. He emphasized that Poland and the EU would
not agree to dismantle the OSCE or NATO despite Russian calls
to eliminate "Cold War institutions." Nevertheless,
Bratkiewicz appeared sympathetic to Russia's desire for more
influence within Europe's security structures. He noted that
the NATO-Russia Council did not address Russian concerns
about Europe's security architecture because the Council was
not a decision-making body.


5. (C) Bratkiewicz told us that Sarkozy's invitation to
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk for a November 13 meeting
reflected Warsaw's increasingly important role in the EU.
Bratkiewicz said Tusk would emphasize that Poland wanted the
EU to establish clear "rules of the game" for the
relationship with Russia and to raise concerns related to
human rights and energy supplies.


6. (C) COMMENT: The Poles may have concluded that they could
not oppose the determined French push for a November 10 GAERC
approval of restarting the partnership agreement talks with
Russia. Lithuania's decision to block consensus has had
little effect; nor would a second no-vote by the Poles have
had one. Warsaw may have calculated that a principled
dissent would only irritate the majority in favor of moving
forward on the talks. As PM Tusk told the media, President
Kaczynski's joint declaration with the Lithuanian President

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against resuming the talks could jeopardize other Polish EU
goals. Although Bratkiewicz denied a quid pro quo between
Polish support on the talks and more lenient EU emissions
ceilings for Poland, the Sarkozy meeting with Tusk on the eve
of the November 14 EU-Russia summit is a tell-tale sign of
how much the EU presidency values Polish cooperation
regarding the engagement of Russia. Presumably, Tusk will
expect that Polish "reasonableness" will be rewarded.
SCHILLING