Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08WARSAW1175
2008-10-07 10:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
POLAND TO ABSTAIN ON KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION
how-toVZCZCXRO0076 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO DE RUEHWR #1175 2811022 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 071022Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7129 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001175
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/CE PIERANGELO AND EUR/SCE SHIRATORI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNGA KV PL
SUBJECT: POLAND TO ABSTAIN ON KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION
REF: STATE 105796
Classified By: DCM Quanrud; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001175
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/CE PIERANGELO AND EUR/SCE SHIRATORI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNGA KV PL
SUBJECT: POLAND TO ABSTAIN ON KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION
REF: STATE 105796
Classified By: DCM Quanrud; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poland will abstain on Serbia's UNGA resolution to
refer a question on the legality of Kosovo's independence to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ),according to MFA
Political Director Witold Sobkow. In response to reftel
demarche, Sobkow, who is responsible for EU foreign policy
and security issues, told the DCM October 6 that Poland
agrees with the U.S. position on the legality of Kosovo
independence and the need to show support for Kosovo. Warsaw
also generally shares U.S. views on the negative impact a
prolonged ICJ consideration will have on attempts to broaden
recognition of Kosovo's independence. However, discussions
within the EU obviously have been contentious, leading Poland
to it's decision to abstain, given the high likelihood that
the EU will not adopt a common position.
2. (C) Sobkow discussed thinking within the EU, pointing to
two schools of thought. On the one hand, Poland and the EU
have long encouraged Serbia to adhere to the rule of law, and
in this respect, Belgrade had the right in principle to seek
an ICJ ruling. On the other hand, it is also important to
continue to urge the Serbs to move on and to resolve
differences over Kosovo's independence peacefully.
3. (C) Sobkow noted that the EU had discussed the issue many
times, most recently on the margins of the UNGA in New York.
The French EU Presidency continues to hope Belgrade will
withdraw their UNGA resolution, but this seems unlikely.
Sobkow commented that the Serbs appear to be using the
resolution to take some domestic heat off of the Kosovo issue
by kicking it into another fora. This, the thinking goes,
might in turn give the government some breathing room to be
more forward leaning on the EU's agenda. An outright
negative vote on the ICJ resolution, might undermine ongoing
efforts to encourage a shift in Belgrade's broader position.
According to Sobkow, some in the EU hoped that by abstaining
on the ICJ resolution Belgrade would accept deployment of EU
monitors throughout Kosovo, including northern Kosovo, along
the lines of the French Presidency proposal. At a minimum,
the EU hoped to get "something" from Serbia in return for an
abstention.
ASHE
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/CE PIERANGELO AND EUR/SCE SHIRATORI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNGA KV PL
SUBJECT: POLAND TO ABSTAIN ON KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION
REF: STATE 105796
Classified By: DCM Quanrud; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poland will abstain on Serbia's UNGA resolution to
refer a question on the legality of Kosovo's independence to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ),according to MFA
Political Director Witold Sobkow. In response to reftel
demarche, Sobkow, who is responsible for EU foreign policy
and security issues, told the DCM October 6 that Poland
agrees with the U.S. position on the legality of Kosovo
independence and the need to show support for Kosovo. Warsaw
also generally shares U.S. views on the negative impact a
prolonged ICJ consideration will have on attempts to broaden
recognition of Kosovo's independence. However, discussions
within the EU obviously have been contentious, leading Poland
to it's decision to abstain, given the high likelihood that
the EU will not adopt a common position.
2. (C) Sobkow discussed thinking within the EU, pointing to
two schools of thought. On the one hand, Poland and the EU
have long encouraged Serbia to adhere to the rule of law, and
in this respect, Belgrade had the right in principle to seek
an ICJ ruling. On the other hand, it is also important to
continue to urge the Serbs to move on and to resolve
differences over Kosovo's independence peacefully.
3. (C) Sobkow noted that the EU had discussed the issue many
times, most recently on the margins of the UNGA in New York.
The French EU Presidency continues to hope Belgrade will
withdraw their UNGA resolution, but this seems unlikely.
Sobkow commented that the Serbs appear to be using the
resolution to take some domestic heat off of the Kosovo issue
by kicking it into another fora. This, the thinking goes,
might in turn give the government some breathing room to be
more forward leaning on the EU's agenda. An outright
negative vote on the ICJ resolution, might undermine ongoing
efforts to encourage a shift in Belgrade's broader position.
According to Sobkow, some in the EU hoped that by abstaining
on the ICJ resolution Belgrade would accept deployment of EU
monitors throughout Kosovo, including northern Kosovo, along
the lines of the French Presidency proposal. At a minimum,
the EU hoped to get "something" from Serbia in return for an
abstention.
ASHE