THE END OF A SUCCESSFUL IRAQ MISSION: EVALUATING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001093

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED INFO ADDRESSEES

SIPDIS

EUR FOR A/S FRIED, EUR/CE FOR PIERANGELO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PL
SUBJECT: THE END OF A SUCCESSFUL IRAQ MISSION: EVALUATING
THE POLISH DEPLOYMENT

REF: A. IRR 6 878 0113 08

B. STATE 96122

C. PITRE-SAINZ E-MAIL 08/28/08

D. HILLAS-SAINZ E-MAIL 08/28/08

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Classified By: DCM Quanrud. Reason 1.4 (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 15, Poland will bring to a close
her five-year mission in Iraq. On balance, the Polish
military presence in Iraq must be seen as a success. The
deployment dates from the earliest days of the coalition in
2003; it survived two changes in government in Warsaw; and
the decision to withdraw after the 2007 elections was
coordinated with U.S. and Iraqi forces over the course of a
full year. Poland leaves behind a stable province in
Qadisiyah that is now secured by Polish-trained Iraqi
soldiers. The Poles see their Iraq effort as an invaluable
learning experience, one which will serve them (and us) well
in other expeditionary missions. Despite these positives, we
have often allowed the Polish mission to be overshadowed by
our dialogue with the Poles regarding economic contracts and
financial support. This is shortsighted, as economic factors
were never determinative: Poland came in with us in a
much-needed show of solidarity and withdrew (half a decade
later) only when the public could no longer accept
casualties. The contracts and the plea for military
assistance were mosly about domestic political cover. Ref B
rightly reminds us of the need to recognize Polish
contributions and Polish achievements. This, along with
continued material assistance, will help build public support
for the deployment in Afghanistan and subsequent joint
missions. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poland will hand over its military responsibilities
to the coalition on October 1, and withdraw its last soldiers
by the middle of the month. This will concluded its longest
expeditionary activity since the Second World War. The Poles
were among the first to deploy in 2003, and at its peak, the
contingent numbered 2,500 troops. Some 15,000 Poles rotated
through Iraq. Poland joined the fight to show solidarity with
a key ally, the U.S., whom they consider the cornerstone of
NATO's Article V commitment to defend Central Europe.


3. (C) Poland leaves behind a stable province in Qadisiyah.
Although only two Polish soldiers died during the most
critical stages of the Surge, the Polish contingent from June
to November 2007 conducted 25 operations outside the wire,
involving 1,012 day and night patrols, 374 escorts, and 392
mobile control points. As a result, according to Polish
assessments, insurgent activity by Jaish Al Mahdi and other
militias was reduced, and freedom of movement on critical
routes in the province was restored (Ref A). The Polish
commander, General Buk, established promotions and extra pay
for soldiers who patrolled outside of their base. After the
October 2007 elections, the GOP decided to withdraw its
forces within a year, and the Polish contingent hunkered down
in its base camp. But by then it was the view of Polish
officers in the field that their mission had been completed
successfully. Indeed, the July 2008 handover to Iraqi
authorities in Qadisiyah was the result of an improved
security climate and successful Polish training of border
guards and the Iraqi 8th Army.


4. (C) Polish officials continue to have an overall positive
assessment of their experience in Iraq, particularly within
the military. Defense Minister Klich cites invaluable
experience working with international partners. One official
from the National Security Advisor's office reported that
with regard to changing the mentality of the military and
developing operational procedures and English language
skills, Iraq has been "better than NATO -- a unique chance"
for the Polish Army. Unlike some former partners who withdrew
from Iraq and then attacked the U.S. position, a series of
Polish governments have supported U.S. policy throughout.
Even now, former President Kwasniewski says in speeches and
op eds that the decision to go to Iraq was the right one.


5. (C) Mutual frustration over operational conduct of the
war sometimes led to recrimination between U.S. and Polish
defense officials. At times the Poles have been portrayed
as whiners. However, such a view minimizes the
contributions Poland made at a difficult time, and ignores
that our partner is still undergoing a post-Warsaw-Pact
evolutionary process. Poland provided steadfast political
and military support when international opinion was
overwhelmingly against the Iraq war. The Polish troops,
along with other Coalition partners, also had to overcome
Coalition intelligence and strategic errors during the
build-up and early days of the conflict. The Polish side
believes that it is the aggrieved party in bilateral

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interactions over Iraq: Foreign Minister Sikorski, for
example, is adamant that Poland received U.S. oral assurances
that it would get economic contracts in Iraq. He has told
U.S. officials privately that those assurances were violated
when U.S. officials wrote letters to steer contracts to
others, and away from the Poles.


6. (C) Increasing Polish conditions and demands fed this
atmosphere of recrimination, leading to a perception that the
Poles were too "contractual." However, Polish participation
in the war was never about military assistance or economic
contracts -- as former Deputy Foreign Minister Witold
Waszczykowski told the DCM recently, the Polish Government
was intent on enhancing the Alliance with the U.S., as part
of the Poles' perennial effort to cement stronger security
assurances. In his view, the idea that Poland might play a
large role in Iraq's reconstruction was just a feeble effort
by the GoP to convince Poles that they had a direct interest
in the country they were defending.


7. (C) Far from being too insistent on contracts or higher
military funding, most Poles would say their original sin was
being not contractual enough. Poles saw other U.S. partners
receive substantial economic assistance (Turkey) or U.S.
bases (Romania),and even non-partners won contracts in Iraq
(France). During Missile Defense talks, Sikorski asked for
more explicit, written guarantees because of his sense that
Iraq-related oral assurances had not been fulfilled. Despite
the bruised feelings, disappointment over military assistance
and Iraq contracts -- for which Polish firms were admittedly
weak bidders -- was not the reason for withdrawing from Iraq.
Prime Minister Tusk made the decision to withdraw because of
public opinion against the war and a desire to avoid further
casualties. But unlike other partners, Poland spent a year
coordinating its withdrawal with Iraqi and Coalition
partners, with much of the equipment moving directly to the
Afghan theater.


8. (C) A shared U.S.-Polish understanding and greater U.S.
appreciation of Poland's imperfect but nonetheless essential
contribution to the Iraq mission would serve both Allies
well. We need to apply lessons learned from Iraq to
Afghanistan, where appropriate logistical and intelligence
support can build on Poland's record as one of our most
expeditionary partners.

ASHE