Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08VILNIUS951
2008-11-06 10:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vilnius
Cable title:
BELARUS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIME APPROVAL OF INCREASE
VZCZCXRO4401 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHVL #0951 3111016 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 061016Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3045 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000951
SIPDIS
KYIV ALSO FOR USAID
AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: AMGT APER CMGT PREL ABUD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIME APPROVAL OF INCREASE
IN USDH STAFFING
REF: A. VILNIUS 940
B. VILNIUS 941
Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reason 1.4 (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000951
SIPDIS
KYIV ALSO FOR USAID
AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: AMGT APER CMGT PREL ABUD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIME APPROVAL OF INCREASE
IN USDH STAFFING
REF: A. VILNIUS 940
B. VILNIUS 941
Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reason 1.4 (d).
1. (U) This message builds on ref A, which provides a report
on the current status of operations at Embassy Minsk.
2. (C) Post anticipates that Lukashenka -- who is under
increasing economic pressure and is now seeking a USD 2
billion loan for the IMF as reported ref B -- may soon make
some steps in an attempt to appease the U.S. and EU and
obtain additional sanctions relief. In general, we and the
EU should watch any GOB moves with scrutiny and skepticism,
and focus on those which are not easily reversible. As a
specific bilateral issue, it is possible that the GOB will
offer the return of some or all of the U.S. diplomats who
were forced to leave Embassy Minsk in March and May. It is
our strong recommendation that we not act too readily on any
such offer.
3. (C) When Belarusian dictator Lukashenka forced our
Ambassador out of his residence about nine years ago, the USG
requested a letter from Lukashenka pledging to respect the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations before/before we
returned our Ambassador to Belarus. We should request
nothing less than that in this case: clear, written
confirmation from the highest level for the U.S. Embassy to
be staffed as the USG sees fit, without any regard to the
exact number. It would be unconscionable to bring USG
personnel to Minsk with anything less; the inherent lack of
stability and strategy in Lukashenka's approach could mean
that the number of GOB-approved USDH staff might fluctuate
again based on the dictator's whim. A letter from him would
not be a guarantee, but would help to put the matter of
staffing behind us; no embassies have been challenged on
residential issues since the last letter was provided in 2000.
4. (C) Should such a letter be forthcoming, as a practical
point, post anticipates that USDH staffing would not soon
reach the pre-March 2008 level of 35. Beyond the five
positions now at post -- Charge/DCM/POL/ECON, MGT/GSO/FMO/HR,
CONS/PAO, RSO, and IMO -- and contingent on DS and OBO views,
we would first expect to return a six-person MSG detachment
to Minsk and two PA&E contractors to permit us to resume
using our chancery. We would also ask USAID to return the
FSO position moved in March 2008 from Minsk to Kyiv. For
State personnel, with or without the assignment/arrival of a
COM, we would hope for: a consular officer to allow the
resumption of full NIV operations, a POL/ECON officer, a PAO,
and an OMS.
5. (C) We will continue to this issue closely and appreciate
the Department's continued support for our difficult
situation.
CLOUD
SIPDIS
KYIV ALSO FOR USAID
AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: AMGT APER CMGT PREL ABUD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIME APPROVAL OF INCREASE
IN USDH STAFFING
REF: A. VILNIUS 940
B. VILNIUS 941
Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reason 1.4 (d).
1. (U) This message builds on ref A, which provides a report
on the current status of operations at Embassy Minsk.
2. (C) Post anticipates that Lukashenka -- who is under
increasing economic pressure and is now seeking a USD 2
billion loan for the IMF as reported ref B -- may soon make
some steps in an attempt to appease the U.S. and EU and
obtain additional sanctions relief. In general, we and the
EU should watch any GOB moves with scrutiny and skepticism,
and focus on those which are not easily reversible. As a
specific bilateral issue, it is possible that the GOB will
offer the return of some or all of the U.S. diplomats who
were forced to leave Embassy Minsk in March and May. It is
our strong recommendation that we not act too readily on any
such offer.
3. (C) When Belarusian dictator Lukashenka forced our
Ambassador out of his residence about nine years ago, the USG
requested a letter from Lukashenka pledging to respect the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations before/before we
returned our Ambassador to Belarus. We should request
nothing less than that in this case: clear, written
confirmation from the highest level for the U.S. Embassy to
be staffed as the USG sees fit, without any regard to the
exact number. It would be unconscionable to bring USG
personnel to Minsk with anything less; the inherent lack of
stability and strategy in Lukashenka's approach could mean
that the number of GOB-approved USDH staff might fluctuate
again based on the dictator's whim. A letter from him would
not be a guarantee, but would help to put the matter of
staffing behind us; no embassies have been challenged on
residential issues since the last letter was provided in 2000.
4. (C) Should such a letter be forthcoming, as a practical
point, post anticipates that USDH staffing would not soon
reach the pre-March 2008 level of 35. Beyond the five
positions now at post -- Charge/DCM/POL/ECON, MGT/GSO/FMO/HR,
CONS/PAO, RSO, and IMO -- and contingent on DS and OBO views,
we would first expect to return a six-person MSG detachment
to Minsk and two PA&E contractors to permit us to resume
using our chancery. We would also ask USAID to return the
FSO position moved in March 2008 from Minsk to Kyiv. For
State personnel, with or without the assignment/arrival of a
COM, we would hope for: a consular officer to allow the
resumption of full NIV operations, a POL/ECON officer, a PAO,
and an OMS.
5. (C) We will continue to this issue closely and appreciate
the Department's continued support for our difficult
situation.
CLOUD