BELARUS: LOOKING FORWARD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VILNIUS 000841 NOFORN SIPDIS AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS PARIS PLEASE PASS TO EUR DAS MERKEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM ETRD BO SUBJECT: BELARUS: LOOKING FORWARD REF: A. A) VILNIUS 824 ¶B. B) VILNIUS 398 Classified By: Jonathan Moore, Charge, Embassy Minsk, for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Belarus' failed parliamentary elections are behind us and the democratic forces are working to consolidate and strengthen themselves. We are following their efforts closely, and advocate continued support and engagement with them by U.S. and other NGOs, focused primarily on the existing democratic coalition. Former political prisoner Alyaksandr Kazulin can be expected to play an increasingly important role in that process. Although the parliamentary elections are a lost opportunity, there is an opening in the post-election phase to build on the releases of the last political prisoners in August and encourage further useful steps by the Belarusian regime. Without specifying a timeline or drawing specific linkages, this message proposes a number of actions we could reasonably request of the GOB and a number of steps they are hoping for us to take. End summary. Belarus' Democratic Forces: Moving Forward Together -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) As reported ref A, the United Democratic Forces (UDF) are maintaining an impressive level of unity despite -- in fact, as a result of -- their defeat in the September parliamentary elections. (The regime did the UDF a huge favor by shutting them out of the parliament completely: the coalition might have fragmented if some of its number had found themselves elected.) While individual UDF members disagree on many policy questions, they are acting on the message -- shared with them by many USG and U.S. NGO interlocutors -- that if they all go their own ways they will fail. For now, they seem set on staying together, and are reviewing their structures and addressing previous differences. Former political prisoner Alyaksandr Kazulin is very well-placed to become a new leader, formally or informally, of the UDF: he was endorsed as a spokesperson by the UDF leaders for his September 21-23 trip to the U.S., seems to be able to work with all existing UDF factions, and has the star power to attract other opposition elements -- perhaps including the youth group Malady Front -- to join the coalition. Kazulin is also working with fellow former presidential candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich. We will track this process closely, and see merit in the provision of both ongoing and new support through NGOs including NDI, IRI, NED, and the German Marshall Fund. (Comment: Where possible, it would be very beneficial to allow NGOs that generally avoid supporting political activities to treat the UDF as a broader civil society organization. End comment.) A Comment on Kazulin -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) EU missions in Minsk tend to take a dim view of Kazulin, making vague comments about his past as a university rector -- when, it must be admitted, some expulsions showed that he was not always democratic in his approach to student dissent. In contrast to many Belarusians, some EU diplomats do not seem to believe that Kazulin's two years in jail as a political prisoner grant him much credibility. Others find him arrogant (hardly the first politician to be so dismissed by diplomats). However, most of the reticence seems to stem from Lukashenka's powerful dislike of Kazulin -- which the more timid EU colleagues do not want to incur -- and Kazulin's bad personal relationships with individual EU heads of mission, notably the German Ambassador who harangued him in jail, and the French Ambassador who was condescending to Kazulin's daughter Olga in a May meeting hosted by Embassy Minsk (ref B). Current State of Play -------------- ¶4. (S) While the democratic opposition sorts itself out, there is merit is seeing what we can accomplish by working with the authorities. After the August releases of the last three political prisoners, the quick and concrete response by the USG -- six-month suspension of sanctions against Lakokraska and Polotsk Steklovolokhno, both subsidiaries of petrochemical conglomerate Belneftekhim -- was very well received in Minsk. If the elections had gone well, there would be more impetus and justification for continuing with VILNIUS 00000841 002 OF 003 positive responses by the U.S. side. Although the regime failed to make significant improvements in the conduct of elections, there are other possible actions that would indicate 1) the regime is willing to make some solid improvements and 2) the prisoner releases were not the exception to the rule. Possible GOB Steps -------------- ¶5. (S) The regime has it within its power to easily show greater enlightenment towards civil society. Key steps could include: -- Allowing the registration of Alyaksandr Milinkevich's "For Freedom" movement and the youth movement "Malady Front" (both organizations have sought legal registration and have been denied at a number of levels); -- Delaying the implementation of (or simply scrapping) restrictive legislation on the media and internet; -- Allowing distribution of independent newspapers through state-owned press kiosks and through the mail; -- Accepting offers for dialogue from credible members of civil society; -- Rescinding new rules that have raised NGOs' and political parties' rents 1000 percent; -- Removing politically active Belarusian citizens' names from a list of persons banned from leaving the country (nominally a law enforcement mechanism, it has been used arbitrarily against some students and opposition members); -- Following OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to change and improve the electoral code; -- Registering independent publications. (Comment: A further GOB step would be to allow the Embassy in Minsk to have more than five U.S. direct hire staff, although based on USG rejection of any linkage between sanctions and Embassy staffing that step alone should not earn any sanctions relief. Similarly, the humanitarian release of a jailed private AMCIT in poor health would be a positive step without linkage to sanctions. End comment.) Possible USG Steps -------------- ¶6. (S) The GOB would welcome: -- Six-month (or longer) suspension of sanctions against other Belneftekhim subsidiaries (the GOB is particularly eager to allow transactions for the modernization of the Naftan refinery in Novopolotsk in preparation for its privatization); -- Suspension or removal of persons from the travel restriction/"visa ban" list (although the 53-person list is not public, removal of Lukashenka's two sons Viktor and Dmitriy -- not directly associated with acts of repression -- and Presidential Administration Deputy Head Nataliya Petkevich would probably have the most impact; most of the others should remain on the list given their complicity in outrageous propaganda, manipulation of elections, and/or alleged human rights violations); -- Suspension or removal of similar persons from the asset freeze list (a much more public step); -- Removal of the visa ban introduced against broad categories of persons in 2007; -- Offers to begin/re-open discussions on bilateral agreements and multilateral issues (their priorities might differ from ours, but possibilities include talks on WTO membership, a 123 agreement on nuclear cooperation, etc.). Comment -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Despite the failed elections, the releases of the political prisoners offer some hope that regime will otherwise act in a positive way at home and abroad. The next few weeks are crucial. There will inevitably be some discord: recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia seems likely within the next month or so -- a decision Lukashenka could make on his own, but has instead kicked to the new parliament (to be seated October 27). It is also possible that Belarus' dictator will find the already much-delayed EU responses to the August prisoner releases to be insufficient, and will lash out in response. The current inward focus of the opposition may serve to limit the potential for "provoking" backwards moves but cannot itself guarantee that no such blows will be struck by the regime. MOORE VILNIUS 00000841 003 OF 003 CLOUD