AUSTRIA ON BOSNIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 001648

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU BK AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA ON BOSNIA

REF: STATE 113894

Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Austria recognizes the deteriorating
political situation in Bosnia, but believes that to redress
the situation, Bosnian leaders must take on real political
responsibility, which requires terminating the OHR and a
transition to the EUSR. The 2010 elections appear to set the
outer limits for the transition period, though the Austrians
deny working to any timeline. The GoA will largely be guided
by OHR Lajcak's assessment of when the 5 2 PIC agenda has
been fulfilled. Austria agrees that Bonn powers should not
be delegated to the EUSR and that constitutional reform,
though necessary in the long run, is not appropriate now.
End Summary.


2. (C) Econ/Pol Couns met 11/10 with Austrian MFA Office
Director for the Western Balkans, Thomas Schnoell, to discuss
USG concerns raised in reftel. Schnoell acknowledged the
deteriorating political climate in Bosnia, noting that until
June the EU had been optimistic, especially in light of the
agreement reached on policing. Thus, what Schnoell described
as a sobering presentation by OHR Lajcak to the EU in July
had come as something of a shock. The EU now recognized that
it had allowed its focus on Kosovo to distract it from
Bosnia. Schnoell analyzed the present situation as arising
from the lack of real political responsibility enjoyed by the
Bosnian entities, who preferred to take extremist position to
please their constituents and use the OHR as the scapegoat
for the country's failings. Thus, Austria considered a
transition to the EUSR, with no Bonn powers, he emphasized,
as critical to changing the political dynamic and allowing
for a further progressive evolution of the Dayton framework.


3. (C) Schnoell reported that Austria and, he thought, most
other EU member states, would follow "the Lacjak line" with
regard to the implementation of the 5 2 agenda. He described
this as entailing a "not too strict" interpretation of
successful implementation of the agenda. This was important
to avoid the sort of prolonged impasse that maintaining a
strict line on the policing agreement had created and to
ensure continued Russian support for the PIC process.
Schnoell argued that the "not to strict" position would guide
internal decision-making in the PIC and EU, but not be made
public so as to avoid giving an impression of weakness. E/P
Counselor challenged the possibility of keeping such an
"internal" decision secret. Schnoell also reported that,
except for the UK, which clearly favored a strong line, EU
members were not focusing on the terms for a PIC decision in
February, but rather on the conditions for the transition.


4. (C) Schnoell said Austria supported the Solana-Rehn
proposal to have all EU preparations for the OHR to EUSR
transition completed by mid-2009. E/P Counselor challenged
thinking in terms of timelines, Schnoell appeared to
backtrack, but also said that if the transition were to slip
beyond 2010, the Bosnian election campaign would focus on the
OHR and politicians would again take destabilizing, extreme
nationalist positions. Schnoell also reported that he did
not expect the EU to make constitutional reform a
pre-condition for the EU-Bosnia Stabilization and Association
Agreement.


5. (C) Comment: E/P Counselor took away from the meeting the
strong sense that Asutria, recognizing EU internal
inefficiencies, is focusing much more on being ready for the
transition in a logistical as well as political sense than on
ensuring that conditions for the transition and EUSR are as
good as possible. End Comment.
GIRARD-DICARLO