NABUCCO: OMV STILL CONFIDENT DESPITE SOUTH STREAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 000142 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 TAGS: ENRG EPET EINV PREL IR AU SUBJECT: NABUCCO: OMV STILL CONFIDENT DESPITE SOUTH STREAM CHALLENGE REF: 07 VIENNA 2890 Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Dean Yap for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco, told Emboffs on January 25 that the project remains on track despite the Russian campaign to present South Stream as an alternative. One of the reasons Russia is flouting South Stream, according to Mitschek, is to improve Gazprom's negotiating position as an eventual Nabucco supplier. Mitschek warned that, on the heels of Russia's diplomatic offensive in Belgrade and Sofia, Gazprom is now pressing for an increased presence in Croatia. Mitschek said Nabucco and South Stream are not mutually exclusive, but, the initial load factor in both pipelines "would be lousy." ¶2. (C) The consortium will soon announce the addition of a crucial sixth partner (most likely Germany's RWE). OMV told us that a seventh (ideally French) partner could also join the consortium at a later stage, giving Nabucco additional, crucial political support from two key EU Member States. Azerbaijan (6-7 bcm/y) and Blue Stream will supply the initial start-up volume of 8-12 bcm/y. OMV remains bullish about the possibility of significant quantities of Iraqi gas in Nabucco by 2015. Nabucco's partners will finance 30% of the estimated Euro 5 billion project, with a combination of international financial institutions (EBRD, EIB, IFC),export credit agencies, and commercial banks providing the remainder. End Summary. South Stream as Bargaining Chip? -------------- ¶3. (C) Commenting on Russia's recent deals promoting South Stream in Bulgaria and Serbia, Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH and OMV Gas Vice-President for Logistics, told Emboffs and USEU Energy Officer on January 25 that "Nabucco was not dead." Part of the reason behind South Stream, according to Mitschek, was a Russian tactic to increase Gazprom's bargaining position as an eventual supplier for Nabucco. Mitschek noted that South Stream would face significant technical hurdles, not least the construction and operation of a pipeline 2000 meters under the Black Sea. ¶4. (C) Mitschek expressed frustration with DG Competition's firm opposition to Russian gas a part of Nabucco. Nabucco had two choices, in Mitschek's view: invite Russia to become a supplier or keep Russia outside, with an "inevitable unhappy ending for Nabucco." OMV, according to Mitschek, had information that Russia was pressing to become more active in Croatia following the agreements in Sofia and Belgrade. Mitschek said OMV was counseling its Croatian interlocutors to be wary of Russian advances; Croatia should ask Gazprom to produce basic planning documents for South Stream, none of which exist, according to Mitschek. When pressed, Mitschek maintained that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive. However, he predicted that the initial load factors for both "would be lousy," at least until 2025 when European gas demand will increase significantly. OMV: Nabucco Remains on Track -------------- ¶5. (C) Mitschek maintained that Nabucco remained on track, with construction scheduled to start in 2009 and operation in ¶2012. The consortium planned to announce the addition of a sixth partner "in the next days." (Note: Austrian and international press have long speculated that Germany's RWE would be the sixth partner. End Note) According to Mitschek, Nabucco had signed Letters of Intent, as well as Confidentiality Agreements, with shippers representing 7 SIPDIS different European countries. Mitschek noted that the shippers wanted to remain anonymous for the moment to avoid antagonizing Russian interests. Nabucco has also engaged the British firm Penspen (www.penspen.com) to serve as an engineering coordinator for the project. ¶6. (C) Azerbaijan (6-7 bcm/y) would provide the bulk of the initial volume of 8-12 bcm/y, with Blue Stream contributing the remainder. Mitschek again stressed that Russian gas was welcome in Nabucco, but only "as an add-on." Nabucco planned to increase capacity to 31 bcm/y by the end of the second construction phase in 2017. VIENNA 00000142 002 OF 003 Financing Nabucco -------------- ¶7. (C) Mitschek regretted that he could not release a detailed ABN Amro financial feasibility study for Nabucco to the USG without the express consent of all the Nabucco partners. Euro 4 billion will be required for "Construction Step 1" to ensure initial deliveries by 2012/2013. An additional Euro 1 billion will be required during "Construction Step 2" to raise capacity to 31 bcm by 2017/2018 by adding additional compressor stations along the route. Financing will be divided between equity from the Nabucco partners (30%) and loans (70%). Multilateral financial institutions (EBRD, EIB, IFC) will provide between one-third and 40% of the total loan amount; export credit agencies will cover 25-30%; and commercial banks will provide the remainder. Mitschek predicted that "when it came time to put money on the table," OMV, Hungary's MOL, and the soon-to-be-announced sixth partner would increase their shares in the project. Mitschek hinted that a seventh partner "from France or Germany" could eventually join the consortium, bolstering political support for the project. ¶8. (C) Given the highly competitive situation at Baumgarten, Austria's major gas hub and Nabucco's end point, Mitschek underscored that the project would be competitive. Mitschek cautioned that there were considerable costs to Gazprom to refurbish depreciating pipelines in Eastern and Southeastern Europe for South Stream. By contrast, Nabucco was essentially a greenfield investment implementing the latest technology. Furthermore, Nabucco expected the European Commission to soon approve important exemptions to the EU's Gas Directive, which would prevent national regulators along Nabucco's route from capriciously raising tariffs. In all these aspects, Mitschek claimed, OMV was a more viable investment than South Stream over the long-term. Iran Remains Nabucco's Ace-in-the-Hole -------------- ¶9. (C) Mitschek maintained that Nabucco would only consider Iran as a supplier, "when the international political framework would allow it." If it became politically feasible, Mitschek outlined how "Iranian gas" would be included in Nabucco. A part of OMV's South Pars field could supply Tehran and northern Iran with gas via pipeline. Nabucco could then swap 10-20 bcm/y of its South Pars gas for Turkmen gas, which could be transported to Europe via Iran and Turkey. Egypt could supply 2-4 bcm/y to Nabucco at a later stage, and OMV remained bullish about northern Iraq's potential. (Note: OMV has begun oil exploration in the Kurdistan region. OMV Exploration executives previously told us (reftel) that Iraqi gas could provide as much as 5-10 bcm/y to Nabucco by 2015. End Note) Turkey Still Key to Nabucco's Success -------------- ¶10. (C) Turkey remained a key piece for Nabucco, according to Mitschek. Turkey's uncooperative stance was encouraging the construction of bypasses. Although Turkey aimed to develop itself as a gas trading hub, Mitschek noted that the country needed "a stronger backbone" -- storage capacity, improved LNG capabilities -- before it could assume such a role. OMV, according to Mitschek, had offered Turkey assistance to develop its storage capacity. EU Needs a Synchronized Approach to Central Asia -------------- --- ¶11. (C) Mitschek pleaded for a more "synchronized" European approach to Central Asia. The EU needed to bring "a complete package" to the region, i.e., engagement in social, educational, and political areas to complement cooperation in the energy sector. Mitschek also argued that fully integrated energy companies were a necessity to compete with Gazprom in the region. In Mitschek's view, if the EU successfully carries through its unbundling proposals, as outlined in the Commission's 3rd Energy Package, Europe will ultimately end up with less security of supply with no appreciable benefits to consumers, i.e., lower prices. ¶12. (C) Mitschek said that OMV was not surprised by the December agreement to build a Caspian pipeline across Russia. However, Turkmenistan, according to Mitschek, remained interested in developing an alternative route, which would bypass Russia, to transport gas to Europe. Moreover, OMV believes relations between Azeri President Aliev and Turkmen President Berkymukhamedow were excellent, laying the VIENNA 00000142 003 OF 003 groundwork for more intensive cooperation in the energy sector. Turkmenistan would gladly supply Nabucco at a later date, Mitschek claimed, but it will not actively cooperate to develop a Trans-Caspian Pipeline at the moment. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Overall, Mitschek portrayed a credible optimism regarding Nabucco's chances in the face of Russian maneuvering. OMV has had a long and mutually beneficial relationship with Gazprom, so the company believes it understands and can deal with the Russian company, probably better from within than from outside. Perhaps the biggest reason for OMV's confidence in the face of South Stream is the belief (and hope) that, if and when international dynamics with Iran change, OMV will be able to access Iran's enormous untapped gas reserves for Nabucco. Moreover, with the Turkmen-Iranian gas swap outlined above, Nabucco could access Turkmen gas without the enormous challenges of building a Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Kilner