RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT: AUSTRIA SHARPLY CRITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001216 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2023 TAGS: PREL MARR RU GG EUN AU SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT: AUSTRIA SHARPLY CRITICAL OF RUSSIA, BUT UNCLEAR ON FOLLOW-UP REF: STATE 89769 Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Yap. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Austrian FonMin Plassnik has delivered a sharply worded statement on Russia's invasion of Georgia, concluding that "business as usual" was not an option. The MFA official responsible for the Caucasus, however, was unsure of what that meant in practice and indicated that the MFA is looking for guidance to emerge from the EU's September 5-6 Gymnich. The MFA's analysis and position tracks our own on most points, but differs on how to address human rights concerns and humanitarian access. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Action Request: Concrete proposals on how to implement a not-business-as-usual policy in future relations with the Russians as well as a cleared intel assessment on Ossetian-Russian provocations prior to the Georgian attacks on Tskhinvali would be very helpful to Embassy in future discussions with the GoA. End Action Request. Minister Plassnik's Statement -------------- ¶3. (C) Speaking August 20 at a commemoration of Russia's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Minister Plassnik used sharply stronger language than previously to criticize Russia's invasion of Georgia. "The dramatic developments (in Georgia) have given us the bitter insight that even in the world of 2008 it is possible that one country, a member of the Council of Europe, puts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another member state of the Council into question and violently occupies its territory. Particularly on an occasion such as today's, it must be said that Europe, in the light of a step of this sort, cannot simply return to business as usual (zur Tagesordnung uebergehen). Tanks cannot be the essential factor in the foreign policy of a power of the future. The language of threat cannot be the language of the future. ... We never again want to be obliged to fear Russia. The basis of a good partnership is the priceless raw material, trust." Ministry Views -------------- ¶4. (C) Econ/Pol Counselor met August 21 with MFA Department Director for the South Caucasus, Josef Kuglitsch, who described the statement as a product of the Minister's "own hand," reflecting her personal frustration at the Russians' failure to live up to their ceasefire/withdrawal agreement with the French and their obstructionism in the OSCE and UN. Kuglitsch indicated some personal discomfort at the sharpness of Plassnik's language, noting wryly that he imagined the U.S. was pleased with the statement. ¶5. (C) Kuglitsch echoed his Minister's commitment to supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and Austria's commitment to the call for full Russian withdrawal to positions before August 6. With regard to the withdrawal, he said that a temporary buffer zone might be understandable. Emboff pushed back, noting that "temporary" was a term easily abused and that countries should be careful not to give any legitimacy to Russian delay. Emboff stressed throughout the hard line being taken by many USG interlocutors in Moscow and the lack of a clear, transparent decision-making process in Moscow. ¶6. (C) Austria was very supportive of the deployment of OSCE and/or UN military observer missions to all of Georgia as soon as possible. Kuglitsch emphasized that the principle of access to all Georgian territory had to be maintained. Austria would in principle plan to participate in such missions, depending on the availability of personnel and funding. The MFA had already put these questions to the Defense Ministry, but had not yet received a response. (Note: E/P Counselor also met 8/21 with former Defense Minister Herbert Schiebner, who reported that he had seen Austrian Chief of Defense Entacher earlier in the day, who had told him Austria did not have the resources available for more than a minimal (2-3 personnel) deployment of observers.) Emboff stressed the political importance of broad participation in such missions, even with small numbers, because of the importance of demonstrating international rejection of Russia's action and support for Georgia's sovereignty and integrity. Kuglitsch was convinced Russia would not accept an EU mission. ¶7. (U) Kuglitsch reported that Austria had already provided emergency humanitarian assistance (tents, medicines, etc.) worth 130,000 euros to Georgia and would pledge another 150,000 euros in cash to the UN' "flash" appeal for huanitarian relief for Georgia. Additional support ould VIENNA 00001216 002 OF 003 also be considered. ¶8. (C) The MFA had not yet considered raising the issues of humanitarian access or human rights violations, according to Kuglitsch. His understanding was that Russia had opened routes for humanitarian assistance in both South Ossetia and other areas of Georgia under Russian control. He noted in that regard Russian statements about providing aid via Russia to South Ossetia and the opening of a corridor to allow ethnic Georgians to leave South Ossetia. E/P Counselor made clear that neither measure could be considered as providing free access to the conflict regions and could be easily abused for political purposes. As to human rights reports, Kuglitsch noted the lack of confirmed evidence of violations. Emboff noted that this was one of the reasons to insist on an impartial, international investigation of allegations. Emboff also explained that the U.S. was not alleging a systematic campaign of human rights violations. However, there were enough doubts about a systematic Russian commitment to preventing human rights violations to warrant reminding Moscow of its obligations under the laws of armed conflict. Next Steps -------------- ¶9. (C) Kuglitsch said he had no doubt that the Russian invasion would be a burden on future European relations with Russia, but that at this point the Austrians had no precise thoughts on what a not-business-as-usual policy would entail. Russian steps in the coming days and weeks -- especially on withdrawal and the setting up of an international mechanism for resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, would be the major factors in determining the Austrian and EU response. For now, Austria would be reluctant to cease work on the EU-Russia partnership, a step which he argued would reduce channels for communication with Russia. Austria would look to the Sept. 5-6 Gymnich discussion to take a longer perspective on relations and develop more specific plans. ¶10. (C) Kuglitsch himself raised, and then dismissed, the possibility that Russia would recognize South Ossetian or Abkhaz independence. Poloff noted USG concerns that, while the Government might not recognize independence there were indications the Russian parliament might do so, both because of heightened nationalist feelings and as a signal of Russian attitudes to the international community. ¶11. (C) The steps to be taken, Kuglitsch said, would depend in part on the assessment of how the invasion had come to pass. In that regard, Kuglitsch noted troubling differences between the U.S. and, as he put it, Europe. The U.S. was more prepared to place the entire blame on Russia, he thought, while Europe saw the picture as less clear. E/P Counselor said this was a mis-reading of U.S. statements. The U.S. saw a definite campaign of provocations by the South Ossetian side, abetted in some cases by Russian personnel (reftel para 4). Saakashvili's military response to these provocations was wrong, but the rapidity and organization of the Russian counter-stroke showed that plans for it had been developed in advance. Kuglitsch agreed on the latter point, but was reluctant to accept the idea that the Ossetians and/or Russians might have been deliberately seeking to provoke Georgian military action. Without an agreed assessment, he said, it would be difficult to agree on a common response. Comment and Action Request -------------- ¶12. (C) Plassnik's sharp rhetoric contrasts with the more cautious tone of her chief MFA advisor on Georgia and where Austria will come down in the European debate about its response is unclear. Former DefMin Schiebner did not believe any party would wish to use the issue during the present election campaign -- Austria's entrenched sense of itself as a neutral works to suppress public debate on conflicts in Europe, be argued. Moreover, Austria will want to be securely in the mainstream of the European response. Ambassador and senior Embassy staff will have multiple opportunities to engage Plassnik and other Austrian ministers, senior MFA staff, and Austrian and other European opinion leaders in discussions of Georgia at the August 24-28 Alpbach Forum symposia on foreign and economic policy. USUN Amb. Khalilzad will also attend the Forum. To encourage a steadfast Austrian position, we would welcome specific thoughts on what actions the EU could undertake to show Russia that it is not conducting business-as-usual. As important, the maximum possible cleared intelligence analysis on Russian actions in the run-up to August 6 would be helpful in dispelling questions about Russia's ultimate responsibility for the conflict. VIENNA 00001216 003 OF 003 Girard-diCarlo