Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK819
2008-09-12 16:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:
GEORGIA: SRSG DESIGNATE VERBEKE ALARMED AT NEW
VZCZCXRO1798 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO DE RUCNDT #0819 2561621 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121621Z SEP 08 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4932 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000819
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SRSG DESIGNATE VERBEKE ALARMED AT NEW
GEORGIA AGREEMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000819
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SRSG DESIGNATE VERBEKE ALARMED AT NEW
GEORGIA AGREEMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1.(C) Summary. SRSG-designate for the United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),Johan Verbeke, told Ambassador
DiCarlo he concluded that Russia viewed the September 8
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement as a mechanism to make the EU
monitoring mission a "guarantor" of Georgia's pledge not to
use force. Moscow is ready, in principle, for returns of
Georgians to Abkhazia and would consider expanded UN
involvement there in humanitarian issues-- provided UNOMIG
were renamed to reflect Abkhazia's independence. Verbeke's
Russian interlocutors were also ready to consider a UN
fact-finding mission for South Ossetia, but would want to
consider the terms of reference before giving their assent.
Verbeke expressed concern that the U.S. needed to be more
forceful in challenging what he considers the misplaced
conceptual arrangements that have been agreed to by the EU
and Moscow. End Summary.
2.(C) On September 11, the Secretary General's Special
Representative-designate for UNOMIG, Johan Verbeke, gave
Ambassador DiCarlo and poloff a readout of his September 8
meetings in Moscow with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Deputy FM
Karasin, MP Konstantin Kosachev and others. Verbeke is
concerned that the arrangements that had been agreed to in
Moscow would put the UN, EU, and OSCE monitors in the
position of serving as a buffer between Georgia and new
defacto borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He noted
U.S. silence on the agreed security arrangements and plans
for an October 15 meeting in Geneva, and said he was hoping
to get more clarity on U.S. views of the future UN role in
both places.
3.(C) Verbeke said FM Lavrov had made clear that the EU and
OSCE should maintain a "credible presence" of military
monitors in the security zones outside of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to protect against Georgian aggression. Russia did
not see the need to increase the international presence in
South Ossetia by adding UN monitors. For Abkhazia, the
Russians want a credible presence of UNOMIG and EU monitors
and police on the Georgian side of the boundary with
Abkhazia. DFM Karasin suggested that the area of operation
ought to expand to include the entire boundary between
Abkhazia and Georgia. For Abkhazia, DFM Karasin did not rule
out a unified mission with the EU operating under a UN
umbrella when Verbeke raised it. For both missions (OSCE-EU
and UN-EU),Russia thought the organizations should
coordinate modalities of their cooperation.
4.(C) Lavrov told Verbeke that the UN Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) would have to have a different name to reflect that
it was operating in an independent Abkhazia. Likewise, he saw
a different role for the UN in Abkhazia going forward. The FM
thought the new role should be focused on humanitarian,
reconstruction, economic and social issues, as opposed to the
monitoring role that the UN currently has. DFM Karasin said
to Verbeke that Russia wanted a multi-ethnic Abkhazia and
wanted Georgians to return to their homes in the Gali
district. The de facto Abkhaz authorities, Verbeke believes,
want the UN to remain. He said this was confirmed by a brief
conversation he had had with de facto Foreign Minister Shamba
in Moscow, when they bumped into each other between meetings.
5.(C) Verbeke raised the proposed UN fact-finding mission in
South Ossetia on humanitarian and human rights issues with
his Russian interlocutors. They questioned the added value
of such a mission, since the Council of Europe, the Red
Cross, and the Swiss had already undertaken missions. The
Russians said they would consider it, but would need to take
a look at the terms of reference before making a decision.
6.(C) Lavrov did not rule out a ministerial on Georgia at the
UNGA, though Russia would not ask for one. Lavrov made clear
that Russia expected to have representatives of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia "associated" with such a meeting.
7.(C) Verbeke said Russia is comfortable with the EU leading
the international discussions to be held in Geneva. Given
the absence of other parties weighing in on the issue,
Verbeke thought that the UN would have a minimal role.
Ambassador DiCarlo noted that the United States was still
discussing the parameters for international discussions with
the EU.
8.(C) Verbeke raised concerns with DiCarlo that the U.S. has
not been more vocal in challenging the conceptual
relationship of the EU monitors as guarantors of Georgian
non-aggression. Verbeke (protect) believed that the agreement
was flawed, in that it protects Russia's interests but not
those of Georgia.
Khalilzad
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SRSG DESIGNATE VERBEKE ALARMED AT NEW
GEORGIA AGREEMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1.(C) Summary. SRSG-designate for the United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),Johan Verbeke, told Ambassador
DiCarlo he concluded that Russia viewed the September 8
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement as a mechanism to make the EU
monitoring mission a "guarantor" of Georgia's pledge not to
use force. Moscow is ready, in principle, for returns of
Georgians to Abkhazia and would consider expanded UN
involvement there in humanitarian issues-- provided UNOMIG
were renamed to reflect Abkhazia's independence. Verbeke's
Russian interlocutors were also ready to consider a UN
fact-finding mission for South Ossetia, but would want to
consider the terms of reference before giving their assent.
Verbeke expressed concern that the U.S. needed to be more
forceful in challenging what he considers the misplaced
conceptual arrangements that have been agreed to by the EU
and Moscow. End Summary.
2.(C) On September 11, the Secretary General's Special
Representative-designate for UNOMIG, Johan Verbeke, gave
Ambassador DiCarlo and poloff a readout of his September 8
meetings in Moscow with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Deputy FM
Karasin, MP Konstantin Kosachev and others. Verbeke is
concerned that the arrangements that had been agreed to in
Moscow would put the UN, EU, and OSCE monitors in the
position of serving as a buffer between Georgia and new
defacto borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He noted
U.S. silence on the agreed security arrangements and plans
for an October 15 meeting in Geneva, and said he was hoping
to get more clarity on U.S. views of the future UN role in
both places.
3.(C) Verbeke said FM Lavrov had made clear that the EU and
OSCE should maintain a "credible presence" of military
monitors in the security zones outside of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to protect against Georgian aggression. Russia did
not see the need to increase the international presence in
South Ossetia by adding UN monitors. For Abkhazia, the
Russians want a credible presence of UNOMIG and EU monitors
and police on the Georgian side of the boundary with
Abkhazia. DFM Karasin suggested that the area of operation
ought to expand to include the entire boundary between
Abkhazia and Georgia. For Abkhazia, DFM Karasin did not rule
out a unified mission with the EU operating under a UN
umbrella when Verbeke raised it. For both missions (OSCE-EU
and UN-EU),Russia thought the organizations should
coordinate modalities of their cooperation.
4.(C) Lavrov told Verbeke that the UN Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) would have to have a different name to reflect that
it was operating in an independent Abkhazia. Likewise, he saw
a different role for the UN in Abkhazia going forward. The FM
thought the new role should be focused on humanitarian,
reconstruction, economic and social issues, as opposed to the
monitoring role that the UN currently has. DFM Karasin said
to Verbeke that Russia wanted a multi-ethnic Abkhazia and
wanted Georgians to return to their homes in the Gali
district. The de facto Abkhaz authorities, Verbeke believes,
want the UN to remain. He said this was confirmed by a brief
conversation he had had with de facto Foreign Minister Shamba
in Moscow, when they bumped into each other between meetings.
5.(C) Verbeke raised the proposed UN fact-finding mission in
South Ossetia on humanitarian and human rights issues with
his Russian interlocutors. They questioned the added value
of such a mission, since the Council of Europe, the Red
Cross, and the Swiss had already undertaken missions. The
Russians said they would consider it, but would need to take
a look at the terms of reference before making a decision.
6.(C) Lavrov did not rule out a ministerial on Georgia at the
UNGA, though Russia would not ask for one. Lavrov made clear
that Russia expected to have representatives of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia "associated" with such a meeting.
7.(C) Verbeke said Russia is comfortable with the EU leading
the international discussions to be held in Geneva. Given
the absence of other parties weighing in on the issue,
Verbeke thought that the UN would have a minimal role.
Ambassador DiCarlo noted that the United States was still
discussing the parameters for international discussions with
the EU.
8.(C) Verbeke raised concerns with DiCarlo that the U.S. has
not been more vocal in challenging the conceptual
relationship of the EU monitors as guarantors of Georgian
non-aggression. Verbeke (protect) believed that the agreement
was flawed, in that it protects Russia's interests but not
those of Georgia.
Khalilzad