MAXIMIZING U.S. LEVERAGE IN THE 63RD UNGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000736 SIPDIS DEPT FOR U/S BURNS AND IO AA/S HOOK E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON UN SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING U.S. LEVERAGE IN THE 63RD UNGA Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (C) Summary. The 63rd United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) offers an opportunity to maximize U.S. influence within the UN by promoting targeted initiatives and reducing, without compromising U.S. policies or principles, the number of resolutions where we vote in or nearly in isolation. This cable outlines plans for a USUN initiative targeting poverty, requests information on Department priorities for the 63rd UNGA (see para 5),and intends to pursue a new framework with a differentiated U.S. approach on voting tactics across three categories of resolutions: those where we are isolated due to budgetary and procedural concerns; those where we are opposed to language based on technical or legal grounds; and those where we are isolated out of cause. A change in voting tactics on some resolutions may offer opportunities to enhance our leverage in the GA, influence the content of resolutions, and preserve the impact of principled U.S. opposition to resolutions that compromise core U.S. policies. Among the alternatives to isolated "no" votes are finding ways to increase the number of countries also voting no, not voting (dissociating),abstaining, or seeking changes to resolutions that would allow us to join consensus, perhaps with a strong explanation of position (EOP). End summary. Building Support for USUN and Department Initiatives -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The U.S. has historically focused on a few key issues to advance during each General Assembly. When we put U.S. prestige behind an initiative, it is important that we win. However, sponsoring resolutions is extremely resource intensive and limits our ability to play an active, lead role on other issues of interest. Spreading our delegation too thin can also result in failed initiatives, or a hijacked initiative that the U.S. can no longer support. It is also possible that U.S. initiatives may provoke counter resolutions from unfriendly states. Given these factors, in choosing U.S. initiatives, it is vital to pick an area where we can develop broad backing and maximize the chance for success. We should also not shy away from co-partnering with non-European delegations where our interests converge. ¶3. (C) Based on the considerations in paragraph two above, informal contacts with the Department, and discussions with various UN Missions about likely forthcoming resolutions, we suggest the following U.S. priorities in the 63rd UNGA: --Sponsoring and winning adoption of an appropriate country-specific human rights resolution (country TBD),and supporting the successful adoption of country-specific human rights resolutions sponsored by like-minded countries; --Strengthening international support for freedom of expression and continuing to draw international attention to the plight of prisoners of conscience; --Aggressively engaging on an anticipated G77 resolution on the global food crisis to positively influence the substance and build consensus; --Winning adoption of a U.S. sponsored resolution on reducing poverty through the legal empowerment of the poor (see para 4). ¶4. (C) USUN has begun informal consultations with UNDP and like-minded states about the possibility of assembling a group of countries to co-sponsor a resolution supporting the legal empowerment of the poor as a key tool in poverty eradication. Such a resolution would build on the June 2008 report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP). A resolution building on the work of the CLEP would be fully consistent with U.S. development and worker rights policy (the CLEP report emphasizes the importance of property rights, business rights, the rule of law, and labor rights for poverty eradication),could offer a good issue on which to build a bridge to the G77 (a diverse group of countries including Egypt, Tanzania, Indonesia and Pakistan supported the Commission's efforts),and would help counter allegations that the U.S. is not supportive of the UN development agenda. Two out of three people in the world live outside the rule of law and any hope of empowering the poor to escape poverty depends on giving them basic legal rights to own and transfer property, establish a business and gain access to a fair system of justice. ¶5. (C) ACTION REQUEST: We request an update on resolutions the Department anticipates initiating this year to assist us in planning our engagement strategy for the 63rd UNGA. We also request the Department review the U.S. approach on certain resolutions we oppose in or nearly in isolation (list to be sent to IO) with a view toward identifying some on which we can easily align or appeal--without compromising core U.S. policies or principles--as part of an effort to maximize our overall leverage in the 63rd UNGA. Isolation Due to Budgetary and Procedural Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) When considering UN budget issues within the 5th Committee (the Budget Committee),the U.S., while taking a strong position during negotiations, almost always joins consensus. We have on occasion effectively used the threat of calling for a vote to obtain concessions that addressed our concerns. As a result, in recent years, there have been relatively rare occasions where we have actually called for a vote and vote no. In those instances, we vote no due to principle--fiscal discipline concerns or where funding a certain activity runs counter to core U.S. foreign policy interests or goals. However, there are a number of resolutions outside the 5th Committee where we vote in or almost in isolation for budgetary concerns, despite having little or no substantive objection. We believe that a differentiated, case-by-case approach to resolutions in this category is warranted, including, where appropriate, the possibility of threatening a vote in an effort to obtain concessions. Opposition to resolutions because of budgetary concerns outside the 5th committee often serves to undermine our ability to influence content. This happens particularly in the First Committee, where resolutions often require an increase in funding from the UN regular budget. Our votes in these cases have proved ineffective at preventing the expenditures, as the resolutions pass and are funded, and it is often unclear whether such votes have any sobering impact on how Member States approach similar issues in other contexts. In addition, others may perceive us to have a substantive difference on these resolutions when in fact we have no principled objection. In other cases, we vote no because of procedural concerns, such as the miscategorization of resolutions in committees or other procedural objections. Concerns about appropriate allocation of items in this category should be addressed in the General Committee. Negotiators within the Main Committees will also have an opportunity to clarify with the Secretariat the words or phras es within a resolution that may give rise to financial obligations. ¶7. (C) In resolutions outside of the 5th Committee involving budgetary implications, we suggest greater consideration be given to the following alternatives to voting no: join consensus but issue a strong EOP; vote no on specific paragraphs related to our budget concerns while joining consensus on the overall resolution; disassociate from consensus; or vote no on certain paragraphs and abstain. Resolutions Where We Could Maintain Our Position But Shift Emphasis -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) In this category, the U.S. has voted in or almost in isolation to express opposition to language on technical grounds, including on those resolutions that reference existing conventions to which the U.S. is not a party. This occurs primarily in the First and Third Committees. The subjects of these resolutions, especially those within the Third Committee, have overwhelming support among the membership and are often especially important to U.S. allies. Often we find ourselves in the company of those member states that do not share our values. In cases where we cannot persuade others to move to our position, we should reassess how great the difference is between us and others and ascertain whether we could derive benefits from adjusting our approach. We believe that revisiting our approach on some of these issues could contribute to a more favorable dynamic in the GA for the U.S. ¶9. (C) In some cases, it may be possible to avoid isolation through minor, acceptable changes in language. If not achievable, we should, where possible, consider joining consensus while issuing a strong EOP or, as an even stronger form of objection, dissociating from consensus without calling for a vote. This course of action may be appropriate in cases where we are not party to a convention to which the resolution is linked, and therefore not bound by it. Isolation for Cause -------------- ¶10. (C) The U.S. also finds itself isolated on certain resolutions about which we have justifiably strong objections or that contravene core U.S. foreign policy positions or equities, including those incorporating unacceptable anti-Israeli language. Compromise in this area is unlikely given the wholly unbalanced nature of the resolutions and the ulterior motives behind them. ¶11. (C) On these resolutions, we will continue to engage our allies and partners, urging them to seek improvements to the resolution texts to bring them closer to U.S. positions. Many of these resolutions are negotiated directly between the EU and Palestinians, and we believe early outreach to France, as current EU president, could yield benefits. Even if negotiations fail, seeking to open up the negotiating process can restrain the more radical actors, and may help us convince those voting yes to move towards abstentions, and those who abstain to move towards no votes or not vote at all, reducing U.S. isolation. ¶12. (C) Early demarches to the Palestinians and moderate Arabs are recommended to try and consolidate and lessen the number of anti-Israel resolutions from the agenda. We are aware, however, that softening language on Middle East resolutions could increase the support of other delegations but not be enough to make it possible for us to join consensus. Khalilzad