SOMALIS PUSH STABILIZATION FORCE, UN RESISTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000689 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR IO, AF, PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018 TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC SO SUBJECT: SOMALIS PUSH STABILIZATION FORCE, UN RESISTS REF: USUN 668 Classified By: Amb. Alejandro Wolff, for reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10. ¶2. (C) Summary: In meetings during the week of July 21-25, Somali representatives and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials offered sharply different perspectives on prospects for a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) or multinational stabilization force in Somalia. The Somali Foreign Minister, African Union (AU) representatives and members of the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) gave enthusiastic assessments of recent political progress and pressed for urgent movement toward a large, UN-backed security force. DPKO planners subsequently provided a private briefing for USUN that focused on the extreme volatility of the situation in Somalia and concluded that the situation would need to be secured by a multinational force (MNF) before a PKO could deploy. End summary. Somalis push for immediate security help -------------- ¶3. (C) In a July 22 meeting with Amb. Khalilzad, Somali Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Jana described progress on the political front and advocated a clear message from the UNSC that it was prepared to move toward a peacekeeping operation, which he estimated would require 10,000-12,000 troops. A future force need not be a UN PKO, Jana said, but should be UN-funded in order to avoid the funding and logistics pitfalls that have hampered AMISOM. Jana said that he looked forward to an official signing of the Djibouti Agreement soon, hopefully in Mecca. He noted that under the terms of the agreement the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and ARS were to cease hostilities and work together to end attacks by non-signatory groups. ¶4. (C) Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ahmed Ould Abdallah and AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra briefed Amb. Khalilzad on July 23 on developments in the political process following the initialing of the Djibouti Agreement. They said that delay in the agreement's signing was not due to misgivings by the parties, but by a desire to accommodate the schedule of the king of Saudi Arabia. In the words of the SRSG and Lamamra, the main "spoilers" to the peace process were Eritrea and individuals in Saudi Arabia who funded militias like al-Shabaab. It was their hope that signing the peace process in Mecca with the Saudi king in attendance would make it easier for them to press the Saudi government into shutting down these individuals. They hoped that the king's schedule would accommodate a signing before Ramadan, perhaps as soon as August 15. They also dismissed the threat posed by the Asmara-based ARS faction led by Sheikh Aweys, who Ould Abdallah privately referred to as "a nobody" who "dyes his beard with henna so he can say he's an Islamist." ¶5. (C) On the subject of a peacekeeping force, Ould Abdallah and Lamamra said that an additional force was needed as soon as possible in order to allow Ethiopian troops to withdraw and the political process to progress. Lamamra lamented what he called a "civil war" between the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and DPKO over the need for a Somalia peacekeeping operation and described military officers around Guehenno as being "brainwashed" into believing that a PKO in Somalia needed at least 28,000 troops. Like the Somali FM, Lamamra believed that a significantly smaller force would suffice. Amb. Khalilzad urged Lamamra and Ould Abdallah to be open to creative options to improving security in Somalia, including by increasing the capacity of Somali security forces. Finally, the SRSG and Commissioner discussed the linkage of security and humanitarian issues in Somalia, with the SRSG emphasizing that no food can be delivered in Somalia without paying off warlords for protection. According to him, the protection money paid by WFP and other NGOs goes to buy weapons, perpetuating the power of the warlords and instability in the country. What was needed, Ould Abdallah and Lamamra agreed, was an empowered envoy along the model of Kai Eide in Afghanistan, who would be able to coordinate security and humanitarian efforts to ensure that they were mutually reinforcing. Amb. Khalilzad undertook to study this possibility when reviewing AMISOM's mandate in August. USUN NEW Y 00000689 002 OF 003 Opposition wants peacekeepers, too -------------- ¶6. (C) On July 24, Pol Counselor and Poloff met with Mohammedabdir Mohammed and Omar Sheikh Ali Idris - two members of the ARS who were in New York as part of FM Jana's delegation. Idris and Mohammed confirmed the ARS's strong support for the Djibouti process and said that the ARS had already identified its delegates to the political and security committees that would be formed once the agreement was formally signed. They said that spoilers such as Sheikh Aweys could claim no more than 24 out of 191 members of the ARS Central Committee and that Sheikh Hassan had recently reached out to Sheikh Aweys in order to try to convince him to join the agreement. Idris and Mohammed said that for the ARS, the Ethiopian presence in Somalia is the biggest obstacle to peace. Idris urged that international peacekeepers be deployed "immediately" to Somalia in order to allow the Ethiopians to withdraw, and claimed that most fighters in Somalia would lay down their ARMS if this happened. Idris and Mohammed said that even if a peacekeeping force could not immediately secure the whole country, an initial deployment that would allow Ethiopians to withdraw from Mogadishu would lay a strong foundation for peace. DPKO tries to put on the brakes -------------- ¶7. (C) Following the U.S.'s reftel request for a briefing before August 15 on peacekeeping scenarios for Somalia, DPKO military planners requested a meeting with USUN political officers and Military Staff Committee officers on July 25. DPKO Chief of Military Planning COL Brian Norman (U.S.) and his staff told USUN that while DPKO is "encouraged" by the momentum of the Djibouti Agreement, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile and is not conducive to deploying a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO). He cited a UN Department of Safety and Security review that classified Somalia as the most non-permissive environment in the world -- significantly worse, he noted, than Iraq or Afghanistan. Margaret Carey, principal officer in DPKO's Africa Division, said that based on AMISOM's experience, any new security force was likely to be tested severely within the first 90 days of its deployment by those seeking to derail the peace process. For that reason, any such force would need to have full-spectrum combat capabilities, unlike AMISOM. DPKO staff outlined two objections to a direct move to a UN PKO. The first, political objection was summarized by Carey: "We would not like to see blue helmets using force to the extent that this force will have to -- it will undermine the UN's ability to mediate this conflict and deliver humanitarian aid." On the operational front, Norman said that the command and CONTROL and intelligence capabilities of the UN were not sufficient to tackle a situation as unpredictable and kinetic as that in Somalia. ¶8. (C) DPKO believes it is imperative that, prior to any PKO in Somalia, a MNF headed by a capable lead nation must deploy first in order to establish a "baseline" of stability built around sustained political will and reconciliation between the parties. According to DPKO, this force would need to be a self-deploying, self-sustaining force of approximately two or three brigades (8,000-10,000 troops total) which would operate chiefly in Mogadishu and have the capacity to stabilize the situation on the ground through use of force if necessary. Such a force would be designed to monitor the Peace Agreement, secure air and seaports and provide limited force protection for the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in order to allow it to relocate to Somalia and better facilitate the political process. DPKO planners said that this MNF could either replace or subsume AMISOM, but emphasized that AMISOM's current troops did not have the full-spectrum capabilities they deemed necessary for a potential MNF. Only once the MNF established a secure environment would DPKO be prepared to segue to a UN PKO that would relieve the MNF. In DPKO's view, this PKO would need to be at least 22,000 strong and operate in central and southern Somalia. It would need to have very specific tasks and missions that would include and expand upon those of the MNF. ¶9. (C) DPKO acknowledged that the wild card in their planning USUN NEW Y 00000689 003 OF 003 is the Ethiopian Army. DPKO repeatedly asked for U.S. support with the GOE, specifically requesting information regarding the GOE's intentions and possible withdrawal plans. DPKO also asked for sustained U.S. intel support concerning the security situation on the ground in Somalia. In response to MSC questions on building the capabilities of Somali security forces, DPKO agreed that a security sector reform (SSR) component will be central to the long-term stability of Somalia, but because SSR is a commitment of several years, they do not believe such programs can offer immediate support to the Djibouti Agreement process. A maritime task force (MTF) was also discussed, with general agreement that it would be useful to modestly increase the size of the existing effort. While the AU has asked for a very large MTF, DPKO believes this is likely not achievable. ¶10. (C) Comment and action request: DPKO's August 15 briefing to the Council is likely to shape Council members' thinking on possible engagement in Somalia, and from the July 25 briefing it appears likely that DPKO will lean strongly toward the deployment of a MNF rather than a UN PKO. This approach may be persuasive to some members of the Council, but faces many obstacles, particularly with regard to force generation -- even if sufficiently capable troops were interested in joining a Somalia operation, countries would have no incentive to fund their own participation in a MNF when they could instead deploy to a UN-funded PKO. We request Department guidance on responding to DPKO's anticipated mid-August briefing, as well as DPKO's requests for assistance vis-a-vis Ethiopia. Mission would also welcome the Department's views on the idea of an empowered envoy for Somalia, similar to that in Afghanistan. Khalilzad