RUSSIA THREATENS ZIMBABWE VETO, P-3 DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000610 SIPDIS S FOR THE PARTY, DEPT FOR P, IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICES E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAL KWBG UNSC ZI RS IS PA SUBJECT: RUSSIA THREATENS ZIMBABWE VETO, P-3 DISCUSS SETTLEMENTS UNSCR REF: A. USUN 605 ¶B. USUN 604 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Amb Khalilzad discussed the Arab settlements UNSCR with British and French PermReps on July 9. After previously saying they would offer only weak amendments to the preambular Arab text, the French said they now had clearance from Paris to present additional operative paragraphs as well that the Arabs will not be able to accept. (Note: USUN e-mailed the French elements to IO and NEA on July 9. They are similar to the alternate U.S. draft. End Note.) France would "push the Arabs as far as possible," and if they don't agree, would come back to "consider" an alternate text. But the French Amb cautioned there is no need to rush to present an alternate text. If the experts meeting on the afternoon of July 9 results in a serious negotiation towards a comprehensive resolution, the P-3 should let those talks play out. The French Amb confirmed that Paris's first priority is to avoid any UNSC action before the end of the July 13/14 Euro-Med summit. ¶2. (C) Amb Khalilzad agreed to see what happens at the July 9 experts meeting before deciding whether to table the alternate U.S. text. The U.S. had worked with France to delay UNSC action for the past three weeks and would continue to try to push for delay. But he emphasized that we also have an interest in avoiding a U.S. veto. If the Arab text becomes the only game in town, and delegations begin to amend it in ways that would isolate the U.S. and UK, USUN will have to table an alternate text after the experts meet on July 9 in order to change the basis of the discussion. The UK supported this position. Amb Khalilzad said the P-3 should continue to coordinate on tactics, but if the Arab text gains momentum, the U.S. and France might need to pursue a different approach temporarily. France could continue trying to amend the Arab text in ways that the Arabs cannot accept, the U.S. could propose its alternate text, and then the UK and France -- potentially after the Euro-Med summit -- could present a compromise solution pre-cooked with the U.S. The French agreed to discuss the need for an alternate text immediately after the July 9 experts meeting concludes. Zimbabwe -------------- ¶3. (C) The P-3 also discussed next steps on Zimbabwe. Amb. Khalilzad briefed the UK and France on South Africa's July 7 request for a waiting period for sanctions implementation, but advised that in a meeting with South African Ambassador Kumalo earlier in the day, this proposal seemed to no longer be on the table. Amb. Khalilzad stressed that with the Zimbabwean FM in Ouagadougou, it was important to move quickly to a vote to avoid the risk of Burkina Faso's vote becoming unreliable. French PermRep Ripert indicated that he was open to incorporating a delayed period of sanctions implementation if it would win votes, but nevertheless said that we should take advantage of our momentum to vote the resolution today. Ripert also voiced concerns about Burkina Faso, stating that the Burkinabes were nervous of the isolation they would face if they voted for sanctions on Zimbabwe and the resolution ultimately failed due to a Russian veto. The meeting closed with P3 agreement to vote the resolution today, but with the UK and France both worried over the possibility of a Russian veto. ¶4. (C) Amb. Khalilzad received a subsequent phone call from Russian PermRep Churkin, in which Churkin reiterated his request that the vote be delayed until Friday, July 11, complaining that Russian principals were currently traveling and unable to offer instructions. Should we ignore their calls for a delay, Churkin said that he would insist on waiting until 24 hours after the text went into blue (delaying the vote until 9pm EST tonight) and that he would then exercise a technical veto on the grounds of insufficient time for consultation. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: After consulting with the UK, we recommend the following course of action: -Not proceeding with a vote today -Not committing at this point to a delay until Friday -Engaging the Russians here in New York, as well as in Washington and Moscow. The UK should be encouraged to do the same. The risk of a Russian veto on substance remains, and there USUN NEW Y 00000610 002 OF 002 are concerns that the Russians will submit a number of amendments if consultations are delayed until Friday. End comment. Khalilzad