DPKO'S UNMIK PLAN: STATE RECONFIGURATION INTENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000407 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018 TAGS: PREL UNMIK UNSC YI KV SUBJECT: DPKO'S UNMIK PLAN: STATE RECONFIGURATION INTENT, HOPE NO-ONE OBJECTS REF: USUN 00385 USUN NEW Y 00000407 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Introduction and Summary: The U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, the EU Council, and NATO had an extensive exchange with UN U/SYG Guehenno and his team on May 1 about the future international community role in Kosovo. Guehenno said the UN wants to leave Kosovo as quickly and completely as possible and would like to facilitate EULEX deployment, under a UN umbrella at first if helpful. Both sides in this discussion saw it as part of an ongoing dialogue aimed at reaching common understanding of an UNMIK/EULEX/ICR division of labor in Kosovo after the June 15 effective date of Kosovo's new constitution. Guehenno said Secretary-General Ban intended to issue a report in mid-May laying out a decision to reconfigure the UN presence in Kosovo. ¶2. (C) Summary Continued: Welcoming the Secretary-General's intention to offer clarity on the way forward, participants sought to contribute by detailing a likely UNMIK future. The German representative laid out what UNMIK should continue to do after June 15, including: making regular reports to the Security Council, facilitating Kosovo's participation in international fora, and staffing and securing the Kosovo-Serbia border. DAS DiCarlo laid out what UNMIK should not do, including: governing Kosovo, opposing or duplicating activities of the ICO, making new institutional arrangements except in coordination with the Government of Kosovo, managing Kosovo's economy, and supervising the KPC. In response to concerns that objections by Russia, Serbia or others should not be allowed to derail Ban's proposed reconfiguration, Guehenno was non-committal, saying that "adjustments" to the plan might have to be made. End Summary. GUEHENNO: OUR STRATEGIC GOAL IS TO GET OUT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On May 1, U.S., German, UK, Italian and French Balkan Directors (DAS Rosemary DiCarlo, Emily Haber, Raimondo De Cardona, Adam Bye, and Edouard Beslay) joined by representatives from their UN missions, Slovenian Deputy Permrep Aleska Simkic (representing the EU Presidency), Croatian Permrep Neven Jurica, the EU Council's Stefan Lehne and NATO's Michel Soula met with UN U/SYG Guehenno and his team, which included DPKO Europe Director David Harland, to discuss the future international community role in Kosovo. ¶4. (C) Guehenno said he knows the UN needs the buy-in of the EU for any reconfiguration of UNMIK. He explained that the UN's strategic goal is to "get out" of Kosovo, adding that the UN wanted to facilitate EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) deployment in Kosovo. Elaborating on Harland's earlier description of a new DPKO game plan for partial or complete UNMIK withdrawal from Kosovo (reftel),Guehenno and his staff explained that the SYG would probably send a report to the Security Council in mid-May (after May 11 Serbian elections) conveying the SYG's decision to reconfigure UNMIK and would not seek UNSC endorsement for this. In advance of sending this report, the SYG would discuss the parameters for reconfiguration with all key players, including Russia. The goal would be to get broad support from as many UNSC members as possible (including non-permanent members) and at least non-objection from others. COUNTRIES RESPOND: OUR VISION AND REDLINES FOR A UN ROLE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The EU's Lehne said there is considerable interest among the 27 EU members in the idea of EULEX deploying under a UN umbrella, but the EU has long had concerns about double-hatting or other arrangements that might interfere with the "autonomy of EU decision-making." He said the EU will insist on deploying everywhere in Kosovo, emphasizing that any "geographic differentiation" must be a temporary accommodation for as long as EULEX remains unable to deploy safely in the north. Lehne told Guehenno that "the EU is ready to help you help us," on the transfer of key UNMIK assets to the EU, explaining that constraints on these transfers pose the biggest practical problem for the EU's deployment. ¶6. (C) Germany's Haber explained that after the Kosovo USUN NEW Y 00000407 002.2 OF 002 constitution takes effect on June 15, Kosovo will begin to govern itself and the International Civilian Representative (ICR) will become the preeminent figure in Kosovo. A residual UN presence could, she said, have an important role in monitoring/reporting on developments, facilitate Kosovo's interaction in certain international fora, ensure ongoing travel privileges for Kosovo's citizens, facilitate Belgrade-Pristina dialogue on technical matters and perhaps carry out certain policing or customs functions on a temporary basis. (Note: Participants did not discuss the potential duration of any such arrangement. End Note.) DiCarlo stressed that after June 15 the UN must not: govern Kosovo, oppose or duplicate the ICO's work, manage Kosovo's economy or supervise the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC.) She said UNMIK cannot continue to manage the economic functions currently carried out by UNMIK Pillar IV (funded by the EU), though there can be discussion on those areas the Kosovars cannot handle. DiCarlo stated that UNMIK can facilitate dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, but the UN should not negotiate status or new institutional arrangements on its own. GUEHENNO SEES COMMON GROUND -------------- ¶7. (C) Guehenno broadly agreed with these presentations, adding that the SYG will not put anything in writing with which the group would not be comfortable. Guehenno stated there could not be an institutionally partitioned end state for Kosovo with the UN in one part and the EU elsewhere. He said questions the UN will eventually need an answer regarding EU deployment in the north of Kosovo include whether it will be a "big bang" or proceed in "penny packets" and how long the UN would need to stay there. Guehenno said the UN would facilitate EULEX entry in the north of Kosovo, but said some agreement or at least acquiescence is necessary with Belgrade and Pristina. Regarding the International Civilian Office (ICO),Guehenno said it is outside of UN parameters and will be dealt with on a "neither confirm nor deny basis." Guehenno stated that the UN will not interfere with the KPC's metamorphosis and equally has no appetite for involvement in Kosovo's economy, though there may be money issues remaining related to Pillar IV fiduciary responsibilities. ¶8. (C) Lehne voiced strong doubts about whether agreement with Belgrade on deployment of EULEX is possible. He asked Guehenno how the UN SYG would deal with strong opposition from within the UNSC and whether this would derail the SYG from implementing his decision to reconfigure UNMIK. French Permrep Ripert suggested DPKO share its plan with Russia to test its reaction before sending the plan to the Security Council. Guehenno stated that if Russia or other P-5 members were to object to the plan, this might compel "adjustments." DPKO's Harland noted that SYG Ban had the impression that around the time of Kosovo's declaration of independence the UNSC was divided almost evenly on Kosovo and that the goal should be to win the support for UNMIK reconfiguration of perhaps twelve UNSC members. ¶9. (C) Guehenno allowed that the UN will need a small presence in Kosovo even under the best of circumstances. Lehne warned that some in Belgrade such as Prime Minister Kostunica and Minister for Kosovo Samardzic will want to draw the UN into negotiations on status. Guehenno said that UN officials have made clear to Belgrade that "the Secretariat is the wrong address" for discussions on status as long as the Security Council is divided. He said UN discussions with Belgrade are aimed at determining what the market will bear in terms of an understanding, although understanding will not come overnight. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) While Ban and DPKO seem to be moving in the right direction, it is clear that we and our European partners will need to provide significant input into the UN reconfiguration plan and keep the UN's feet to the fire in face of Russian resistance. Khalilzad