LEBANON: FRENCH THREATEN TO CIRCULATE SHORT 1701

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000319 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG, NEA A/S WELCH E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER KPKO UNSC SY LE IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH THREATEN TO CIRCULATE SHORT 1701 PRST OVER U.S. OBJECTIONS REF: KUMAR-REINEMEYER UNCLASSIFIED E-MAIL 4/7/08 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) The French held expert-level consultations on April 7 on their draft UNSC Presidential Statement (PRST) on resolution 1701 (reftel). Libya, South Africa, China, and Panama objected to the draft statement but expressed a willingness to consider a shortened version that simply reiterates support for all elements of resolution 1701 without going into detail on selected issues such as violations of the arms embargo and the fate of the abducted Israeli soldiers. Following this discussion, French PR Ripert informed USUN on April 8 that he had received instructions from Paris to circulate a shortened draft to UNSC members. The French argue that a short PRST (text contained in para 3) is better than no text at all, in order to reaffirm support for UNIFIL amidst increased tension in Lebanon and threats of renewed hostilities. The French say they have been instructed to circulate this text to UNSC members by noon on April 9, although due to the close U.S.-French working relationship, they were providing us with advance notice. The Lebanese strongly support a shortened PRST along the lines proposed by the French. The Israeli Mission, on instructions from Jerusalem, told USUN that a shortened PRST would be unacceptable because it would fail to address the two issues of greatest concern to Israel -- illegal arms transfers and the fate of the Israeli soldiers. The Israeli position is that no PRST at all is better than a short PRST. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Based on our current instructions to oppose a shortened version of the 1701 PRST, we have told the French that they have two options, both of which result in the same outcome of no/no PRST. On one hand, they can drop the PRST now, which most UNSC members expect them to do based on opposition expressed by other delegations. Or, they can circulate the text and force the U.S. to block it, thereby creating the first rift in the four-year-old U.S.-French partnership on Lebanon. Unless our instructions on the shortened text change, we have three tactical options to respond to the French threat: 1) Engage Paris overnight to convince them to drop the PRST and to issue new instructions to this effect to their mission in New York, or 2) wait until the French circulate the shortened PRST, and then block it, on the grounds that the UNSC cannot ignore the most important violations of resolution 1701. Although other delegations (UK, Croatia, maybe other Europeans) want the PRST to address these violations as well, they can support the shortened version and will allow the U.S. alone to take the blame for blocking the text, an action which could be perceived in Lebanon as lack of support for the GOL and UNSCR 1701. There is also option 3) try to force the hardest-line delegation (probably Libya) to block the text by adding elements to isolate it from its allies, but Israel would probably object to some of these elements (Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar, provision of cluster bomb information) and France would be very reluctant to put forward such a text. END COMMENT. ¶3. (SBU) Pending clearance from Paris on the text, the French Mission plans to circulate the following draft PRST by noon on April 9 to UNSC members, unless it receives new instructions: The Security Council recalls its resolution 1773 (2007) as well as the statement of its president of August 3 2007 (S/PRST/2007/29) and welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General of 30 October 2007 and of 28 February 2008. SIPDIS It reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) and reaffirms its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General in this regard. The Security Council takes note of the reported progress as well as of the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of resolution 1701 and emphasizes the need for greater progress on key issues required for a permanent cease-fire and long-term solution, as referred to in the Secretary-General's reports. It also calls upon all concerned parties, in particular in the region, to intensify their efforts in implementing resolution 1701 (2006) and to fully cooperate with the Secretary-General in this regard. SIPDIS The Security Council reiterates its full support for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and calls on all parties to abide by their obligations to respect the safety of UN personnel. It welcomes the further enhancement of the cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). (It expresses its concern about the repercussions of the continuation of the political impasse in Lebanon. It reiterates its call for the holding without delay of a free and fair presidential election in conformity with Lebanese constitutional rules, without foreign interference or influence, and with full respect for democratic institutions. It welcomes constructive regional and international efforts, including those of the Arab League, to help Lebanese parties reach an agreement, in a spirit of dialogue and reconciliation.) The Security Council stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973. Khalilzad