UN/1267 SANCTIONS: ARAB AND PAKISTANI SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000313 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018 TAGS: ETTC PREL EFIN KTFN PTER UNSC SUBJECT: UN/1267 SANCTIONS: ARAB AND PAKISTANI SECURITY OFFICIALS COMPLAIN SECURITY COUNCIL SLOW TO SANCTION AL-QAIDA REF: KONZET-CROWE EMAIL 03-06-08 USUN NEW Y 00000313 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Minister-Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior officials representing the intelligence and security services of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen have complained to the UN that the Security Council has thus far failed to impose sanctions on alleged al-Qaida terrorists that these governments have identified for Security Council action, and suggested that this inaction will discourage them from proposing additional subjects for sanctions in the future. In a March 17 briefing of Security Council delegations on the views of Pakistan and these Arab states, UN officials reported that these government officials agreed that al-Qaida is resilient in their countries, including its threat to the UN, and called on the UN to facilitate greater operational cooperation between them and the U.S. and Europe. They also expressed concern about terrorist use of the Internet and satellite phones to plan and support their operations. End summary. ¶2. (C) The 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban) Sanctions Committee of the Security Council met informally on March 17 with the Coordinator of the Committee's Monitoring Team, Richard Barrett, to discuss the Team's meeting with heads of intelligence and security services from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen on January 23-24 in Vienna. Egypt and Jordan were invited to the meeting but did not attend. Barrett stressed that these officials are frustrated that their requests to recommend specific individuals affiliated with al-Qaida or the Taliban for sanctions by the Security Council are frequently put on hold, either temporarily or for long periods of time. They also complained about lack of Committee follow-up on the holds. They claimed that this inaction has discouraged them from proposing new listings. ¶3. (C) Explanatory Note on Holds: Following is a status report on holds placed by Security Council members on Arab government requests for listings. Belgium and France placed holds on an Algerian request from 2003 to list one individual. The U.S., UK, and Belgium placed holds on a Libyan request from 2004 to list twelve individuals (at the request of the Committee, Libya winnowed an initial list of seventy-four individuals to twelve). The U.S., UK, Belgium and Russia have placed a hold on a Moroccan request from 2005 to list thirty-two individuals. The U.S., UK, France and Russia have a hold on a Yemeni request from 2006 to delist one individual. End note. ¶4. (C) In a separate discussion with USUN, Barrett reported that these governments attribute U.S. refusal to support the imposition of sanctions against the individuals they have proposed to conspiracy; they do not understand or accept that legal and bureaucratic impediments may prevent action on the requests they submit. ¶5. (C) In speaking to the Committee, Barrett relayed that the Pakistani and Arab officials had asked that the Council's list of sanctioned individuals also refer to the fact of their detention (when appropriate) to serve as a deterrent and to highlight the counter-terrorism efforts undertaken by these states. ¶6. (C) Referring Committee members to the assessment in the report prepared by the Monitoring Team following its discussions in Vienna (ref email),Barrett noted that the government officials concluded that al-Qaida is resilient in North Africa, the Sahel, Somalia, and the Pakistan/Afghanistan region. Terrorism in Algeria is undergoing a "Qaida-ization" process, as illustrated by the recent attacks by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),and local Maghreb groups are being transformed into Qaida "franchises." All agreed that the main al-Qaida targets are oil installations, government and security officials, Western interests, and, increasingly, the United Nations. Participants also shared concerns about the al-Qaida trend to recruit very young individuals, who are unknown to the authorities and lack criminal records. USUN NEW Y 00000313 002.2 OF 002 ¶7. (C) The report noted that the government officials looked to the international community for assistance in their counter-terrorism efforts. Barrett explained that the officials see the UN as an actor that could convince the U.S. and Europe to agree to greater operational cooperation with them. In a separate conversation with USUN, Barrett described the type of assistance sought, which includes: cooperation on intelligence sharing, including on intelligence that supports listing requests; technical help with intercepts; and more action from EU countries in response to the threat posed by persons located in Europe -- including those under asylum -- who incite terrorism in the region, but whose freedom of speech is nonetheless protected. Pakistan also seeks help in acquiring technology to block satellite phone use by terrorists in the hinterlands. Barrett opined that these officials want to be treated as equals by their U.S. and EU counterparts. Barrett further emphasized that these officials viewed the 1267 Committee and the Monitoring Team as a neutral interlocutor that could facilitate U.S. and EU assistance to them under multilateral cover. Many of these officials believe it is easier for their governments to be seen cooperating with the UN than to be accused of responding to the bilateral demands of the U.S. or other western countries. Barrett also reported to the Committee that these officials believe that public statements from Western countries questioning the commitment of Arab and Pakistani governments to fighting terrorism have a negative impact on Muslim and Arab public opinion, and noted that insults against Islam were seen to fuel radicalization. ¶8. (C) Barrett recalled that the government officials stressed their concerns about the use of the Internet by al-Qaida for propaganda, recruitment, training, and bomb-making, and argued that the United States had a particular responsibility to regulate the Internet. He said that in regions where the Internet is not widely available, satellite phones are considered a more immediate problem, and noted that the officials had argued that satellite phone providers should deny terrorists access to their services. TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED Khalilzad