UN/1267 SANCTIONS: ARAB AND PAKISTANI SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018
TAGS: ETTC PREL EFIN KTFN PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: UN/1267 SANCTIONS: ARAB AND PAKISTANI SECURITY
OFFICIALS COMPLAIN SECURITY COUNCIL SLOW TO SANCTION
AL-QAIDA

REF: KONZET-CROWE EMAIL 03-06-08

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Classified By: Minister-Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior officials representing the
intelligence and security services of Algeria, Libya,
Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen have
complained to the UN that the Security Council has thus far
failed to impose sanctions on alleged al-Qaida terrorists
that these governments have identified for Security Council
action, and suggested that this inaction will discourage them
from proposing additional subjects for sanctions in the
future. In a March 17 briefing of Security Council
delegations on the views of Pakistan and these Arab states,
UN officials reported that these government officials agreed
that al-Qaida is resilient in their countries, including its
threat to the UN, and called on the UN to facilitate greater
operational cooperation between them and the U.S. and Europe.
They also expressed concern about terrorist use of the
Internet and satellite phones to plan and support their
operations. End summary.


2. (C) The 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban) Sanctions Committee of the
Security Council met informally on March 17 with the
Coordinator of the Committee's Monitoring Team, Richard
Barrett, to discuss the Team's meeting with heads of
intelligence and security services from Algeria, Libya,
Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen on January
23-24 in Vienna. Egypt and Jordan were invited to the
meeting but did not attend. Barrett stressed that these
officials are frustrated that their requests to recommend
specific individuals affiliated with al-Qaida or the Taliban
for sanctions by the Security Council are frequently put on
hold, either temporarily or for long periods of time. They
also complained about lack of Committee follow-up on the
holds. They claimed that this inaction has discouraged them
from proposing new listings.


3. (C) Explanatory Note on Holds: Following is a status
report on holds placed by Security Council members on Arab
government requests for listings. Belgium and France placed
holds on an Algerian request from 2003 to list one
individual. The U.S., UK, and Belgium placed holds on a
Libyan request from 2004 to list twelve individuals (at the
request of the Committee, Libya winnowed an initial list of
seventy-four individuals to twelve). The U.S., UK, Belgium
and Russia have placed a hold on a Moroccan request from 2005
to list thirty-two individuals. The U.S., UK, France and
Russia have a hold on a Yemeni request from 2006 to delist
one individual. End note.


4. (C) In a separate discussion with USUN, Barrett reported
that these governments attribute U.S. refusal to support the
imposition of sanctions against the individuals they have
proposed to conspiracy; they do not understand or accept that
legal and bureaucratic impediments may prevent action on the
requests they submit.


5. (C) In speaking to the Committee, Barrett relayed that
the Pakistani and Arab officials had asked that the Council's
list of sanctioned individuals also refer to the fact of
their detention (when appropriate) to serve as a deterrent
and to highlight the counter-terrorism efforts undertaken by
these states.


6. (C) Referring Committee members to the assessment in the
report prepared by the Monitoring Team following its
discussions in Vienna (ref email),Barrett noted that the
government officials concluded that al-Qaida is resilient in
North Africa, the Sahel, Somalia, and the
Pakistan/Afghanistan region. Terrorism in Algeria is
undergoing a "Qaida-ization" process, as illustrated by the
recent attacks by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),and
local Maghreb groups are being transformed into Qaida
"franchises." All agreed that the main al-Qaida targets are
oil installations, government and security officials, Western
interests, and, increasingly, the United Nations.
Participants also shared concerns about the al-Qaida trend to
recruit very young individuals, who are unknown to the
authorities and lack criminal records.


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7. (C) The report noted that the government officials looked
to the international community for assistance in their
counter-terrorism efforts. Barrett explained that the
officials see the UN as an actor that could convince the U.S.
and Europe to agree to greater operational cooperation with
them. In a separate conversation with USUN, Barrett
described the type of assistance sought, which includes:
cooperation on intelligence sharing, including on
intelligence that supports listing requests; technical help
with intercepts; and more action from EU countries in
response to the threat posed by persons located in Europe --
including those under asylum -- who incite terrorism in the
region, but whose freedom of speech is nonetheless protected.
Pakistan also seeks help in acquiring technology to block
satellite phone use by terrorists in the hinterlands.
Barrett opined that these officials want to be treated as
equals by their U.S. and EU counterparts. Barrett further
emphasized that these officials viewed the 1267 Committee and
the Monitoring Team as a neutral interlocutor that could
facilitate U.S. and EU assistance to them under multilateral
cover. Many of these officials believe it is easier for
their governments to be seen cooperating with the UN than to
be accused of responding to the bilateral demands of the U.S.
or other western countries. Barrett also reported to the
Committee that these officials believe that public statements
from Western countries questioning the commitment of Arab and
Pakistani governments to fighting terrorism have a negative
impact on Muslim and Arab public opinion, and noted that
insults against Islam were seen to fuel radicalization.


8. (C) Barrett recalled that the government officials
stressed their concerns about the use of the Internet by
al-Qaida for propaganda, recruitment, training, and
bomb-making, and argued that the United States had a
particular responsibility to regulate the Internet. He said
that in regions where the Internet is not widely available,
satellite phones are considered a more immediate problem, and
noted that the officials had argued that satellite phone
providers should deny terrorists access to their services.

TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
Khalilzad