GUEHENNO ON DARFUR: UNAMID SO FAR IS REHATTED AMIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU
SUBJECT: GUEHENNO ON DARFUR: UNAMID SO FAR IS REHATTED AMIS

REF: STATE 2151

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY. UN U/SYG Guehenno presented a previously
scheduled briefing on Darfur to the Security Council on
January 9 and used the occasion to strongly criticize
Sudanese military forces for the ambush of a UNAMID convoy on
January 7 that left one driver seriously injured and damaged
several vehicles. Guehenno roundly criticized the Government
of Sudan (GOS) for lack of follow through after its December
13 agreement to hold talks to resolve all outstanding issues.
He told the Council that some Troop Contributing Countries
(TCC) were compounding Khartoum-originated deployment
problems by delaying reconnaissance visits to Darfur and
setting conditions (such as allowing daytime operations only)
that would disqualify their offers. He acknowledged the
January 1 formal AMIS-UNAMID transfer of authority but said
little had changed on the ground besides the color of the
berets worn by the troops. Guehenno also expressed concern
about escalating violence along the Sudan-Chad border as
Chadian forces pursued Chadian rebels into Darfur. Council
members uniformly condemned the January 7 attack but differed
in their willingness to attribute blame for it to the GOS.
Differences were resolved over the following days and a PRST
issued on January 11. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) United Nations Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno briefed the Security Council
on Darfur in open session on January 9. No other
participants spoke in the open session. Council members then
joined Guehenno in closed consultations.

Guehenno on January 7 Ambush of UNAMID Convoy: Inexcusable
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3. (C) U/SYG Guehenno summarized the events of January 7 as
follows: "A UNAMID supply convoy of more than 20 clearly
marked white vehicles moving at low speed came under fire
from Sudanese Armed Forces at approximately ten o'clock at
night as they moved from Um Baru to Tine in West Darfur. The
convoy, whose movements had been confirmed with the
Government and rebel forces in advance ... came under
sustained fire from light weapons and rocket propelled
grenades for 10-12 minutes.... After the attack the UNAMID
deputy force commander was telephoned by the Sudanese Armed
Forces area commander ...(who) confirmed that it was a
Sudanese Armed Forces unit which had fired upon the convoy."
Later, in the closed consultations, Guehenno added that
"forces can't open fire when they can't make an
identification; if we did that, we'd have constant
casualties." The UNAMID convoy did not return fire.

UNAMID Deployment: Frustration Continues
--------------


4. (C) Guehenno recounted the familiar list of unresolved
UNAMID issues -- including composition of the UNAMID
military force, negotiation of a status of forces agreement
(SOFA),24-hour operations, and land use in El Geneina. He
agreed with Government of Sudan (GOS) characterization of
these issues as technical, adding that "there is no good
reason that these issues should persist ad infinitum,
especially in light of the adverse impact they are having on
the deployment of the mission and implementation of its
mandate."


5. (C) Summing up his frustration, he said "five months after
the adoption of resolution 1769, we do not yet have
guarantees or agreements from the Government of Sudan on
basic technical issues." He said SYG Ban Ki-moon had spoken
recently with Sudanese President Bashir and the two had
agreed to meet at the forthcoming African Union Summit after
preparing the ground with relevant expert-level technical
discussions. On the composition of UNAMID, Guehenno said the
GOS "has verbally rejected the Nordic unit." On the SOFA
issue, he said Khartoum had agreed to begin negotiations on
January 12 and indicated that the UN would assign Assistant
SYG Hicine Medilli to the effort. (NOTE. In the closed
consultations, Guehenno explained that he is happy to call
outstanding deployment issues "technical" if that allows
Khartoum to more easily address them and he agreed that "each
issue is small and easy to resolve," but he concluded that
the entire package of problems has become a major political
stumbling block. END NOTE.)


6. (C) Guehenno criticized other partners in the UNAMID
deployment effort as well. He accused some TCC's of dragging
their feet on scheduling reconnaissance visits to Darfur and

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submission of load lists needed to contract air
transportation and said that others had set unacceptable
conditions on their participation (such as offering day
operations only or geographically limiting operations).
(NOTE. USUN/MSC subsequently learned that the TCC in question
is Egypt. END NOTE.) More generally, Guehenno said offers
had not been forthcoming for crucial transportation and
aviation assets, including "one heavy and one medium
transport unit, three military utility aviation units (18
helicopters),and one light tactical helicopter unit (six
helicopters)." He welcomed a UKUN offer to convoke a meeting
(now scheduled for January 16) focusing on the missing assets
and said DPKO continues to work with Ukraine about
transferring tactical helicopters from another mission and
with Russia about providing "airframes" for use by other
TCC's.


7. (C) Guehenno described the AMIS-UNAMID Transfer of
Authority (TOA) ceremony in El Fashir on December 31, 2007 at
which the GOS was represented by the governor of North
Darfur. He said even this modest show of UNAMID force was
marred by a GOS objection to the ceremonial re-hatting of
AMIS troops. He said UNAMID would continue to try to build
on the "modest momentum" created by the TOA but admitted that
"at the moment the mission is effectively a re-hatted AMIS,
with few additional troops or police having arrived."

Security Situation Deteriorating
--------------


8. (C) Guehenno described a worsening security situation in
Darfur due to clashes between Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) forces and Sudanese Armed Forces and to cross-border
operations by Chadian forces pursuing Chadian rebels into
Sudan. He was especially concerned that Sudanese forces had
arrested Major General Bashir, the JEM representative to the
ceasefire commission in El Fasher, on charges stemming from
an earlier attack on the police station in the town of
Seleia. Guehenno was also concerned about reports that
Chadian forces had evidently pursued Chadian rebels into
Darfur on several occasions and that the Chadian Air Force
had evidently bombed locations in Western Darfur where
Chadian rebels may have congregated.

Member State Comments
--------------


9. (SBU) Speaking first in the closed session, Ambassador
Khalilzad, per Ref A, strongly condemned the attack by the
Sudanese Armed Forces on the UNAMID convoy, introduced a
draft PRST to that effect, and more generally called on the
Government of Sudan to cooperate on the full range of
outstanding UNAMID deployment issues, including acceptance of
all UNAMID TCC's, clearance for 24/7 UNAMID operations, and
provision of land and landing rights.


10. (SBU) Belgium pointed to the prediction of paragraphs
47-48 of the SYG's report that UNAMID would be tested early
and urged the Council to impress on the African Union that,
as a full partner in UNAMID, its credibility was as much at
stake as that of the UN.


11. (SBU) Italy emphasized that the Heavy Support Package
(HSP) seems to have been forgotten and contended that HSP has
been as abject failure. Guehenno agreed and said HSP has
been subsumed into UNAMID. UK said the Council could
reasonably have differed four months ago as to whether
UNAMID's deployment deplays were technical but that their
persistence clearly showns that the problem is political.


12. (SBU) Burkina Faso, Croatia, and Costa Rica unambiguously
supported the U.S. PRST. Russia, China, Panama, Indonesia,
and Italy declined to accept DPKO's account of the January 7
incident as definitive. Differences were ultimately resolved
in two expert meetings and a PermRep-level consultation. The
PRST was adopted on January 11.
KHALILZAD