NEW YORK STILL IN DISARRAY ON KOSOVO END GAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: UNMIK UNSC
SUBJECT: NEW YORK STILL IN DISARRAY ON KOSOVO END GAME

REF: USUN 225

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY. In the aftermath of the February 19 and
March 17 violence in Kosovo, UN component parts (DPKO, UNMIK,
OLA) have been warily eyeing one another and approaching the
UN-EU transition with different perspectives. Quint missions
collectively have had little strategic guidance to offer,
instead holding to an increasingly irrational hope that the
embattled UN will itself produce a revised transition plan
despite changing assumptions about the scope and timing of
the UN's continued presence in Kosovo. Individual Quint
missions seem to be arguing at cross-purposes to one another
-- and in some cases even to their capitals -- in their
bilateral meetings with the UN. Against this backdrop,
coordinated Russian and Serbian pressure on the Secretariat
remains unabated. USUN recommends that the USG guide Quint
thinking towards a common policy that recognizes and takes
all possible advantage of UN inability to expressly endorse a
UN-EU transition by: (1) ensuring that ICO/EULEX continues to
assume Ahtisaari responsibilities south of the Ibar; (2)
deciding how far UNMIK should go to reconstruct and even
expand its presence north of the Ibar; (3) reassuring DPKO
that UNMIK need not react to the forthcoming Kosovo
Constitution; and (4) pushing DPKO to continue drawing down
UNMIK's presence wherever possible. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) has been shell-shocked since the February
19 riots at Kosovo-Serbia border crossings and March 17
violence in north Mitrovica. Our DPKO contacts expect
(correctly) no guidance from the Security Council and tell us
frankly that they don't have a coherent policy of their own
beyond a very general desire to fade from the Kosovo scene
when possible. Content to allow the EU to assume Ahtisaari
responsibilities as long as that could be achieved through
quiet cooperation in Pristina, they admit to not knowing what
to do in response to emerging obstacles to the rollout of
EULEX in the north beyond reciting their "status neutral"
nostrum.


3. (C) The original UNMIK-EU transition plan, of which DPKO
regularly used to speak with approval in private, called for
the Secretary-General to pronounce Kosovo's declaration of
independence and subsequent recognitions of statehood a
"changed circumstance" sufficient to require a greatly
heightened EU role in Kosovo. Now our contacts hedge. The
SYG having quietly blessed UNMIK cooperation with the new
International Civil Office (ICO),DPKO is content to continue
that cooperation in areas where UN-EU transition is not being
seriously questioned, i.e., in the ethnic Albanian areas that
make up most of Kosovo. For the Serb-dominant areas,
especially in the north, DPKO is less certain that the EU
rollout would be responsive to circumstances brought about by
UDI and recognitions. Hence DPKO is not inclined to push Ban
to declare the "changed circumstances" trigger the EU had
expected for full ICO/EULEX rollout.


4. (C) Beyond the practical problems (procurement of vehicles
and office space) lack of formal UNMIK-EU transition may
bring, DPKO believes that ICO/EULEX is not able to deploy
fully in the north anyway. Rather, DPKO understands that
UNMIK must remain in place as a practical hedge against
partition in the north or confrontation between ethnic Serbs
in the north and ethnic Albanians in the south. Aware also
that UNMIK's presence in the north has always depended on a
delicate balance of force and quiet cooperation with Belgrade
institutions, primarily Customs and Police, DPKO is
attempting to re-establish an UNMIK presence that takes
account of post-UDI realities.


5. (C) Individual Quint missions in New York -- notably the
French and Italians -- have conveyed softer lines on the need
for firm UNMIK/KFOR presences than other Quint members (and
possibly softer than their own capitals). It is not clear to
us that DPKO would welcome a clear Quint articulation of a
UN-EU transition plan for Kosovo even if the Quint could
offer one. It is clear to us, however, that the UN is so
mired in DPKO-UNMIK recriminations stemming from the events
of February 19 and March 17 that we should not expect the UN
to itself develop a transition plan. If there is to be a
revised transition plan, therefore, the Quint must produce it
and we must sell it politically to Secretary-General Ban.


6. (C) USUN suggests that Quint engagement with DPKO feature
a Quint-approved action plan. Elements we believe need to be
incorporated include: (1) continuation with heightened
urgency of ICO/EULEX cooperation on practical points of
transition to include procurement of vehicles and building
space; (2) continuation of the re-establishment of UNMIK's
presence north of the Ibar with UNMIK discretion to engage

USUN NEW Y 00000308 002 OF 002


Belgrade and of course KFOR as necessary; (3) recognition
that the UN need not react to the forthcoming Kosovo
Constitution; and (4) insistence that DPKO continue to
quietly draw down UNMIK's presence as quickly as possible in
those parts of Kosovo where ICO/EULEX is able to deploy.


7. (C) To buttress our arguments we need also to produce a
clear strategic Quint vision for both the timing and nature
of the UN's decreasing role and presence and the manner in
which that role and presence are shifted to Kosovars where
possible and the EU or ICO where still necessary.
Wolff