UNAMID: PRESSURE BUILDING AT UN FOR KARAKE DECISION

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000297

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR RW
SUBJECT: UNAMID: PRESSURE BUILDING AT UN FOR KARAKE DECISION

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for Reasons 1.4 B/D.


1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations senior leadership reportedly
believes they must decide soon whether to remove Rwandan
General Karake as UNAMID deputy force commander in the
aftermath of his indictment by a Spanish court and the
issuance of a related Interpol notice. Our contacts with the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),the UN
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA),and the Secretary General's
office make clear that the UN understands the potential risks
to Rwanda's presence in UNAMID and the need to deal with
Rwanda cautiously before making any decisions. USUN has
informed UN contacts that Ban should not presume USG
willingness to carry difficult UN messages to Kigali but
should allow Kigali to save face in the event Ban decides to
dismiss Karake. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In several conversations with the office of UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, DPKO, and OLA over the past

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three days, USUN has learned that Ban had sent back to DPKO
and OLA the question of whether to retain General Karenzi
Karake as UNAMID deputy force commander. DPKO's Michael
Gaouette (integrated team leader for Darfur, Protect) told
DepPolCouns on March 28 that Ban had complained to DPKO and
OLA that they had not adequately teed up the Karake case for
his decision in the aftermath of a Spanish indictment and
arrest warrant against him for alleged war crimes in Rwanda
and instructed them to perform further due diligence.
Gaouette said A/SYG for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet,
accordingly, would be reaching out to the Spanish Mission to
the UN to guage the seriousness with which the Spanish intend
to prosecute the case against Karake. Gaouette added his
personal view that the Spanish Mission's failure to
pro-actively press the case at the UN was an indication that
the Government of Spain was distancing itself from the judge
involved. Gaouette also complained that OLA's advice to Ban
was less legal opinion on the reach of the Spanish indictment
and warrant than it was an invitation to political
expediency. Gaouette closed by appealing for USG assistance
in breaking any bad UN news about Karake to the Government of
Rwanda ("We'd like Luca Brasi to show up a half hour before
us.")


3. (C) Gaouette reported to DepPolCouns on March 31 that the
Spanish Deputy PermRep had indicated to DPKO that the judge
who had issued the indictments was personally motivated by
the unsolved killings of Spanish NGO workers in the 1990's.
Gaouette said the Spanish DPR had made a point of saying that
the Spanish Government is a separate entity from the Spanish
court. Finally, Gaouette said DPKO's preliminary analysis of
the indictment was that it contained no allegations that had
not been fully vetted when Karake was made UNAMID deputy
force commander several months ago. Having consulted with
the Department, DepPolCouns informed Gaouette that the USG
was not volunteering to carry bad UN news on Karake to
Kigali, that the UN should not assume USG willingness to do
so as it decided what to do, and that the UN should carefully
consider how to soften the blow in Kigali (by masking
Karake's exit as a normal rotation, for example) should Ban's
decision go against Karake.


4. (C) Nevertheless, A/SYG Mulet told Ambassador Wolff on
April 2 that Spain was obliged to respect the indictment and
arrest warrant but would not take a position on the matter
with respect to the UN. U/SYG for Legal Affairs Nicolas
Michel told Ambassador Wolff that the Spanish indictment and
warrant put the UN in a very difficult position and that
building pressure on Ban meant that doing nothing would not
remain a viable option. A/SYG Kim Won-Soo, Ban's deputy
chief of cabinet, confirmed to Ambassador Wolff on April 2
that Ban was coming under increasing pressure to act on the
Karake matter. He acknowledged the need to protect UNAMID
equities and to deal with Kigali with sensitivity. He did
not indicate any need for the U.S. to get involved, noting
that the UN would need to find a creative solution with
Kigali.


5. (C) COMMENT. It is clear the UN believes the Karake issue
has the potential to "blow up in its face" (Kim's term).
We've made clear our concern is connected with UNAMID and the
need to find a way to deal with this issue that avoids
jeopardizing Rwanda's deployment. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD