P-3 AMBASSADORS DISCUSS SUDAN, KOSOVO, BURMA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000271 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNMIK KV YI BM SU SUBJECT: P-3 AMBASSADORS DISCUSS SUDAN, KOSOVO, BURMA AND TIBET REF: USUN 244 USUN NEW Y 00000271 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. P-3 PermReps met on March 20 to discuss Sudan, Kosovo, Burma, and Tibet. On Sudan, the three agreed that specific benchmarks are essential to UNAMID deployment progress and tasked mission experts with drafting them. On Kosovo, AMB Khalilzad suggested a P-3 strategy review. The French PermRep said the highest priority for Paris is assisting Serbian President Tadic's slate win the May parliamentary elections, adding that events in northern Kosovo could not be allowed to undermine Tadic's prospects. Regarding Burma, AMB Khalilzad pushed for a Presidential Statement (PRST) drawn from the October 11 PRST that would focus on the upcoming referendum. P-3 ambassadors agreed to engage China and Indonesia before presenting the PRST to the broader Council. On Tibet, the ambassadors agreed that it was important to let the Chinese know the P-3 is showing restraint. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) UKUN PermRep John Sawers hosted French PermRep Jean-Maurice Ripert and Ambassador Khalilzad and respective poloffs in a March 20 discussion of Sudan, Kosovo, Burma, and Tibet. SUDAN ¶3. (C) Sawers suggested that the P-3 should start working on a timeline with specific benchmarks that could be used to hold the UN, the Government of Sudan and troop contributing countries to their deployment commitments. He argued that specific dates should be set for deployment of Egyptian and Ethiopian units in particular and recommended that the concept be used to address the political track as well, with a timeline and benchmarks for implementation of a variety of issues, including the cessation of hostilities. AMB Khalilzad proposed that there should be a six-month time frame for the different steps that need to happen, including deployment, and cautioned that the objectives must be realistic. He gained agreement for tasking P-3 experts to meet within the next week for follow up discussions on workable benchmarks. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said the U.S. has received reports that SYG Ban is concerned about the Egyptians, specifically whether they will cooperate and whether they will accept the UNAMID chain of command. Sawers responded that this was a disturbing development, adding that DPKO is upset that the SYG agreed to include an additional Egyptian battalion as a concession to Bashir at the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Dakar (reftel). KOSOVO ¶5. (C) Sawers raised the issue of the recent letter from Serbian FM Jeremic to the Security Council calling for an investigation into the March 17 violence in Kosovo. Sawers remarked that it was not likely that Russian PR Churkin, as current President of the Council, would take any initiative to respond. AMB Khalilzad suggested that it is essential to review P-3 strategy and to recalibrate based on the expected role of the UN over the next months. Ripert said the highest priority for France is assisting Tadic win the May elections on a pro-European platform. He said Paris believes it important that the situation in northern Kosovo not affect that outcome and urged "utmost caution" in reacting to events in the north. Ripert also said France was disappointed with the way UNMIK, NATO, and KFOR had handled the situation on March 17, pointing out that there were "many French soldiers in hospitals in Paris." He complained that if "you want to blame the French, no problem," and insisted that the P-3 should be consulted before there is action on any politically sensitive operation. Sawers commented that he was "a bit surprised about the scale of violence" but reasoned that it was the result of an unwillingness to react swiftly to the situation and "nip it in the bud." AMB Khalilzad also cautioned against a policy of appeasement, which he said would further escalate the situation. Ripert raised Ban's fragile position on Kosovo, remarking that the P-3 should not take initiatives that would put Ban in a more difficult position. AMB Khalilzad agreed and pressed for P-3 unity on the issue. BURMA USUN NEW Y 00000271 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) AMB Khalilzad said a new Presidential Statement (PRST) text following Gambari's latest report to the Council should draw heavily from the Council's October 11 PRST and focus on upcoming milestones in the country, specifically the referendum. He rebuffed a French proposal to engage China, Russia, Indonesia and Vietnam on the draft text, remarking that engagement with China and Indonesia would be sufficient. Sawers proposed that the UK recast the PRST for P-3 discussion the week of March 24 on the text and tactics before presenting the PRST in the Security Council. Ripert pressed for timely circulation of the PRST in the Council, noting that other Council members may read the passage of too much time as a "defeat." Ripert also reported that in a private conversation, Singapore PR Menon encouraged him to pursue bilateral, individually targeted sanctions against the Burmese authorities. According to Ripert, Menon claimed that any other action would not be effective. TIBET ¶7. (C) In a side conversation, Sawers commented that the P-3 had let China "off easy" on Tibet. He added, however, that the Dalai Lama had distanced himself from the violent protests, which he said seemed targeted at Chinese civilians. AMB Khalilzad remarked, and all agreed, that it was important to let the Chinese know that the P-3 were showing restraint. Ripert commented that France may boycott the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. Sawers replied that the UK would not join any such boycott. KHALILZAD