Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK255
2008-03-20 10:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

USUN CONCERNED WITH UN ACTIONS IN ALGIERS PRIOR TO

Tags:  AORC KUNR UNGA 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0255/01 0801041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201041Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3951
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000255 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA
SUBJECT: USUN CONCERNED WITH UN ACTIONS IN ALGIERS PRIOR TO
AND FOLLOWING DECEMBER 11, 2007 ATTACK ON UN
PREMISES/BRAHIMI PANEL WILL NOT ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR UN'S OPERATIONAL SECURITY FAILURES
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000255

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA
SUBJECT: USUN CONCERNED WITH UN ACTIONS IN ALGIERS PRIOR TO
AND FOLLOWING DECEMBER 11, 2007 ATTACK ON UN
PREMISES/BRAHIMI PANEL WILL NOT ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR UN'S OPERATIONAL SECURITY FAILURES

1.(U) USUN has had informal discussions with UN staff,
including Diana Russler (pls protect),from the Department of
Safety and Security (DSS) regarding the circumstances
surrounding the December 11, 2007 bombing of the UN field
office in Algiers that killed seventeen (17) people. These
conversations have also addressed the "Independent Panel on
Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises," (Brahimi
Inquiry) led by Lakdar Brahimi, which was established by the
Secretary-General (SYG) in response to the bombing. Russler

SIPDIS
expressed her concern that the Terms of Reference (ToR) for
the Brahimi Inquiry does not include a mandate to establish
accountability for possible security failures relating to the
bombing. The United Nations Staff Union has expressed the
same concern in a letter to the SYG dated February 22, 2008.
See para 10 for text of letter from the UN Staff Union to the
SYG.

2.(U) Russler stated that she had expressed concerns with the
actions of the UN and UNDP regarding security at the UN field
office in Algiers both prior to and following the bombing.
Russler stated that prior to the bombing, the UNDP Resident
Coordinator (RC),Mr. Marc de Bernis, ignored threat
assessments and reports warning of a possible attack from a
DSS security officer in Algiers, Mr. Babacr Ndiaye (who was
killed in the bombing). Russler also stated that the U/SYG
for DSS, Mr. David Vaness, coordinated with UNDP to draft a
confidential preliminary report for submission to the SYG.

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She said that this confidential report omits analysis from
the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and
others within DSS, and also sought to deflect accountability
for the security failures in Algiers from DSS, UNDP and the
Algerian Government. Russler told USUN that U/SYG Vaness
stated that he will resign if he and/or DSS is blamed for the
Algiers bombing. This confidential report, which was
apparently leaked to the Washington Times, states that the UN
did in fact receive advance warnings of an impending attack
from Mr. Ndiaye. See para 6.

3.(U) UN RECEIVED WARNINGS OF ATTACK ON UN PREMISES IN
ALGIERS. Russler stated that the DSS security officer in
Algiers, Mr. Babacr Ndiaye of Senegal, issued several threat
assessments and other reports to the UNDP RC, Mr. Marc De
Bernis, in which he warned of the high probability of an
attack on the UN premises in Algiers. Russler stated that
reports issued by Mr. Ndiaye included specific
recommendations to raise the threat level from Phase One (the

lowest threat level) and to install retractable
metal-barricades to protect against car bombings. Notably,
both the SYG and the UNDP Administrator have stated in the
media that no one in the Organization received any advance
warnings from "whatsoever sources on this issue."

4.(U) Russler stated that DSS retrieved Ndiaye's laptop and
safe contents from the attack site. Included in these
materials are copies of the threat assessments and other
reports that Ndiaye sent to the UNDP RC in Algiers and to DSS
at UN Headquarters in New York. Russler stated that she will
only share copies of these materials with the Panel
established by the SYG.

5.(U) U/SYG VANESS'S CONFIDENTIAL REPORT TO THE SYG: Russler
stated that after the attack, she was tasked with drafting an
initial confidential report for submission to the SYG.
Russler stated that her draft report sought to establish
preliminary accountability for the operational security
failures in Algiers. Russler stated that U/SYG Vaness, in
coordination with UNDP, subsequently "gutted" the report of
much of its substantive analysis and removed sections which
sought to establish initial accountability within DSS and
UNDP. Russler stated that when U/SYG Vaness submitted his
revised report for clearance to the Inter-Agency Security
Management Network (IASMN),the IASMN refused to clear on the
draft because it was "a piece of crap." Russler stated that
U/SYG Vaness disregarded the edits and recommendations
submitted by IASMN and submitted the report as revised by him
and UNDP directly to the SYG without IASMN clearance.

6.(U) A copy of this confidential preliminary report has
apparently been shared with the Washington Times. In an
article dated March 14, 2008, the Washington Times reports
that the preliminary report states that "The hostile intent
against the UN in Algeria was present and well-known before
the attack" and that "six months before the attack, 'the
media branch for (Al Queda in the Maghreb) issued a direct
threat against the U.N." Furthermore, the Washington Times
article states that the preliminary report states that "care
has been taken not to apportion blame or responsibility."

7.(U) SYG ESTABLISHES PANEL TO BE LED BY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI. The
"Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and
Premises" was established by the SYG to review security




arrangements around the world. The Panel is led by Lakhdar
Brahimi and consists of the following five (5) members:
Elsayed Ibrahime Elsayid Mohamed Elhabbal (Egypt); Anil Kumar
Gupta (India); Unit Pamir (Turkey); Thomas Boy Sinabde (South
Africa); Margareta Wahlstrom (Sweden). The Brahimi Inquiry
began its work on March 1, 2008. Russler stated that the ToR
for the Brahimi Inquiry were ostensibly drafted by the
Algerian government and expressed her concern that the ToR
for the Brahimi Inquiry do not include an element of
accountability for the Algiers bombing. The Brahimi Inquiry
will not examine the facts of the UN security situation in
Algiers prior to the bombing with a view to establishing
accountability among DSS, UNDP, and/or the Host Country.
Instead, the Brahimi Inquiry will conduct a global
examination of security threats to the UN more generally.

8.(U) The UN Staff Union has echoed the concern expressed by
Russler. In a letter from the Head of the Staff Union, Mr.
Stephen Kisambira, to the SYG dated February 22, 2008, the
Staff Union "express its alarm and disappointment that you
appear to have no interest in seeking a determination of
accountability or the 11 December 2007 terrorist attack on
the United Nations premises in Algiers." (See para 10 for
full text of letter from Staff Union to SYG).

9.(U) In the aftermath of the Canal bombing in 2003, SYG
Annan established the "Independent Panel on the Safety and
Security of UN Personnel in Iraq". Per the recommendation of
this Panel, SYG Annan subsequently established the "Security
in Iraq Accountability Panel" (SIAP) to undertake an
independent audit and accountability procedure to review the
responsibilities of key individuals in the lack of preventive
and mitigating actions prior to the attack on the UN
Headquarters building in Baghdad. SIAP specifically sought to
"identify individuals in HQ and in the field who were
responsible for the managing and monitoring of security of UN
personnel and property in Baghdad and make findings whether
they should be held accountable by the Secretary-General."
The report of SIAP was widely regarded as responsible,
unbiased and transparent. The findings of the first Panel
established by SYG Annan led to the overhaul of the UN's
security apparatus and the establishment of DSS. The Algiers
bombing was the most deadly attack directed against the UN
since the establishment of DSS. The bombing revealed
significant shortcomings in the UN's operational security
framework. Based on the testimony from individuals within DSS
and reports in the media concerning security failures in
Algiers, the ToR for the Algiers Panel does not contain an
accountability mechanism similar to what was established by
SIAP so that security lapses in security can be addressed and
responsible individuals can be held accountable.

10.(U) Text of letter from Mr. Stephen Kisambira, President,
United Nations Staff Union to Secretary-General Ban, February
22, 2008. Begin letter text:

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

The United Nations Staff Union wishes to express its alarm
and disappointment that you appear to have no interest in
seeking a determination of accountability or the 11 December
2007 terrorist attack on the United Nations premises in
Algiers. During a press conference on 7 January 2008, you
were asked whether you thought it was "imperative for the
credibility of the United Nations that there will be an
independent investigation that is not being done by the
person who was in charge of security to see whether security
procedures w ere actually followed." Your response was, "I
will see; I will reserve my judgment until I have a full
report from DSS."

Following the receipt of the "full report from DSS," which
specifically did not seek to establish accountability, on 14
January 2008 you were quoted in the media as saying "We are
now going to try to find out more facts, and it's not only
limited to the Algiers case" and that "We'd like to engage
other member states, and other international experts on this
issue, and try to find out ...what we can do more to
strengthen our measures against all these possible attacks
against the United Nations."

We fully agree that it is imperative to "find out more facts"
and to "do more to strengthen run measures against all these
possible attacks." We would expect the involvement of the
staff in such measures. On 5 February 2008, however you
appointed chairperson to lead a panel to review United
Nations security worldwide in response to the attack in
Algiers, without the involvement of staff. We find it
disturbing that on such an important matter no consultations
with the staff were made prior to the announcement. There are
many questions regarding the appointment of the panel and the




definition of its terms of reference that must be answered
before staff can find it acceptable. The panel, as presently
announced, raises issues regarding lack of accountability and
possible conflicts of interest.

We implore you to direct that the team led by Mr. Brahimi
also examines, under its terms of reference, lapses in the UN
security system which may have led to an increase in the loss
of life in Algiers on 11 December 2007, compared to the loss
of UN staff at the Canal Hotel attack in 2003.

Following the Canal Hotel attack your predecessor
commissioned the "Report of the Independent Panel on the
Safety and Security of the UN Personnel in Iraq" to, inter
alia, "examine the adequacy of UN security policy, management
and practices in Iraq prior to the attack." This report
recommended that "In the case of Iraq, the Panel believes
that the seriousness of the breaches in the security system
by the UN managers in charge at Headquarters and in the field
warrants the setting up of a separate and independent audit
and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities
of key individuals in the lack of preventive and mitigating
actions prior to the attack on 19 August."

Your predecessor acted on this recommendation, and created
the Waltzer Panel which in fact found that several UN
officials were responsible for their lack of preventative and
mitigation actions. We respectfully request that you direct
the Brahimi Panel to have the same responsibility that was
given to the Waltzer Panel. Unfortunately the impression
created by your public statements and those by your
Spokespersons is that the Brahimi Panel will not examine the
facts of the United Nations security system prior to the
Algiers bombing, but rather will be a global examination of
security threats. While there is merit in such an
examination, it must not be allowed to overshadow the
imperative question of accountability or Algiers.

On 10 January 2008, you stated to representatives of Member
States that you "will work to deliver results; to create a
stronger UN through full accountability of all parties." By
avoiding the question of accountability for security failures
in Algiers, you are not following your own words, and you are
not leading by example. On 4 February 2008, you stated that
your "overall goal is to develop an accountability framework
that outlines clear roles, responsibilities and authorities
for all levels and stakeholders of the Organization."

We believe that without accountability there is impunity. We
ask that you not be complicit in a cover-up of what happened
prior to the 11 December attack. The staff is sick and tired
of the impunity extended by the office of the
Secretary-General to senior managers for their failings

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especially in situations where it has led to death and
disability. We request for an immediate and public
clarification of your intentions.

Please accept, sir, the assurances of our highest
consideration. End letter text.
KHALILZAD

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