TIME TO EUTHANIZE UNMEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000211 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018 TAGS: ER ET KPAL MOPS PREL UNSC SUBJECT: TIME TO EUTHANIZE UNMEE REF: STATE 21218 Classified By: Ambassador Alex Wolff for Reasons 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations Undersecretaries Pascoe and Guehenno separately told Ambassador Wolff on March 4 that UNMEE will complete the relocation home of most personnel by mid-March, leaving in place a residual force to watch over the mission's heavy equipment until it can be redeployed. Ambassador Wolff pressed reftel points regarding a residual UN presence to observe military movements and implement confidence building measures. Neither Pascoe nor Guehenno was sanguine, although Pascoe said he remains willing to engage the parties and to make use of any level of UN presence they will support. Both undersecretaries were highly critical of Eritrea's tactics of noncooperation. Pascoe was even more critical of the Security Council for declining to terminate UNMEE as Eritrea began to turn the screws on the mission and for declining for several years to support Eritrea's position on the border. Guehenno focused on the repercussions of UNMEE's unseemly exit for peacekeeping operations generally and expressed interest "as soon as we are out" in holding Eritrea to account for its disrespect of the UN. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In separate March 4 meetings, Ambassador Wolff and DepPolCouns presented reftel demarche to UN U/SYG for Political Affairs (DPA) Lynn Pascoe and U/SYG for Peacekeeping (DPKO) Jean-Marie Guehenno. Pascoe was joined by political officer Roselyn Akombe. Guehenno was joined by DPKO A/SYG Edmond Mulet and senior advisor Andrei Shkourko. Pascoe: Still Willing -- But We Have No Brilliant Ideas -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) U/SYG Pascoe had to be prodded into discussing next steps, preferring to talk about how we got into the situation we are in and to argue that sanctions would only exacerbate matters. He was critical of Eritrea for its tactical decision to force UNMEE out rather than simply "kicking us out, as it had a perfect right to do." He said Eritrea had "treated UNMEE badly, no question this is a black eye for UN peacekeeping, and the UN can make a big blast over being angry at Eritrea for making it pick up its marbles and go home over the fuel issue." He recognized that "Eritrea managed to change the high ground into the low ground" in prosecuting its dispute with Ethiopia. ¶4. (C) Even as Pascoe finds understandable a desire to hold Eritrea accountable for its recent actions, he is also frustrated with the Security Council. To Ambassador Wolff's question about a residual UN presence, Pascoe complained about the Council's handling of this PKO: "We are grumpy because for years the Council has been no help to UNMEE. The Council kept passing even-handed resolutions saying both sides should do something, but offering no real direction. Eritrea has been right on the border question all along, and the Council was never willing to help them. So the Council can harrumph about Eritrea and its mistreatment of UNMEE, but the Council isn't going to do anything about Ethiopia." Not looking for a nuanced discussion of demarcation law, Pascoe said the Algiers agreement and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission process were "historic diplomatic achievements" that had never fulfilled their promise. He believes the Security Council bears a large measure of responsibility for that failure. ¶5. (C) Pascoe blames both the Secretariat and the Council for failing to act in response to Eritrea's misbehavior. He said "none of us reacted quickly enough when Eritrea started turning the screws in December. We should have just said 'let's get out with dignity.' But we were concerned with repercussions for Kosovo and so didn't act." He reminded us that the Secretariat had wanted a one-month UNMEE renewal with a strong warning to Eritrea, but the Council gave us six months when we knew we had fuel for two weeks. We knew we were in trouble -- there was nothing we could do but lose." ¶6. (C) Returning to Ambassador Wolff's question about a residual presence, Pascoe said "there is no point in a residual force, not even observers. UNMEE hasn't been useful since we let them (i.e., Eritrea) box us in." Ending on a relatively optimistic note, Pascoe said, "if we get over this stage, I would be happy to re-engage, maybe through a political office if the parties allow, but we have no brilliant ideas either." He would offer no prediction of what UN presence Asmara would tolerate. USUN NEW Y 00000211 002 OF 002 Citing "Trend of Disrespect for UN," Guehenno Would Close UNMEE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) In contrast to Pascoe's blast at the Security Council, Guehenno put the blame for UNMEE's predicament squarely on Eritrea. He called Asmara's behavior "totally outrageous" and warranting consideration of targeted measures "as soon as we get out." Regarding a residual presence, he said military observers would remain in Ethiopia until the Council decided what to do with UNMEE and a force would remain in Eritrea as well for at least three months to watch over the redeployment of UNMEE's heavy equipment. To Ambassador Wolff's question about a possible observer force in Ethiopia only, Guehenno said "having observers on one side works in Lebanon because it benefits a neighboring state (i.e., Israel) but observers in Ethiopia will not benefit Eritrea." He concluded that "DPKO's preferred option is to close UNMEE." ¶8. (C) Guehenno sees the UNMEE debacle as evidence of a trend -- now including Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Eritrea -- that has host countries showing disrespect for the United Nations by presuming to reject special representatives, choosing among troop contributors, and now evicting a mission that was invited in in the first place. He said these missions come into a country to help and, "if they do not want our help, we should get out." He said "it reverses logic to invite us in and then use us to send a message to the Security Council." He said the Secretary-General is growing very concerned and will want to discuss this at this weekend's retreat, especially because "all the troublemakers are watching." COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Although the SYG's special report of March 3 holds out some hope (paragraph 34) that UNMEE can be saved if Eritrea suddenly resumes fuel shipments, USUN believes UNMEE should be terminated as lacking any coherent reason to be continued. As a practical matter, there will be a residual UNMEE presence in the region for three months as the mission redeploys its heavy equipment and otherwise wraps up its affairs. During that time, Asmara and Addis Ababa can make their feelings known about any appropriate follow-on UN presence so there is no void between missions. USUN will use the forthcoming Council consultations to sound out members on next steps. We sense so far much anger on the Council at Eritrea but little belief sanctions would have a role unless Eritrea first takes the further misstep of appropriating UN or TCC equipment. Still, we sense some inclination for a show or act of displeasure toward Eritrea out of principle. We also sense that a political mission would be a relatively easy sell in the Council, however hard it might go down with the Secretariat. KHALILZAD